Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things

John Locke

Knowledge of the existence of other finite beings is to be had only by actual sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition. The existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown.

The knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation: for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man: no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when, by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For, the having the idea of anything in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history.

Instance: whiteness of this paper. It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know, that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in us; though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it. For it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced: v.g. whilst I write this, I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call white; by which I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand; which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of anything, but a man’s self alone, and of God.

This notice by our senses, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge, and proves the existence of things without us. The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties; nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is.
But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons:

I. Confirmed by concurrent reasons:

First, because we cannot have ideas of sensation but by the inlet of the senses. It is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses: because those that want the organs of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them: for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell roses in the winter: but we see nobody gets the relish of a pineapple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.

II. Secondly, Because we find that an idea from actual sensation, and another from memory, are very distinct perceptions. Because sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory; so I can at pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my view that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory, (over which, if they were there only, I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without.

III. Thirdly, because pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensation, accompanies not the returning of those ideas without the external objects. Add to this, that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which, when felt, was very troublesome; and is again, when actually repeated: which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies when applied to them: and we remember the pains of hunger, thirst, or the headache, without any pain at all; which would either never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of pleasure, accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For, it would be very strange, that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth, that two angles of a figure, which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram, should be bigger one than the other, and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles, which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by.

IV. Fourthly, because our senses assist one another’s testimony of the existence of outward things, and enable us to predict. Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other’s report, concerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting his hand in it. Which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too: which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again.

Thus I see, whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper; and by designing the
letters, tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing
my pen over it: which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand
still; or though I move my pen, if my eyes be shut: nor, when those characters are once made on
the paper, can I choose afterwards but see them as they are; that is, have the ideas of such letters
as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that they are not barely the sport and play of my own
imagination, when I find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts,
do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses
constantly and regularly, according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add, that
the sight of those shall, from another man, draw such sounds as I beforehand design they shall
stand for, there will be little reason left to doubt that those words I write do really exist without
me, when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which could not be the
effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them in that order.

But yet, if after all this any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to affirm that
all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and
deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality; and therefore will question
the existence of all things, or our knowledge of anything: I must desire him to consider, that, if
all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question, and so it is not much matter
that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him
this answer, That the certainty of things existing in rerum natura when we have the testimony of
our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For,
our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive
knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple; but to the preservation of us, in whom they
are; and accommodated to the use of life: they serve to our purpose wen enough, if they will
but give us certain notice of those things, which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he
that sees a candle burning, and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his finger in
it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts
him to great pain; which is assurance enough, when no man requires greater certainty to govern
his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to
try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy
man’s fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater
than he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as
great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, i.e. happiness or misery;
beyond which we have no concernment, either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the
existence of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding
the evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made
acquainted with them.

In fine, then, when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot
but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect
our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties, and actually produce
that idea which we then perceive: and we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as to doubt that
such collections of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together, do
really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses,
employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further. For if I saw such a
collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man, existing together one minute since, and
am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary
connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now: by a thousand ways he may
cease to be, since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence. And if I cannot be certain
that the man I saw last to-day is now in being, I can less be certain that he is so who hath been
longer removed from my senses, and I have not seen since yesterday, or since the last year: and
much less can I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And, therefore, though it be
highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone, writing this, I have
not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts
me past doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there
are men (and men also of my acquaintance, with whom I have to do) now in the world: but this is but probability, not knowledge.

Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting. He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.


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