



The Doctrine of the Self in Augustine and Descartes Marguerite Witmer Kehr

A. The Certainty That I Exist

I. The Teaching of Augustine.

In opposition to the scepticism of the New Academy, Augustine sought a sure foundation for his philosophy. “As regards the uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the differentiating characteristic of the New Academy, the city of God,” he says, “thoroughly detests such doubt as madness.”¹ The thinkers of the New Academy, Augustine writes, base their doubt of all things on the deceptive nature of the knowledge which comes from the bodily senses.² He agrees with their estimate of knowledge from the senses, but denies that universal doubt is a necessary consequence. In fact, as we shall see, from doubt he derives certainty. Augustine declares, then, that certainty of knowledge is a possible attainment. “Regarding matters which it apprehends by the mind and reason,” the city of God “has most absolute certainty, although its knowledge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down the mind.”¹ In *Contra Academicos*, which is Augustine’s earliest work, he seeks to show, in opposition to the teaching of the Academy, that knowledge of truth is possible. His main contention is that the Academics could not attain to the probable unless they knew the true, because what constitutes the probable is similarity to the true.³

In all his philosophical works, Augustine argues for the existence of truth. The first arguments are found in *Contra Academicos*. To the declaration of the sceptics that nothing can be perceived,⁴ Augustine answers that truth is perceived in all disjunctive propositions. “For I regard it as certain that there is either one world, or not one; and if not one, either a finite number, or an infinite number . . . Likewise I know that this world of ours has been ordered thus either by physical nature or by some providence; and either it has always existed and will exist always, or it has begun and will not cease; either it has no beginning in time, but will have an end; or has begun and endures, but will not endure forever. I know many statements of this kind about the physical world. For these disjunctive propositions are true, and no one can confound them by any likeness to the false.”⁵

To the other precept of the sceptics: — “Give assent to nothing,”⁶ Augustine replies that our perceptions are true for us and that there is no deception where we give assent to such perceptions. “Whatever the eyes can see, they see truly. Is, then, the way in which they see the oar in the water true? It is. For I should rather charge my eyes with making a false report if the oar, dipped in the water, appeared straight when the cause of its seeming bent were present. Since, in that event, they would not see what should be seen under such existing conditions. Nevertheless I am deceived if I shall give assent, says someone. Do not give assent to more than you are persuaded appears so to you, and there can be no deception. For I do not see how the Academician can refute him who says: This seems white to me. . . .”⁷

These two arguments for the existence of truth as found in disjunctive propositions and in our assertions of our own immediate perception, are the first which Augustine employs and

are of minor importance. They are not found in his later works. The second mentioned, in its emphasis on subjectivity, forms a transition to that main argument for the existence of the truth, which is the foundation of Augustine's philosophy. The one truth of which we are certain is the fact of our own existence. In *De Beata Vita*, which was composed at almost the same time as *Contra Academicos*, Augustine makes the first statement of this immediate certainty.

"Navigius — I do not think myself ignorant of everything.

"Augustine — Can you tell us some one of the things which you know?

"N— I can.

"A — May I trouble you to name some one? (And when he hesitated). Do you at least know that you are alive?

"N— I do.

"A — You know then that you have life, since none can live except by life?

"N— This too ... I know."⁸

In other works, Augustine makes the same assertion. In a well-known chapter of the *City of God*, he says firmly: "For we both are, and know that we are, and delight in our being, and our knowledge of it."⁹ This assertion, it may be noted, is an example of Augustine's use of the self as an analogy of the Trinity.¹⁰ For Augustine adds: "And we indeed recognize in ourselves the image of God, that is, of the supreme Trinity, an image which, though it be not equal to God, or rather, though it be very far removed from Him, — being neither co-eternal, nor, to say all in a word, consubstantial with Him, — is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of His works, and is destined to be yet restored, that it may bear a still closer resemblance."¹¹ Further statements of the certainty of self-existence are the following: "For it is eternal to the soul to live; it is eternal to know that it lives."¹² "These philosophers have babbled much against the bodily senses, but have never been able to throw doubt upon those most certain perceptions of things true, which the mind knows by itself, such as that which I have mentioned, I know that I am alive."¹³ We may end, as we began, with a quotation from an early dialogue, the *Soliloquies*:

"Reason — You who desire to know yourself, do you know that you are?

"Augustine — I do.

"R — How do you know this?

"A — I do not know.

"R — Do you feel yourself to be simple or complex?

"A — I do not know.

"R — Do you know yourself to be self-moved?

"A — I do not.

"R — Do you know that you think?

"A — I do.

"R — Is it then true that you think?

"A — It is true."¹⁴

This knowledge of our existence does not come through the senses. "But since," says Augustine, "we treat of the nature of the mind, let us remove from our consideration all knowledge which is received from without, through the senses of the body; and attend more carefully to the position which we have laid down, that all minds know and are certain concerning themselves."¹⁵ Certainty of existence comes rather from an inner sense. "For we have another and far superior sense, belonging to the inner man by which we perceive what things are just, and what unjust, — just by means of an intelligible idea, unjust by the want of it. This sense is aided in its functions neither by the eyesight, nor by the orifice of the ear, nor by the air-holes of the nostrils, nor by the palate's taste, nor by any bodily touch. By it I am assured both that I am, and that I know this; . . ."¹⁶

But Augustine realized that these repeated assertions of our certainty of existence would not be sufficient. The question of the possibility of deception would naturally arise. It is in answer to this supposed question that he announces his discovery that the possibility of being deceived implies existence. Suppose, he urges, that I am deceived in thinking that I exist. Instead of making my existence doubtful, this shows the existence of a nature capable of being deceived. The following quotations express this thought: — “But it is clear and manifest to what a degree falsity can injure the mind. For can it do more than deceive? Yet no one is deceived unless he lives. Falsity, therefore, cannot destroy the mind.”¹⁷ “To begin with that which is most evident; I ask you first, whether you exist. You, perhaps, fear that you may be deceived by this questioning, but you could not be deceived in any way, if you did not exist.”¹⁸ “Let a thousand kinds, then, of deceitful objects of sight be presented to him who says, I know I am alive; yet he will fear none of them, for he who is deceived is yet alive.”¹⁹ “In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am deceived I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived, how am I deceived in believing that I am? For it is certain that I am if I am deceived. Since, therefore, I, the person deceived, should be, even if I am deceived, certainly I am not deceived in this knowledge that I am.”²⁰

