One of the most interesting attempts in recent times to revive a theory of the virtues has been carried out by Alasdair MacIntyre in his provocative work, *After Virtue*. In this work MacIntyre offers an extremely persuasive critique of the state of contemporary moral philosophy and an impassioned argument in favor of the return to a more classical approach to ethics with an emphasis on the virtues.

MacIntyre begins his account by describing human life as a “narrative quest.” This quest, he maintains, represents a search for self-fulfillment—that is, for our own good as human beings—and it is the virtues that support us in this quest. Our understanding of the virtues, however, is not shaped by ourselves but by the particular tradition to which we belong. Thus MacIntyre points out that in Homeric culture, in which the paradigm of excellence was the warrior, the virtue of courage would be paramount, while in Aristotle’s own time the paradigm was the Athenian gentleman, and, therefore, the virtue prudence would take priority. He goes on to demonstrate that the specific virtues that were considered important in first century Christian circles, in Jane Austen’s England, and Benjamin Franklin’s America likewise prove to be fairly distinct from one another. Each tradition, according to MacIntyre, will have its own catalogue of the virtues and these catalogues will often be in conflict with one another:

Homer, Sophocles, Aristotle, the New Testament and medieval thinkers differ from each other in too many ways. They offer us different and incompatible lists of the virtues; they give a different rank order of importance to different virtues; and they have different and incompatible theories of the virtues. If we were to consider later Western writers on the virtues, the list of divergences and incompatibilities would be enlarged still further; and if we extended our inquiry to Japanese, say, or American Indian cultures, the difference would become greater still. It would be all too easy to conclude that there were a number of rival and alternative conceptions of the virtues, but, even within the traditions which I have been delineating, no single core conception.

MacIntyre’s conclusion is that there are no universal set of virtues that can be applied to all people at all times. Each culture or tradition’s set of virtues will be unique to that tradition, and fully understandable only from within that particular tradition.

This understanding of the nature of the virtues has also been taken up by Christian theologian Stanley Hauerwas. In his work, *A Community of Character*, Hauerwas argues that all moral traditions are context bound. They are intelligible, he says, only within the framework of a particular community that has been shaped by foundational narratives and continues to display them. Thus the Enlightenment project of trying to develop a universal morality, Hauerwas says, was doomed to fail precisely because it did not recognize that all morality must be relative to a particular community and its tradition.
No ethic can be freed from its narrative, and thus communal, context. To the extent that practical reason seeks to avoid its inherent historical character, it relinquished any power to enable us to order our lives in accordance with our true ends. We thus become alienated from ourselves, we lose the ability to locate the history of which we are a part.  

Hauerwas’ belief that all morality is essentially context-bound applies to Christian ethics as well. Christian morality, he argues, must always proceed within the particular frame of reference set by the Christian story. Its basic “truthfulness” has nothing to do with conveying some common morality that underlies the differences between people, but rather can be evaluated only in terms of the way of life it fosters.  

The analysis of the virtues developed by both MacIntyre and Hauerwas points to a significant problem that must be addressed before we can continue any further. Both authors suggest that any attempt to develop an ethics of virtue would necessitate an acceptance of cultural relativism, and that the terms “virtue” and “universal” must be understood to be mutually incompatible. This sort of tradition- or context-bound account of the virtues has consequently been criticized by those who are looking for a more universal ethic that can transcend cultural boundaries. Martha Nussbaum, summing up these objections, writes,  

For this reason it is easy for those who are interested in supporting the rational criticisms of local traditions and in articulating an idea of ethical progress to feel that the ethics of virtue can give them little help. If the position of women, as established by local traditions in many parts of the world, is to be improved, if the traditions of slave holding and racial inequality, if religious intolerance, if aggressive and warlike conceptions of manliness, if unequal norms of material distribution are to be criticized in the name of practice reason, this criticizing (one might easily suppose) will have to be done from a Kantian or Utilitarian viewpoint, not through an Aristotelian approach.  

