CHAPTER 58

This chapter is even more recondite than the preceding. Know that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes: they do not include any incorrect notions or any deficiency whatever in reference to God, while positive attributes imply polytheism, and are inadequate, as we have already shown. It is now necessary to explain how negative expressions can in a certain sense be employed as attributes, and how they are distinguished from positive attributes. Then I shall show that we cannot describe the Creator by any means except by negative attributes. An attribute does not exclusively belong to the one object to which it is related; while qualifying one thing, it can also be employed to qualify other things, and is in that case not peculiar to that one thing. E.g., if you see an object from a distance, and on enquiring what it is, are told that it is a living being, you have certainly learnt an attribute of the object seen, and although that attribute does not exclusively belong to the object perceived, it expresses that the object is not a plant or a mineral. Again, if a man is in a certain house, and you know that something is in the house, but not exactly what, you ask what is in that house, and you are told, not a plant nor a mineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge of the thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you do not yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negative attributes have this in common with the positive, that they necessarily circumscribe the object to some extent, although such circumscription consists only in the exclusion of what otherwise would not be excluded. In the following point, however, the negative attributes are distinguished from the positive. The positive attributes, although not peculiar to one thing, describe a portion of what we desire to know, either some part of its essence or some of its accidents: the negative attributes, on the other hand, do not, as regards the essence of the thing which we desire to know, in any way tell us what it is, except it be indirectly, as has been shown in the instance given by us.

After this introduction, I would observe that — as has already been shown — God’s existence is absolute, that it includes no composition, as will be proved, and that we comprehend only the fact that He exists, not His essence. Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He has any positive attribute: for He does not possess existence in addition to His essence: it therefore cannot be said that the one may be described as an attribute [of the other]; much less has He [in addition to His existence] a compound essence, consisting of two constituent elements to which the attribute could refer: still less has He accidents, which could be described by an attribute. Hence it is clear that He has no positive attribute whatever. The negative attributes, however, are those which are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which we must believe concerning God; for, on the one hand, they do not imply any plurality, and, on the other, they convey to man the highest possible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been established by proof that some being must exist besides those things which can be perceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when we say of this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence is impossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance, like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore say that it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call such a being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike the heavens, which are living, but material.
Seeing that it is also different from the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living, owes its existence to some cause, we say it is the first, expressing thereby that its existence is not due to any cause. We further notice, that the existence, that is the essence, of this being is not limited to its own existence: many existences emanate from it, and its influence is not like that of the fire in producing heat, or that of the sun in sending forth light, but consists in constantly giving them stability and order by well-established rule, as we shall show: we say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it is not feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its creatures: when we say that it is not feeble, we mean that its existence is capable of producing the existence of many other things: by saying that it is not ignorant, we mean “it perceives” or “it lives,” — for everything that perceives is living—by saying “it is not hasty, and does not abandon its creatures,” we mean that all these creatures preserve a certain order and arrangement: they are not left to themselves; they are not produced aimlessly, but whatever condition they receive from that being is given with design and intention. We thus learn that there is no other being like unto God, and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods than one.

It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God either denotes the quality of an action, or — when the attribute is intended to convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of His actions — the negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributes must not be formed and applied to God, except in the way in which, as you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived in reference to a thing, although that attribute can naturally never be applied to it in the same sense, as, e.g., we say, “This wall does not see.” Those who read the present work are aware that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we can obtain no knowledge of the essence of the heavens — a revolving substance which has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and examined even as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each other and respecting most of their motions — although we know that they must consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the same as sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, not passive and therefore not subject to impressions, and that they do not possess the sensations of taste and smell; or we use similar negative attributes. All this we do, because we do not know their substance. What, then, can be the result of our efforts, when we try to obtain a knowledge of a Being that is free from substance, that is most simple, whose existence is absolute, and not due to any cause, to whose perfect essence nothing can be superadded, and whose perfection consists, as we have shown, in the absence of all defects. All we understand is the fact that He exists, that He is a Being to whom none of His creatures is similar, who has nothing in common with them, who does not include plurality, who is never too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to the universe is that of a steersman to a boat; and even this is not a real relation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea that God rules the universe; that is, that He gives it duration, and preserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treated more fully. Praised be He!

In the contemplation of His essence, our comprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in the examination of His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure!