Thus the possibility of being deceived shows the existence of the one deceived. In the work *On the Trinity*, this argument takes another form in the teaching that the existence of doubt implies the existence of the doubter; “And one has attempted to establish this, and another to establish that. Yet who ever doubts that he himself lives, and remembers, and understands, and wills, and thinks, and knows, and judges? Seeing that even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to assent rashly. Whosoever therefore doubts about anything else, ought not to doubt of all these things; which if they were not, he would not be able to doubt of anything.”²¹

II. The Teaching of Descartes.

As Augustine had reacted against the scepticism of the Academy, and had sought for a philosophical basis which could not be questioned, so we find in the teaching of Descartes a reaction against the prevailing scepticism of his time. In opposition to it he declares that certain knowledge can be discovered. “No doubt, men of education may persuade themselves that there is but little of such certain knowledge . . . but I nevertheless announce that there are more of these [truths] than they think — truths which suffice to give a rigorous demonstration of innumerable propositions, the discussion of which they have hitherto been unable to free from the element of probability.”²²

In order to obtain certain knowledge, Descartes makes use of the scepticism he is combatting. He begins with doubt, but for him it is only a means to an end. “Not that indeed I imitated the sceptics, who only doubt for the sake of doubting, and pretend to be always uncertain; for, on the contrary, my design was only to provide myself with good ground for assurance.”²³ Progress in sifting all knowledge in order to retain what is certain, must necessarily be slow. “Like one who walks alone aid in the twilight,” he says, “I resolved to go so slowly, and to use so much circumspection in all things, that if my advance was but very small, at least I guarded myself well from falling.”²⁴

Descartes seeks for truth by the process of eliminating all beliefs and opinions which

are in any degree doubtful. "... I thought," he says "it was necessary for me ... to reject as absolutely false everything as to which I could imagine the least ground of doubt, in order to see if afterwards there remained anything in my belief that was entirely certain."²⁵ In carrying out this plan, he rejects the knowledge which the senses give us because it is often deceptive. "Thus, because our senses sometimes deceive us, I wished to suppose that nothing is just as they cause us to imagine it to be."²⁶ He finds that knowledge from the senses is unreliable, not only in small matters, but even in differentiating waking states from sleep.²⁷ In reasoning, also, he discovers opportunity for deception. "... Because there are men," he says, "who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry, and judging that I was as subject to error as was any other, I rejected as false all the reasons formerly accepted by me as demonstrations."²⁸

Although these successive steps seem to lead to universal doubt and uncertainty, Descartes presses forward. "I shall nevertheless," he says, "make an effort and follow anew the same path — i. e., I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least doubt could be supposed to exist, — and I shall ever follow in this road until I have met with something which is certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain."²⁹ "I suppose, then, that all the things that I see are false; I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all that my fallacious memory represents to me. I consider that I possess no senses; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind."³⁰

It is in this apparently hopeless condition of doubt that Descartes discovers the truth for which he has been seeking. He cannot, indeed, obtain an absolute assurance of the existence of the external world and the human body. But "am I," he says, "so dependent on body and senses that I cannot exist without these? ... I was persuaded that there was nothing in all the world, that there was no heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then likewise persuaded that I did not exist? Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of something. — But there is some deceiver or other — who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me. Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and — he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something."³¹ Thus, Descartes insists, the possibility of being deceived implies the existence of the one deceived. In the same way the fact of our doubt necessitates our existence. "Since, then, you cannot deny that you doubt, and that it is on the other hand certain that you doubt, and so certain that you cannot even doubt of that, it is likewise true that you are, you who doubt—."³² In parallel fashion, Descartes argues our existence, also, from our ability to think." — I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth 'I think, therefore I am' was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the Philosophy for which I was seeking."³³

III. The Likeness and the Difference between the Two Thinkers.

There is evidently a striking similarity between the doctrines of Augustine and of Descartes as so far stated. Each formulates the underlying principles of his philosophy as a reaction against the scepticism of his age; each finds it necessary in his search for truth to reject the knowledge which comes from the senses; and each takes as basis of his system the certainty of his own existence which each discovers by way of the doubt which he is opposing.

Parallel with this similarity of thought runs a difference in attitude toward their thinking.

It may be traced through all the passages which we have considered. It is so evident and so deep seated that it indicates a fundamental difference in the natures of the two thinkers. This difference is to be found in their estimate of the relative importance of religion and philosophy. For Augustine, religion is everything and philosophy is regarded as a means of approach and as a key to the solution of the problems of religion. With Descartes, however, philosophy is of primary importance, although the opinions of the Church are by no means ignored. The latter fact is shown by his reverence for the Jesuit masters in the College of La Fleche and by his desire for their approval of his work.³⁴ It is manifest also in his expressions of unwillingness to run counter to the opinions of the Church,³⁵ and in his dedication of the *Meditations*.³⁶ In spite of this reverence for the Church and her opinions, one feels that religion for Descartes is not a vital, personal force. Neither his philosophical works nor his letters show that his religion is anything more than a formal reckoning with the power of the Church.

We have noted that religion, to Augustine, is the chief aim and end of life, while we are unable to discover Descartes's attitude from his writings. Their relation to theology, or the organized doctrines of the Church, shows a difference and also gives an insight into the fundamental difference in their characters. The relative importance of philosophy and theology for Augustine, is shown by the fact that as his life advances, and as the dogmas of the Church settle into more and more inflexible lines, it becomes for him increasingly necessary to subordinate philosophy to theology. In many instances, the bishop feels compelled to retract earlier teachings because they seem to defend some heretical opinion which he is now combatting. Descartes does not subordinate either philosophy or theology but attempts to define their fields and so prevent any encroachment. "One must distinguish between three types of questions," he says. "Certain things are believed through faith alone. Such are the mystery of the Incarnation, the Trinity, and the like. Others, however, though they have a certain bearing on faith, can nevertheless be investigated by the natural reason. Among these are generally ranked by the orthodox theologians, the existence of God, and the distinction of mind from body. Finally, there are others which belong in no wise to the sphere of faith, but only to the sphere of human reason, e. g., the question of the squaring of the circle or of making gold by the art of alchemy. And even as these men abuse the words of Holy Scripture, who, from a distorted interpretation of it presume to elicit these last questions, so do those others diminish its authority who undertake to solve the first type of question by arguments sought from philosophy alone."³⁷ Augustine recognizes no such distinction, but considers all theological questions as open to philosophical consideration. An example of this treatment is his method of relating the doctrine of the Trinity to that of the existence of the self.³⁸

This fundamental difference between Augustine and Descartes may be found throughout their philosophical systems. In their arguments for the existence of the self, it is evident in their attitude toward the various stages of the argument. For Augustine, doubt is an intolerable experience which is to be shortened as much as possible, and the transition to certainty is felt, as well as thought. In the system of Descartes, the search for truth is a matter of the reason, rather than of the heart. We feel that Augustine's thinking is an intensely personal experience, while Descartes seems a rather impersonal observer of the workings of his mind.