James Gustafson goes even further when he accuses Hauerwas—and by implication Macintyre—of adopting an anti-rational and sectarian approach to ethics that ultimately forfeits any relevance beyond the particular tradition of the moral theorist. In an effort to respond to some of these objections, attempts have been made in recent times to demonstrate the universality of certain virtues. Jean Porter, for example, argues that there are certain virtues, such as practical wisdom, courage and temperance, that are “perennial” and which would be recognized as virtues in every culture. “They are perennials,” she writes, “because they are integrally related to the human capacity to sustain a course of action, based on overarching principles, ideas, plans or goals.” Similarly, Martha Nussbaum attempts to refute the claim that Aristotelian virtues are essentially relativistic. She argues rather that Aristotle presents a single objective account of the human good, which is derived, not from a local tradition, but from something shared in common by all human beings. That which we all share in common are “spheres of experience” that are perfected by virtue. She selects eleven spheres from Aristotle and says that each of these spheres is essential for human living. Nussbaum thus argues that Aristotle’s account of the virtues actually transcends cultural boundaries.  

But is it in fact true that specific virtues, such as courage, generosity or temperance, which seem to valued in all cultures, have the same meaning in each of these cultures? For example, Porter maintains that courage is a perennial virtue, but the understanding of what courage is would dramatically differ depending on the particular tradition we were discussing. Thus Aristotle’s understanding of courage related only to the experience of facing immanent death, most notably in battle. For an early Christian courage specifically had to do with maintaining one’s religious convictions in the face of persecution. And in contemporary American society where the threat of death in battle or persecution is minimal, it might have more to do with maintaining one’s convictions in the face of cultural pressures. Similarly, although Porter claims that temperance is a perennial virtue, what it means to be temperate in relation to
bodily pleasures would also vary dramatically. For Aristotle being temperate would mean that one is able to appreciate and enjoy in a moderate way all the pleasures of the body; for an early Christian it might mean abstaining completely from some pleasures (alcohol and sex for example) and radically restricting others (sleep or food); and for a contemporary American it might mean little more than not being completely addicted to these pleasures—if that.

The same criticism applies to Nussbaum’s attempt to demonstrate that Aristotle’s virtues are universal because they relate to certain common spheres of experience. Even if we agreed that human beings do in fact share common spheres of experience, what it means to act well within these spheres—in other words, what virtuous behavior is—would still seem to vary dramatically from culture to culture. Subsequently when Nussbaum argues “that everyone makes some choices and acts somehow or other in these spheres,” the matter of dispute lies precisely in the “somehow.”

If MacIntyre and Hauerwas are indeed correct in maintaining that the virtues are relative to particular traditions, this would seem to prevent us from using Aristotelian virtue ethics as a means of responding to subjectivism. Once we begin to argue that our conceptions of what virtuous behavior is or is not are culturally relative, it is only a short leap to arguing that they are in fact individually relative. As one author points out, there are potentially as many different conceptions of virtue as there are people on the planet. In a liberal society, where there might not necessarily be one overriding narrative that binds a community together, why should we not say that the individual can only determine for themselves what is virtuous in a given situation? But then we are back where we started with no objective means of stating what good or bad behavior actually is.

The problem with MacIntyre’s and Hauerwas’ approaches to virtue ethics is that they focus perhaps too much on the differences among people of different cultures and traditions. Having traveled extensively through many parts of the world, I am constantly amazed, not at how different I am from other people, but how much I actually share in common with them. Most human beings that I have encountered have similar hopes, dreams and aspirations for themselves and their loved ones. They all want to have some measure of happiness in their own lives and to avoid unnecessary suffering and pain; they all are looking for someone to love and to be loved in return; they all want to improve their own lives (if only materially) and to provide improved opportunities for those they care about (if only material opportunities); they all want to live in communities that are safe, relatively clean and orderly, and free from extreme violence and oppression; and all, I believe, sincerely want to live their lives the right way, although often they are confused about what this right way might be.

