Of Human Knowledge
John Locke

Chapter 1: Knowledge in General

Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?

But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts:

1. Identity, or diversity.
2. Relation.
3. Co-existence, or necessary connexion.
4. Real existence.

First, as to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. identity or diversity. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have reduced this into those general rules, What is, is, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, for ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it: yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round are the very ideas they are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or square. Nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general rule. This then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mind perceives in its ideas; which it always perceives at first sight: and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it
will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and diversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as the ideas themselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise.

Secondly, the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas may, I think, be called relative, and is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas, of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For, since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement they have one with another, in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.

Thirdly, the third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-existence or non-co-existence in the same subject; and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus when we pronounce concerning gold, that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea signified by the word gold.

Fourthly, The fourth and last sort is that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea. Within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them, is, That it is, or is not, the same with some other; that it does or does not always coexist with some other idea in the same subject; that it has this or that relation with some other idea; or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus, “blue is not yellow,” is of identity. “Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal,” is of relation. “Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions,” is of co-existence. “God is,” is of real existence. Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation, as will easily appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this Essay. I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge, but that it is necessary first, to consider the different acceptations of the word knowledge….

Chapter 2: The Degrees of Knowledge

All our knowledge consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we, with our faculties, and in our way of knowledge, are capable of, it may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find, that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light, only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together, by bare intuition; without the intervention of any other idea: and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human frailty is capable of. This part of knowledge is
irresistible, and, like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as ever
the mind turns its view that way; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination, but
the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the
certainty and evidence of all our knowledge; Which certainty every one finds to be so great,
that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater: for a man cannot conceive himself
able of a greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it
to be; and that two ideas, wherein he perceives a difference, are different and not precisely the
same. He that demands a greater certainty than this, demands he knows not what, and shows
only that he has a mind to be a sceptic, without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly
on this intuition, that, in the next degree of knowledge which I call demonstrative, this intuition
is necessary in all the connexions of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain
knowledge and certainty.

The next degree of knowledge is, where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement
of any ideas, but not immediately. Though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or
disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge; yet it does not always happen, that
the mind sees that agreement or disagreement, which there is between them, even where it is
discoverable; and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most gets no further than a probable
conjecture. The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or
disagreement of two ideas, is, because those ideas, concerning whose agreement or disagreement
the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case then, when
the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison, and as it were
juxta-position or application one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is
fain, by the intervention of other ideas (one or more, as it happens) to discover the agreement or
disagreement which it searches; and this is that which we call reasoning. Thus, the mind being
willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle
and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it: because the three
angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two,
angles; and so of this the mind has no immediate, no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind
is fain to find out some other angles, to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality;
and, finding those equal to two right ones. comes to know their equality to two right ones.

Those intervening ideas, which serve to show the agreement of any two others, are called
proofs; and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly
perceived, it is called demonstration; it being shown to the understanding, and the mind made to
see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas, (that shall discover
the agreement or disagreement of any other,) and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which
is called sagacity.

This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not
altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready, as in intuitive knowledge. For, though
in demonstration the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it
considers; yet it is not without pains and attention: there must be more than one transient view
to find it. A steady application and pursuit are required to this discovery: and there must be a
progression by steps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty, and come
to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and the use of
reason to show it. . . .

Now, in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge, there is an intuitive knowledge
of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a
proof: for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof; since without the perception of such
agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced: if it be perceived by itself, it is
intuitive knowledge: if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure, to show their agreement or disagreement.…

These two, viz. intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge; whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us, which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds; whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects; he may please to dream that I make him this answer:— 1. That it is no great matter, whether I remove his scruple or no: where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream; and that we cannot thereby certainly know, that any such thing as fire actually exists without us: I answer, That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be. So that, I think, we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge this also, of the existence of particular external objects, by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive: in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty.…

Chapter 3: The Extent of Human Knowledge

Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence that,

First, we can have knowledge no further than we have ideas.

Secondly, that we can have no knowledge further than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement. Which perception being: 1. Either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas; or, 2. By reason, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, by the intervention of some others; or, 3. By sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things: hence it also follows:

Thirdly, that we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas, and all that we would know about them; because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have one to another, by juxta-position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus, having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal
bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuitive knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no; because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them: the difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application; and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by, which is demonstration, or rational knowledge.

Fourthly, it follows, also, from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas: because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such mediums as we can connect one to another with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction; and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

Fifthly, sensitive knowledge reaching no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

From all which it is evident, that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from some few, and not very acute, ways of perception, such as are our senses; yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely, and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do for the colouring or support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in....


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