In their method also of search for the truth, we find divergences which arise from this fundamental difference in the nature of the two men. Descartes advances toward the certainty of self-existence by means of a systematic and careful method, while Augustine employs no method, but seems to be driven on by the strivings of his spirit. This difference is characteristic of their systems as a whole. Augustine worked out his philosophy as need arose, from his inner life or from some doctrine of the Church which must be defended. Descartes, on the other hand, had as his primary object, the careful building of a system of thought on a sure foundation and was

not disturbed by outside considerations. As a result of this difference in method, the complete system of Descartes is found in all his principal works. The philosophy of Augustine, however, was never arranged in an orderly manner. It is found as detached fragments in numerous works which are devoted primarily to theological questions. Another cause of this difference is the fact that Descartes had leisure to think and write systematically, while Augustine composed his voluminous writings during a life of strenuous activity.

Not only in their feeling toward doubt, and in their method of seeking the truth, but also in their attitude toward the certainty of self-existence which they have established, can we trace the difference in the nature of the two men. The discovery of the certainty Augustine has been longing for is a real experience to him, and one which is touched with emotion. To use the figure which he employs in *De Beata Vita*, he is a storm-tossed ship which has at length reached a safe harbor. For Descartes, on the other hand, the discovery of certainty is a purely rational procedure, and the satisfaction of the discoverer is that of one who has successfully demonstrated a geometrical proposition. We feel that the thinker himself stands aloof from the search for truth.

In comparing the teachings of Augustine and Descartes on the existence of the self, it is well to emphasize in conclusion, the fact that both use the self as the basis of their philosophy. This is the more remarkable in view of the difference in their estimate of the relative importance of philosophy and theology, and in the face, also, of the centuries which separate the two thinkers. In the main points of the system of Augustine, we find changes as time passed, but the teaching as to the existence of the self does not change and is found in all his important works from the earliest to the latest. These considerations indicate the power and stability of this doctrine of the existence of the self as the basis of philosophical thinking.

B. The Conception of the Self as Free

I. The Teaching of Augustine.

Most significant of the characters attributed to the self both by Augustine and by Descartes is its freedom. It is difficult to summarize Augustine's conception of the self as free, first, because he so closely connects it with his teaching concerning the doctrine of evil, second, because he presents two unharmonized views of freedom, and, finally, because, in this doctrine to a greater extent than in any other, his views change as he grows older in the service of the Church.

a. Before attempting to discuss Augustine's doctrine of freedom, it is necessary to summarize briefly his theory of the origin and nature of evil, since the two doctrines are so closely inter-woven. The existence of evil had always been a problem to Augustine. In an early work he writes: "You bring up that question which tremendously exercised me, when I was quite a youth, and then drove me, exhausted, to the heretics and cast me among them. I was so shattered by this overthrow, and buried so deep under such heaps of empty tales, that if my love of finding truth had not gained for me divine aid, I should never have emerged and breathed the first freedom of research."³⁹ Augustine received his greatest help in the solution of this problem from certain works of the Neo-Platonists,⁴⁰ which he read before his conversion. From these books came the suggestion which he uncritically adopted, that evil is not being, but a failure to reach being, and that its existence is necessary to a comprehension of the world. This idea enabled him to reconcile the existence of evil with the existence of God.

Evil cannot originate in God, because He is good, and wills the good. "Where, then, I saw that the incorruptible was to be preferred to the corruptible, there ought I to seek Thee, and there observe 'whence evil itself was,' that is, whence comes the corruption by which Thy substance

can by no means be profaned. For corruption ... in no way injures our God, . . . because He is God, and what He wills is good, and Himself is that good ; but to be corrupted is not good.”⁴¹ Moreover, there cannot be any entity contrary to the divine, in which evil could originate. — “To that nature which supremely is, and which created all else that exists, no nature is contrary save that which does not exist. For nonentity is the contrary of that which is. And thus there is no being contrary to God, the Supreme Being, and Author of all things whatsoever.”⁴² Since, then, evil can neither originate in God nor in some entity contrary to Him, its origin must be sought in created things. But all things were created good. “... Behold God,” writes Augustine, “and behold what God hath created; and God is good, yea, most mightily and incomparably better than all these; but yet He, who is good, hath created them good.”⁴³

We seem now to have reached a position from which the solution of the question is impossible. If evil can originate neither in God, nor in any other entity, and if all things were created good, how is the existence of evil possible? It was at this point that the Neo-Platonist writings gave assistance to Augustine, by suggesting that evil is not something positive, but a lack or privation of good.⁴⁴ “For evil has no positive nature; but the loss of good has received the name ‘evil.’”⁴⁵ Since evil originates in created things and is a privation, it must be the turning away of the human will from God who is the chief good. “And I inquired,” says Augustine, “what iniquity is, and ascertained it not to be a substance,⁴⁶ but a perversion of the will, bent aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme Substance, towards these lower things.”⁴⁷ Since evil is a defect or privation, it cannot have an efficient cause. “Let no one,” Augustine says, “look for an efficient cause of the evil will; for it is not efficient, but deficient, as the will itself is not an effecting of something, but a defect. For defection from that which supremely is, to that which has less of being, . . . this is to begin to have an evil will. Now, to seek to discover the causes of these defections, . . . is as if someone sought to see darkness, or hear silence.”⁴⁸ In other words, evil is a participation in non-being. “This do I know,” he writes, “that the nature of God can never, nowhere, nowise be defective, and that natures made of nothing can. These latter, however, the more being they have, and the more good they do (for then they do something positive), the more they have efficient causes; but in so far as they are defective in being, and consequently do evil (for then what is their work but vanity?), they have deficient causes.”⁴⁹ To summarize, — “There is, then, no natural efficient cause. . . of the evil will, since itself is the origin of evil in mutable spirits, by which the good of their nature is diminished and corrupted; and the will is made evil by nothing else than defection from God, — a defection of which the cause, too, is certainly deficient.”⁵⁰