Certainly when one initially enters a culture that is dramatically different from one’s own, it is natural to focus on the differences between the two cultures. I have found, however, that when I sincerely take the time to get to know people of different cultures, the walls of difference that separate myself from them gradually tend to erode, and I almost away discover the common bond of humanity that I share with them. This is as true for people that I have encountered in Western Europe as it is for those that I have met from Latin America, Africa or Asia. They may dress differently than I do, they may speak a language that I don’t fully understand, and they may have customs that seem strange to me, but ultimately, we share the same bond of humanity.

I remember a vehement series of arguments that I once had in graduate school with a fellow student from Uganda whose values, initially at least, could not have seemed more different from my own. We had been discussing liberal notions of human freedom and autonomy—ideas that are fairly sacrosanct in Western culture. This fellow, however, attempted to argue, forcefully at times, that one of the main problems with American society is the overemphasis that is placed on individual autonomy. In many of the tribes of his country, he argued, men and women voluntarily submit themselves to the authority of tribal leaders, sacrificing their own autonomy for the good of the community. From my perspective at the time, the idea of blindly submitting to authority figures seemed like a reactionary concept and a dangerous threat to human liberty. I’m sure that I was quite aggressive in my attacks on this fellow’s position, and we probably both left the class thinking the other slightly naive. Some days later, however, I bumped into
my classmate having a bite to eat at the student cafeteria and we resumed our discussion. This led to a series of arguments that we had with one another over the course of the entire academic year. Because we were both sincerely interested in the truth, we were willing to argue for long stretches of time in the hopes of converting each other. In the end, what we discovered is that we were not really all that far apart in our understanding of the value of human autonomy. We both recognized that a certain amount of personal freedom is necessary in order for human beings to thrive, but that quite often—in Western society at least—autonomy is valued to such a degree that it works against the common good. The only question that remained was what specific limits should be placed on the freedom of individuals so that both the individual and the entire community could thrive. Unfortunately, my friend returned to Uganda before we could work out all the details of this common position, but I have no doubts that had we enough time to continue the discussion, moral consensus would have been achieved.

This incident with my Ugandan friend was certainly not unique in my own life. I have had arguments with numerous individuals about a wide variety of moral, political and religious issues. Because I had the luxury of being a graduate student in a European university with very little besides the study of my own discipline to distract me, my classmates and I were able to spend a seemingly absurd amount of time arguing over the most minute moral questions. Sometimes the arguments would go long into the night and over the course of numerous semesters. Quite often the intelligent arguments of my classmates would convince me that my own position on a subject was untenable (although I usually hesitated to admit this to them); sometimes I would emerge victorious because my position was proven to be more consistent than my opponents; at other times, however, after many hours of intense discussion with a classmate, a meeting of the minds would occur, where we would discover that, with some modification of both of our positions, a much better moral position would emerge; and in some cases, as in my discussions with my Ugandan friend, we would discover that our positions were not all that far apart from the start and all that was needed was some clarification of the terms and concepts that we were using.

The point that I am trying to make is that I do believe that there are universal and perennial virtues but that these virtues can only manifest themselves under the right conditions. What are these conditions? First, the presence of two or more individuals, each of whom has their own particular moral perspective which they are convinced is correct, and who are willing to enter into an argument over the nature of the good life, not to score rhetorical points with one another, but to truly discover what this sort of life would entail. Second, that these two individuals would be committed to continuing their discussion on the good life for as long as was necessary either for one to persuade the other that they are in error or for the two of them to arrive at some kind of moral consensus. Third, that these individuals would be humble enough to admit when their own positions were demonstrated to be untenable, inconsistent or just plain foolish. My own experience with moral argumentation has convinced me that a remarkable degree of consensus is possible even among people of completely different backgrounds provided they are willing to commit themselves as long as necessary to the often arduous process of moral argumentation and discussion. The problem that I have found is that most men and women lack the willpower to continue a discussion long enough for consensus to be reached. As Plato so successful describes in his early Socratic dialogues, most people who enter into moral argument either are insincere in their desire to discover the truth or they lack the commitment to stay the course of the argument. More often than not, arguments end inconclusively, not because consensus is unattainable, but because people give up far too soon....

NOTES

2. Stanley Hauerwas, The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame,