CHAPTER 60

I WILL give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order that you may better understand the propriety of forming as many negative attributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing to God any positive attributes. A person may know for certain that a “ship” is in existence, but he may not know to what object that name is applied, whether to a substance or to an accident, a second person then learns that the ship is not an accident; a third, that it is not a mineral; a fourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth; a fifth, that it is not a body whose parts are joined together by nature; a sixth, that it is not a flat object like boards or doors; a seventh,
that it is not a sphere; an eighth, that it is not pointed; a ninth, that it is not round-shaped; nor
equilateral; a tenth, that it is not solid. It is clear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the
correct notion of a “ship” by the foregoing negative attributes, as if he had exactly the same
notion as those who have who imagine it to be a wooden substance which is hollow, long, and
composed of many pieces of wood, that is to say, who know it by positive attributes. Of the
other persons in our illustration, each one is more remote from the correct notion of a ship than
the next mentioned, so that the first knows nothing about it but the name. In the same manner
you will come nearer to the knowledge and comprehension of God by the negative attributes.
But you must be careful, in what you negative, to negative by proof, not by mere words, for
each time you ascertain by proof that a certain thing, believed to exist in the Creator, must be
negatived, you have undoubtedly come one step nearer to the knowledge of God.

It is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and others remain exceedingly
remote from Him, not in the sense of those who are deprived of vision, and believe that God
occupies a place, which man can physically approach or from which he can recede. Examine
this well, know it, and be content with it. The way which will bring you nearer to God has
been clearly shown to you; walk in it, if you have the desire. On the other hand, there is a great
danger in applying positive attributes to God. For it has been shown that every perfection we
could imagine, even if existing in God in accordance with the opinion of those who assert the
existence of attributes, would in reality not be of the same kind as that imagined by us, but
would only be called by the same name, according to our explanation; it would in fact amount
to a negation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and that knowledge, which admits
of no change and of no plurality, embraces many changeable things; His knowledge remains
unaltered, while new things are constantly formed, and His knowledge of a thing before it
exists, while it exists, and when it has ceased to exist, is the same without the least change: you
would thereby declare that His knowledge is not like ours: and similarly that His existence is
not like ours. You thus necessarily arrive at some negation, without obtaining a true conception
of an essential attribute: on the contrary, you are led to assume that there is a plurality in God,
and to believe that He, though one essence, has several unknown attributes. For if you intend
to affirm them, you cannot compare them with those attributes known by us, and they are
consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were, brought by the belief in the reality of
the attributes, to say that God is one subject of which several things are predicates: though the
subject is not like ordinary subjects, and the predicates are not like ordinary predicates. This
belief would ultimately lead us to associate other things with God, and not to believe that He
is One. For of every subject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated, and although in
reality subject and predicate are combined in one thing, by the actual definition they consist of
two elements, the notion contained in the subject not being the same as that contained in the
predicate. In the course of this treatise it will be proved to you that God cannot be a compound,
and that He is simple in the strictest sense of the word.

I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God has not sufficient knowledge
concerning the Creator, admits some association with God, or conceives Him to be different
from what He is: but I say that he unconsciously loses his belief in God. For he whose knowledge
concerning a thing is insufficient, understands one part of it while he is ignorant of the other,
as, e.g., a person who knows that man possesses life, but does not know that man possesses
understanding: but in reference to God, in whose real existence there is no plurality, it is
impossible that one thing should be known, and another unknown. Similarly he who associates
an object with [the properties of] another object, conceives a true and correct notion of the one
object. and applies that notion also to the other; while those who admit the attributes of God,
do not consider them as identical with His essence, but as extraneous elements. Again, he who
conceives an incorrect notion of an object, must necessarily have a correct idea of the object
to some extent, he, however, who says that taste belongs to the category of quantity has not,
according to my opinion, an incorrect notion of taste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he
does not know to what object the term “taste” is to be applied. This is a very difficult subject:
consider it well.
According to this explanation you will understand, that those who do not recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things., which others negative by clear proof, are deficient in the knowledge of God, and are remote from comprehending Him. Consequently, the smaller the number of things is which a person can negative in relation to God, the less he knows of Him as has been explained in the beginning of this chapter; but the man who affirms an attribute of God, knows nothing but the same: for the object to which, in his imagination, he applies that name, does not exist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he applied that name to a non-existing being, for there is, in reality, no such object. E.g., some one has heard of the elephant, and knows that it is an animal, and wishes to know its form and nature. A person, who is either misled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg, three wings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body: its face is wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speaks like a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like a fish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, or that he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I would say that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, and that in reality there exists nothing like it: it is a non-existing being, called by the name of a really existing being, and like the griffin, the centaur, and similar imaginary combinations for which simple and compound names have been borrowed from real things. The present case is analogous: namely, God, praised be His name, exists, and His existence has been proved to be absolute and perfectly simple, as I shall explain. If such a simple, absolutely existing essence were said to have attributes, as has been contended, and were combined with extraneous elements, it would in no way be an existing thing, as has been proved by us; and when we say that that essence, which is called “God,” is a substance with many properties by which it can be described, we apply that name to an object which does not at all exist. Consider, therefore, what are the consequences of affirming attributes to God! As to those attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or in the books of the Prophets, we must assume that they are exclusively employed, as has been stated by us, to convey to us some notion of the perfections of the Creator, or to express qualities of actions emanating from Him.