b. Augustine’s doctrine of freedom is based upon his teaching that the self is conscious of willing. Indeed our knowledge of the existence of the will rests, he believes, upon as secure a foundation as does our knowledge that we live. “...This raised me towards Thy light,” Augustine says, “that I knew as well that I had a will as that I had life.”⁵¹ And again: “I acknowledge, it cannot be denied that we possess a will.”⁵² Over and over again, Augustine asserts the importance of the will. “I have nothing other than the will;” he says, “I know nothing other than that the fleeting and the falling should be spurned, the fixed and eternal sought after.”⁵³ He even teaches that the will is of central importance in perception. For example, in vision there are three elements, — “the form of the body which is seen, and the image of it impressed on the sense, — and the will of the mind which applies the sense to the sensible thing, and retains the vision itself in it.”⁵⁴ In thought, which is the combination of memory, internal vision, and will, will holds the chief place because it unites the others.⁵⁵ Moreover, the will can separate “the bodily senses from the bodies that are to be perceived, by movement of the body, either to hinder our perceiving the thing, or that we may cease to perceive it,” and it can avert “the memory from the sense; when, through its being intent on something else, it does not suffer

things present to cleave to it.”⁵⁶ Finally, the will is in all emotions, or, to use Augustine’s phrase, in all motions of the soul. “But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish?”⁵⁷

In his development of the conception of the will as free, Augustine presents two irreconcilable views which he does not attempt to relate. Both are based upon the self’s consciousness not merely that it wills, but that it wills freely, (i) According to the first of these conceptions, freedom is submission to the divine will. This view is formulated in the following passages: “The mind cannot be influenced against its desire to leave the higher things and choose the lower — For this reason, all useful training makes us turn our will from the flight of temporal things to the enjoyment of lasting good, by means of the rejected and restrained impulse.”⁵⁸ “From this it follows that whoever desires to live righteously and honorably, can accomplish this with so much ease that to will is equivalent to having what one wills.”⁵⁹ The conception of freedom which Augustine is employing here, is based upon his teaching that man is the product of being and non-being. “I viewed,” he says, “the other things below Thee, and perceived that they neither altogether are, nor altogether are not. They are, indeed, because they are from Thee; but are not, because they are not what Thou art.”⁶⁰ When the human will, which is the center of the finite nature, submits itself to being, that is, to the divine will, it is a free will: “Our freedom consists in submission to the truth.”⁶¹ “Hence there is no real freedom except that of the saints and of those who obey the eternal law.”⁶² The free will in this sense is the good, that is, the obedient will. It will later appear that Augustine found it necessary toward the end of his life, to retract some of the statements just quoted with regard to the free will, thus conceived.

(2) Augustine’s second view of freedom regards it as power of choice between good and evil: “For a man, to the extent that he is a man, is something good; because he can live righteously if he so wills.”⁶³ “Now it was expedient that man should be at first so created, as to have it in his power both to will what was right and to will what was wrong; not without reward if he willed the former, and not without punishment if he willed the latter.”⁶⁴ The theological reason for asserting this sort of freedom of the will is the desire to defend the justice of God’s rewards and punishments. But this indeterministic doctrine of the power of choice, while rescuing God’s goodness, seems to encounter a difficulty of its own in the problem of reconciling man’s freedom with God’s omniscience and foreknowledge. Augustine firmly asserts that both conceptions are to be retained. “Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. . . . But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills.”⁶⁵ Augustine implies, by these words, the evident possibility of God’s foreknowing human choices without willing them.⁶⁶ But he does not even attempt the far more difficult task of reconciling God’s omnipotence with the existence of free and evil human wills.

c. After Augustine entered the service of the Church, the doctrine of freedom in both its forms underwent great modification as it became necessary to harmonize it with religious dogmas.

(1) Augustine’s earlier conception of the free will as the good will was definitely related,

during his dispute with the Pelagians, with the doctrine of grace. The followers of Pelagius denied the doctrine of original sin⁶⁷ and declared that man could do good by his own power.⁶⁸ In order to oppose this view which, Augustine thinks, leaves no place for the grace of God,⁶⁹ he retracts some of the earlier statements which the Pelagians are using against him, for example, the assertions that by discipline we can turn our wills from temporal to eternal things; and that he who wishes to live honorably, is able to achieve this, almost with the wish: “In these words of mine,” Augustine says in the *Retractationes*, “and in others of the same kind, because the grace of God was not mentioned (for I was not then treating of it) the Pelagians think or may think that I hold their view. But they are wrong in thinking this.”⁷⁰

Augustine’s doctrine of grace is best summarized in his own words. It starts out from the conviction that man cannot do good by his own power: “For men are separated from God only by sins, from which we are in this life cleansed not by our own virtue, but by the divine compassion; through His indulgence, not through our own power. For whatever virtue we call our own is itself bestowed upon us by His goodness.”⁷¹ Furthermore, no man more than another deserves to receive the grace of God, therefore there is no injustice in the fact that it is bestowed only on some. “... For he who at first gave entrance to sin has been punished with all his posterity...so that no one is exempt from this just and due punishment, unless delivered by mercy and undeserved grace; and the human race is so apportioned that in some is displayed the efficacy of merciful grace, in the rest the efficacy of just retribution.”⁷²

(2) The doctrine of grace, thus stated, supplements and modifies but certainly does not contradict Augustine’s conception of the free will as the good will. It is, however, incompatible with his second conception of freedom as power of choice. For if man is powerless in himself to do good he is, in so far at least, without freedom in this sense of the term. Augustine therefore restricts freedom of choice to the first man, Adam.

For this limitation, Augustine assigns two reasons. The first, which he never treats as decisive, is the unlikelihood (as it seems to him) that God should create each separate individual soul. More probably, he believes, each human soul is derived by propagation from the created soul of the first man.⁷³ The second and more important motive for this restriction of freedom, as power of choice, is the belief to which he comes that complete freedom of choice would remove the necessity for a redeemer. In order to conform to the teaching of the Church with regard to redemption, it becomes necessary to limit complete freedom of the will to the first man, Adam. Adam’s misuse of this freedom is shown in the story of the Fall:

“God, as it is written, made man upright, and consequently with a good will — The good will, then, is the work of God. — But the first evil will, which preceded all man’s evil acts, was rather a kind of falling away from the work of God to its own works than any positive work. And therefore the acts resulting were evil, not having God, but the will itself, for their end.”⁷⁴ “Our first parents fell into open disobedience because already they were secretly corrupted; for the evil act had never been done had not an evil will preceded it.”⁷⁵ The penalty for this sin of the first man and woman was death.⁷⁶ Man was created for immortality or for death, but by his sin deserved the latter. “. . . Our first parents were so created, that, if they had not sinned, they would not have been dismissed from their bodies by any death, but would have been endowed with immortality as the reward of their obedience.”⁷⁷ This penalty of death was just because the commandment broken was not hard to obey. “Therefore, because the sin was a despising of the authority of God . . . who had laid upon him neither many, nor great, nor difficult commandments, — it was just that condemnation followed, . . . and as in his pride man had sought to be his own satisfaction, God in His justice abandoned him to himself, not to live in the absolute independence he affected, but instead of the liberty he desired, to live dissatisfied with himself in a hard and miserable bondage to him to whom by sinning he had yielded himself. . .

. Whoever thinks such punishment either excessive or unjust shows his inability to measure the great iniquity of sinning where sin might so easily have been avoided.”⁷⁸

Not alone the first man suffered this penalty of death, but it has been inherited by the whole human race,⁷⁹ which is derived from one man for the sake of unity.⁸⁰ By the sin of Adam, the race has become sinful. “In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human nature, — and what man was made, not when created, but when he sinned and was punished, this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin and death are concerned.”⁸¹ Because the human race is thus under the bondage of original sin, a redeemer is necessary. “Since, then, we were not fit to take hold of things eternal, and since the foulness of sins weighed us down, . . . it was needful that we should be cleansed.”⁸² By the work of redemption, the freedom of our wills is restored, in the first sense of ‘freedom’ as ‘goodness.’ “The will, therefore, is then truly free, when it is not the slave of vices and sins. Such was it given us by God; and this being lost by its own fault, can only be restored by Him who was able at first to give it. And therefore the truth says, ‘If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.’”⁸³

Because Augustine’s doctrine of freedom is so much better known in this theologically perverted form than in its original conception, it may be well to restate, in outline, the earlier view. According to this view every self is immediately conscious of itself as willing and as possessed of the power of choice. God creates this freely willing self and foreknows (without willing) its evil choices; but the evil of these human purposes is to be regarded as a privation of being rather than as positive evil. And the human self, when it wills in conformity with God’s purposes, is ‘free’ in a second and higher sense: it is a ‘good’ and obedient self.

II. The Teaching of Descartes.

Descartes, like Augustine, bases both the doctrine of freedom and the theory of evil on the supreme fact of the will. In the *Passions of the Soul*, he classifies the functions of the soul into actions, or the will, and passions, or perceptions.⁸⁴ Of these two, the will is more extended. “Further, the perception of the understanding only extends to the few objects which present themselves to it, and is always very limited. The will, on the other hand, may in some measure be said to be the infinite, because we perceive nothing which may be the object of some other will, even of the immensity of the will that is in God, to which our will cannot also extend.”⁸⁵ The will is the most perfect of all our faculties, “since as a matter of fact I am conscious of will so extended as to be subject to no limits.”⁸⁶

a. The will plays a leading part in the origin of evil. Descartes discusses the topic under two heads, — error in conduct, and error in judgment. “But I should like you,” he says, “to remember here that, in matters that may be embraced by the will, I made a very strict distinction between the practical life and the contemplation of truth.”⁸⁷ With regard to error in conduct, or in practical life, Descartes, again like Augustine, asserts, that its origin is not in God. “— He understands and wills and effects everything: that is, everything that really exists; for he does not will the evil of sin because that evil is nothing real.”⁸⁸ Therefore, “... God ... is not to be regarded as responsible for our errors, though endowed with the power to prevent them.”⁸⁹ Sin is not something positive, but is a defect or privation.⁹⁰ “Thus do I recognize that error, in so far as it is such, is no!: a real thing depending on God, but simply a defect.”⁹¹ In his reply to Gassendi’s *Objections to the Meditations*, Descartes writes: “Here you are everywhere guilty of a false assumption in taking as a positive imperfection ‘the fact that we are liable to err,’ since this is really (except with respect to God) the negation of a greater perfection.”⁹²

Finally, Descartes teaches, this evil which is a privation of good, cannot originate in God, but has its origin in the human will. “We know,” he declares, “that all our errors depend on

our will.”⁹³ Yet while evil originates in the will, there is another factor involved, that is, the understanding. Now “... the light of nature teaches us that the knowledge of the understanding should always precede the determination of the will.”⁹⁹ Because of this fact, evil arises when the will is used beyond the point to which our understanding extends. “Whence then come my errors? They come from the sole fact that since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good.”⁹⁴

Errors in judgment, or in the contemplation of the truth, are treated by Descartes in much the same way. As in the case of errors of conduct, so here, error is a defect and not something real. “... By falsity,” he says, “I understand only the privation of truth.”⁹⁵ Error is not to be attributed to God, “who being supremely perfect, cannot be the cause of any error.”⁹⁶ The source of error, then, must be in the self. Yet the will, in itself, is not the origin of error; “for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind,” nor is the understanding; “for since I understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for understanding, there is no doubt that all that I understand, I understand as I ought, and it is not possible that I err in this.”⁹⁷ Error arises, therefore, from the relation between the will and the understanding. We err when we exercise our will beyond the limit of clear understanding.

b. In the doctrine of freedom, Descartes, again like Augustine, finds ground for asserting the existence of freedom in the consciousness of the individual self that it possesses freedom. The following quotations make this evident: “...We are so conscious of the liberty and indifference which exists in us, that there is nothing that we comprehend more clearly and perfectly.”⁹⁸ “I made no assumption concerning freedom which is not a matter of universal experience; our natural light makes this most evident.”⁹⁹ “Refuse then to be free, if freedom does not please you; I at least shall rejoice in my liberty, since I experience it in myself.”¹⁰⁰ In the second place, however, Descartes argues that freedom of action must exist in order to justify praise and blame. “... It is the greatest perfection in man to be able to act by its [the will’s] means, that is, freely, and by so doing we are in a peculiar way masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or blame.”¹⁰¹

Both of Descartes’s conceptions of freedom are as forms of ‘power of choice.’ They correspond to the two forms of error which he has distinguished. One kind of freedom is the power to give or withhold assent in matters of which we have not certain knowledge. This conception is related to that of error in judgment. “...We experience a freedom through which we may abstain from accepting as true and indisputable those things of which we have not certain knowledge, and thus obviate our ever being deceived.”¹⁰² “. . . It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most ordinary notions that are found innately in us.”¹⁰³ The second kind of freedom is the power of choice between good and evil and is related to error in conduct. “... The faculty of will,” Descartes says, “consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or to shun it), or rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in doing so.”¹⁰⁴ Freedom in choosing does not imply indifference as to the choice. “For in order that I should be free it is not necessary that I should be indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two contraries; but contrariwise the more I lean to the one — the more freely do I choose and embrace it.” Indifference “is the lowest grade of liberty.”¹⁰⁵

Descartes has little to say with regard to the grace of God. It increases our liberty: “And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge, far from diminishing my liberty, rather

increase it and strengthen it.”¹⁰⁶ By grace, furthermore, we have an inner illumination which shows us that revelation is from God, “and that it is clearly impossible that He should lie: a fact more certain than any natural light and often indeed more evident than it on account of the light of grace.”¹⁰⁷ By the grace of God, also, I have received that perfection which befits a finite being, and therefore “I have every reason to render thanks to God who owes me nothing.”¹⁰⁸

The problem of harmonizing God’s pre-ordination and man’s freedom is simply ignored by Descartes. We are certain of our freedom¹⁰⁹ and we must believe in the omnipotence of God, from which follows His power to pre-ordain all that can happen.¹¹⁰ But the attempt to harmonize these two conceptions would involve us in great difficulties,¹¹⁰ since “our thought is finite,” and God’s power of pre-ordination is infinite.¹¹¹ Therefore, although we may “know that this power is in God” and are conscious of our own liberty, we have not intelligence “enough to comprehend how He leaves the free action of man indeterminate.”¹¹¹

III. The Likeness and the Difference Between the Two Thinkers.

It is difficult to compare the precise teachings of Augustine and of Descartes on the problem of freedom, for the two thinkers approached the problem from different angles. Yet there are two points of contact which we may note. In the first place, both relate the problem of evil to the doctrine of the self, through the central position given to the will and to our consciousness of ourselves as free in willing. A difference is found in the fact that Augustine conceives evil as a turning away of the will from the good, while Descartes asserts that it is the exercise of the will beyond the limit of certain knowledge. In the second place, both base their doctrine of freedom as power of choice on our consciousness of the possession of freedom. Descartes does not modify this conception, but Augustine, in his effort to reconcile this doctrine of freedom with the teachings of the Church, ends by restricting the power of choice to the first man, Adam, alone.

The fundamental difference, already stated, between Augustine, the theologian, and Descartes, the philosopher, is, in truth, nowhere more apparent than in the discussion of evil and of freedom. Descartes’s unconcern in purely theological matters is shown by the very brevity of his treatment of these subjects, for the domain of freedom lies very near the field of theology which he does not care to enter. The question of pre-ordination, also, he sets aside as outside his province. Augustine makes no such distinction between the fields of theology and philosophy, and therefore attempts to solve all the problems which arise. His predominant interest in theology is shown, in the discussion of evil, by his long explanation of the origin of evil in a world

which God created good. It appears again and most strikingly in the modification of his original doctrine of freedom to harmonize with the doctrines of the Church.

C. Historical Connection Between the Doctrines of Augustine and Descartes.

The great similarity of Descartes to Augustine in his fundamental doctrine of the certainty that ‘I exist’ and the minor likenesses, in his doctrine of freedom, at once suggest the question of Descartes’s knowledge of the teaching of Augustine. Our best source is the correspondence of Descartes, for in his philosophical works, mention of Augustine is found in only one place, that is, in his reply to Arnauld’s Objections to the Meditations. The references to Augustine may be divided into two classes, — those referring to the doctrine of the self, and those referring to other matters. The last-named of these classes, which is the larger, will be first considered.

(i) The first of the general references to Augustine is found in a letter to Mersenne, written

in 1638. “I have looked for the letter in which you cited the passage of St. Augustine, but I have not been able to find it. Moreover, I have not been able to gain access again to the works of the Saint, to see what you have written me about.”¹¹² In 1640, Descartes writes to Father Mersenne: “That which you have written me about St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, namely that our hearts and our thoughts are not in our power In this I quite agree with them.”¹¹³ In 1641, Descartes writes again to Mersenne: “But, as you write me about St. Augustine, I am not able to open the eyes of my readers or to make them give attention to the things which must be considered in order really to know the truth,”¹¹⁴ and further on in the same letter, he mentions a passage from Augustine concerning the possibility of knowing God. In April, 1641, Descartes sends Mersenne a list of passages from Augustine, cited by Arnauld in his *Objections to the Meditations*, and notes the fact that Augustine and others agree in his view that God cannot deceive.¹¹⁵ The next year finds Descartes writing to Mersenne that he cannot find a certain passage in Augustine’s works concerning the fortieth psalm, and that he has also looked for the account of the Pelagian heresy of which he had been accused.¹¹⁶ In 1644 (?) he writes to Father Mesland that there is no preference nor priority between God’s understanding and will, and quotes Augustine in support.¹¹⁷

(2) The other group of Descartes’s references to Augustine comprises those which deal with the doctrine of the self. The first of these is found in a letter to Mersenne, dated 1637, in which he writes that he has not mentioned the teaching of St. Augustine in *De Civitate Dei*, XI: 26 “since he does not seem to apply it as I do.”¹¹⁸ In 1640, he writes to a friend whose name is unknown to us, thanking him for calling attention to the likeness of the Cartesian argument for the existence of the self to that of St. Augustine. Descartes continues: “I have read it to-day in the Library of this city, and I have indeed found that he employs it to prove the certainty of our existence and finally to show that there is a kind of image of the Trinity in us. . . . Whereas I use it to show that this I which thinks, is an immaterial substance. These are two very different things, but I am glad to have read St. Augustine.”¹¹⁹ In 1640, Descartes writes to Mersenne: “You have already called my attention to the passage in St. Augustine concerning my ‘I think, therefore I am,’ which, I believe, you have asked me about before now. It is in the eleventh book of *De Civitate Dei*, chapter 26.”¹²⁰ In Arnauld’s *Objections to the Meditations*, he notes the identity between the fundamental doctrines of Augustine and those of Descartes¹²¹ and Descartes, in his reply, acknowledges the aid of Augustine’s authority.¹²² In 1644, writing to Father Mesland, Descartes expresses satisfaction that his thoughts “agree with those of so saintly and estimable a man.”¹²³

The evidence from Descartes’s letters thus shows clearly that he consistently declared his independence of Augustine’s teaching. Three considerations may be urged in favor of his sincerity. The first of these is the fact that he welcomes the aid of Augustine’s authority. The second is the unlikelihood that he invented the story of going to the city library to read Augustine. The third is the fact that Descartes was educated in a Jesuit school; and this makes it very probable that he knew nothing of Augustine’s thought. This third consideration alone needs elucidation.

Descartes’s school life of eight years was spent at the Jesuit College of La Fleche, newly established in the province of Maine. And the influence of the Jesuits did not end with his school days but continued throughout his life. He is, indeed, always most anxious to win the approval of the Jesuits for his work. Of course this wish to stand well with them must have been in part due to ulterior considerations of his own safety, but his references to them suggest also sincere feeling.¹²⁴ Now the Jesuits in Descartes’s time were wholly opposed to the teachings of Augustine. Their opposition was of long standing. From the time of Augustine onward, a fierce contest had been waged in the Church over the questions of grace and free will, and the teachings

of Augustine were the basis of the dispute. The Church, through the declarations of the Council of Trent (1563), had attempted to put an end to this bitter strife, but in vain. In France, where the conflict was destined to be waged most bitterly, Augustine was unknown at the beginning of the seventeenth century. A change came, however, when Jansenius and St. Cyran entered upon their effort to elevate the standard of the church by reviving the teaching of Augustine. The Jansenists thereupon became the champions of Augustine's teachings, especially with regard to freedom. The Jesuits, on the other hand, upheld the more liberal Pelagian view. Strife between the two parties began when the writings of Jansenius were condemned. It is easy to see that because of the bitterness of the contest Descartes's education under the care of the Jesuits would not have given him a knowledge of Augustine's works. And since he never interested himself in the works of his philosophical predecessors, there is every reason to believe that he reached his certainty of the self's existence in independence of Augustine's teaching. The fact that these two thinkers, under different conditions and in independence, have made the doctrine of the existence of the self the basis of their philosophical systems, indicates the value of this doctrine as the foundation for philosophy.

NOTES

¹ *City of God* (A.D. 413-426), XIX: 18. Translation by M. Dods in Vol. II of Works of St. Augustine, p. 328. This work and *On the Trinity* belong to the latest period of Augustine's thought.

² *On the Trinity* (A.D. 400-416), XV: 12. Translation by A. W. Haddan, in Works of St. Augustine, edited by M. Dods, Vol. VII, p. 402.

³ *Contra Academicos* (A.D. 386), II: 7, 8, 9, n, 12. In Opera Omnia, ed. J. P. Migne, Tomus I (Patrologiae Tomus XXXII), pp. 926 ff. This work belongs to Augustine's early period.

⁴ "Nihil posse percipi." *Contra Academicos*, III: 10; op. tit., p. 945.

⁵ *Contra Academicos*, III: 10; op. tit., p. 946. (Writer's translation.) Cf. III: 13. P- 949-

⁶ "Nulli rei debere assentiri." *Ibid.*, III: 10, p. 945.

⁷ *Contra Academicos*, III: 11; op. tit., p. 947. (Writer's translation.)

⁸ *De Beata Vita*, 37 (A.D. 386). In Opera Omnia, ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII), p. 963. (Writer's translation.)

⁹ *City of God*, XI: 26, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 468.

¹⁰ Cf. also, *On the Trinity*, X: 10, 11, op. cit., pp. 255, 259; *Confessions*, XIII: 11 (A.D. 400). Translation by J. Pilkington, in Works, ed. M. Dods, Vol. XIV, pp. 360, 361. *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 3 (A.D. 392), Opera, Tom. I, pp. 1243-1244.

¹¹ *City of God*, XI: 26, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 468.

¹² *On the Trinity*, XV: 15, op. cit., p. 409.

¹³ Op. cit., XV: 12, op. cit., p. 404.

¹⁴ *Soliloquies*, II: 1 (A.D. 386). Translation R. E. Cleveland, pp. 51, 52.

¹⁵ *On the Trinity*, X: 10, op. cit., p. 256.

¹⁶ *City of God*, XI: 27, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 471.

¹⁷ *De Immortalitate*, XI: 18 (A.D. 387). In Opera Omnia, ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII), pp. 1030, 1031. (Writer's translation.)

¹⁸ *De Libera Arbitrio*, II: 3 (A.D. 392). Opera, Tom. I (XXXII), p. 1243. (Writer's translation.)

- ¹⁹ *On the Trinity*, XV: 12, op. cit., p. 403.
- ²⁰ *City of God*, XI: 26, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 468, 469.
- ²¹ *On the Trinity*, X: 10, op. cit., p. 256.
- ²² *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, II. (Probably the earliest work of Descartes. Published in 1701.) Translation of E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Vol. I, p. 3-
- ²³ *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason* (1637), Pt. III, edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 99. Cf. *Meditations on First Philosophy*, I (1641), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 144; *The Search after Truth* (published 1701, date of writing unknown), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, p. 312-
- ²⁴ *Discourse*, Pt. II, op. cit., p. 91.
- ²⁵ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. *Rules*, II, op. cit., p. 3; *Meditations* I, op. cit., p. 144; *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), Part I, Props. I and II, edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I.
- ²⁶ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. *Meditations*, I, op. cit., p. 145; *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. IV.
- ²⁷ *Meditations*, I, op. cit., pp. 145, 146. Cf. *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101; *Search*, op. cit., pp. 313, 314; *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. IV.
- ²⁸ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, op. cit. Prop. V.
- ²⁹ *Meditations*, II, op. cit., p. 149. Cf. *Search*, op. cit., p. 315; *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101.
- ³⁰ *Meditations*, II, op. cit., p. 149.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- ³² *Search after Truth*, op. cit., p. 316.
- ³³ *Discourse*, Pt. IV, op. cit., p. 101. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VII.
- ³⁴ See Letter to Dinet (1642), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, pp. 347-376.
- ³⁵ *Principles*, Pt. IV, Prop. CCVII.
- ³⁶ *Works*, Vol. I, pp. 133-136.
- ³⁷ *Notes against a Certain Programme* (1647), edition by Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, pp. 438. 439-
- ³⁸ See above, AI.
- ³⁹ *De Libero Arbitrio*, I: 2, op. tit., p. 1224. (Writer's translation.) Cf. *Confessions*, VII: 5, op. cit.
- ⁴⁰ *Confessions*, VII: 9; *De Beata Vita*: 4.
- ⁴¹ *Confessions*, VII: 4, op. cit., p. 145.
- ⁴² *City of God*, XII: 2, op. cit.. Vol. I, pp. 483, 484.
- ⁴³ *Confessions*, VII: 5, op. cit., p. 146. Cf. *City of God*, XI: 21, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 461.
- ⁴⁴ *Confessions*, III: 7, op. oil., p. 46.
- ⁴⁵ *City of God*, XI: 9, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 447.
- ⁴⁶ Cf. *De Vera Religione*: 39. (A.D. 390). In *Opera Omnia*, ed. Migne, Tom. III (XXXIV), p. 138.
- ⁴⁷ *Confessions*, VII: 16, op. cit., p. 162.
- ⁴⁸ *City of God*, XII: 7, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 490. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 20, op. cit., p. 1269.
- ⁴⁹ *City of God*, XII: 8, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 491.
- ⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, XII: 9, p. 491.
- ⁵¹ *Confessions*, VII: 3, op. cit., p. 144.
- ⁵² *De Libero Arbitrio*, I: 12, op. cit., p. 1234. (Writer's translation.)

- ⁵³ *Soliloquies*, I: 1, op. cit., p. 8.
- ⁵⁴ *On the Trinity*, XI: 2, op. cit., p. 266.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, XI: 3. P- 268.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, XI: 8, pp. 279, 280.
- ⁵⁷ *City of God*, XIV: 6, op. tit., p. 9.
- ⁵⁸ *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 1, op. cil., p. 1272. (Writer's translation.)
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, I: 13, p. 1237. (Writer's translation.)
- ⁶⁰ *Confessions*, VII: 11, op. tit., p. 159.
- ⁶¹ *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 13, op. tit., p. 1261. (Writer's translation.)
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, I: 15, p. 1238. (Writer's translation.)
- ⁶³ *De Libero Arbitrio*, II: 1, op. cit., p. 1241 (Writer's translation). Retracted, see *Retractationes*, I: 9 (A.D. 427, 428). A critical review by Augustine of all his earlier works. Ed. Migne, Tom. I (XXXII).
- ⁶⁴ *Enchiridion*; 15, p. 249. (Works, op. cit., Vol. IX.)
- ⁶⁵ *City of God*, V: 9, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 192, 193.
- ⁶⁶ If God's knowledge be conceived, as in Book XI of the *Confessions*, as essentially timeless, causal efficiency is still less properly attributed to it. On this point, cf. Windelband, *History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. J. H. Tufts, p. 283.
- ⁶⁷ *Retractationes*, I: 9, op. cit., p. 598.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 595.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 596.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 596. (Writer's translation.) Augustine here refers specifically to the passage quoted above, pp. 23, 24.
- ⁷¹ *City of God*, X: 22, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 413.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, XXI: 12, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 438.
- ⁷³ Augustine, however, never definitely adopts this view. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 21 and *Retractationes*, I: 1, op. tit., p. 587.
- ⁷⁴ *City of God*, XIV: 11, op. oil.. Vol. II, p. 22.
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 26.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, XIII: 3, Vol. I, p. 523. Cf. *On the Trinity*, IV: 13, op. cit., p. 125. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 20, op. cit., p. 1297.
- ⁷⁷ *City of God*, XIII: 19, op. tit., Vol. I, p. 544-
- ⁷⁸ *City of God*, XIV: 15, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 28, 29. Cf. *On the Trinity*, IV: 12, op. cit., p. 124.
- ⁷⁸ *On the Trinity*, XIII: 16, op. cit., p. 333. Cf. *De Libero Arbitrio*, III: 19, op. cit., p. 1297.
- ⁸⁰ *City of God*, XII: 27, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 520.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, XIII: 3, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 523-
- ⁸² *On the Trinity*, IV: 18, op. cit., p. 133.
- ⁸³ *City of God*, XIV: 11, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 23.
- ⁸⁴ *Passions of the Soul* (A.D. 1650), edition of Haldane and Ross, Vol. I, Pt. I, Article XVII. Cf. Principles, Pt. I, Prop. XXXII.
- ⁸⁵ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXV.
- ⁸⁶ *Meditations*, IV, op. cit., p. 174.

- ⁸⁷ *Reply to Objection II*, op. cit., p. 44.
- ⁸⁸ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIII.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVIII.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXI. Cf. *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXIII.
- ⁹¹ *Meditations*, IV, op. cit., pp. 173, 177.
- ⁹² *Reply to Objection V*, op. cit., p. 223. Cf. *Reply to Objection III*, op. cit., p. 74.
- ⁹³ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XLII.
- ⁹⁴ *Meditations*, IV, op. cit., pp. 175-176.
- ⁹⁵ *Reply to Objection V*, op. cit., p. 225.
- ⁹⁶ *Meditations*, IV, op. cit., p. 178.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, IV, op. cit., p. 175.
- ⁹⁸ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XLI. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VI.
- ⁹⁹ *Reply to Objection III*, op. cit., p. 75.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Reply to Objection V*, op. cit., p. 225.
- ¹⁰¹ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVII.
- ¹⁰² *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. VI. Cf. *Meditations*, IV, op. oil., p. 177.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXIX.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Meditations*, IV, op. oil., p. 175.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, op. cit., p. 175. Cf. *Reply to Objection VI*, op. cit., p. 248.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, op. cit., p. 175.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Reply to Objection II*, op. cit., pp. 43, 44.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Meditations*, IV, op. cit., p. 177. Cf. *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XXXVIII.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Reply to Objection III*, op. cit., p. 75.
- ¹¹⁰ *Principles*, Pt. I, Prop. XL.
- ¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, Pt. I, Prop. XLI.
- ¹¹² Lettre CXLIX, Tome II, Oeuvres de Descartes publiees par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, Paris, 1897-1910, p. 435. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹¹³ Lettre CCXX, op. cit.. Tome III, p. 248. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹¹⁴ Lettre CCXXVII, op. cit.. Tome III, pp. 283, 284. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹¹⁵ Lettre CCXXXVII, op. cit.. Tome III, pp. 358, 359, 360.
- ¹¹⁶ Lettre CCLXXIII, op. cit.. Tome III, pp. 543. 544-
- ¹¹⁷ Lettre CCCXLVII, op. cit.. Tome IV, p. 119.
- ¹¹⁸ Lettre LXXVI, op. cit.. Tome I, p. 376. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹¹⁹ Lettre CCIX, op. cit.. Tome III, pp. 247, 248. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹²⁰ Lettre CCXXII, op. cit.. Tome III, p. 261. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹²¹ *Objection IV*, Works, op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 80.
- ¹²² *Reply to Objection IV*, Works, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 06.
- ¹²³ Lettre CCCXLVII, op. cit.. Tome IV, p. 113. (Writer's translation.)
- ¹²⁴ Descartes's regard for the opinion of the Jesuits is shown in the Dedication of the *Meditations*. It finds

expression also in the Letter to Dinet. (Cf. Works, ed. Haldane and Ross, Vol. II, pp. 347 ff.) and in the annotations on Objection VII to the *Meditations*.

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