Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God

Immanuel Kant

It is easily perceived…that the concept of an absolutely necessary Being is a concept of pure reason, that is, a mere idea, the objective reality of which is by no means proved by the fact that reason requires it. That idea does no more than point to a certain but unattainable completeness, and serves rather to limit the understanding, than to extend its sphere. It seems strange and absurd, however, that a conclusion of an absolutely necessary existence from a given existence in general should seem urgent and correct, and that yet all the conditions under which the understanding can form a concept of such a necessity should be entirely against us.

People have at all times been talking of an **absolutely necessary** Being, but they have tried, not so much to understand whether and how a thing of that kind could even be conceived, as rather to prove its existence. No doubt a verbal definition of that concept is quite easy, if we say that it is something the non-existence of which is impossible. This, however, does not make us much wiser with reference to the conditions that make it necessary to consider the non-existence of a thing as absolutely inconceivable. It is these conditions which we want to know, and whether by that concept we are thinking anything or not. For to use the word **unconditioned**, in order to get rid of all the conditions which the understanding always requires, when wishing to conceive something as necessary, does not render it clear to us in the least whether, after that, we are still thinking anything or perhaps nothing, by the concept of the unconditionally necessary.

Nay, more than this, people have imagined that by a number of examples they had explained this concept, at first risked at haphazard, and afterwards become quite familiar, and that therefore all further inquiry regarding its intelligibility were unnecessary. It was said that every proposition of geometry, such as, for instance, that a triangle has three angles, is absolutely necessary, and people began to talk of an object entirely outside the sphere of our understanding, as if they understood perfectly well what, by that concept, they wished to predicate of it.

But all these pretended examples are taken without exception from **judgments** only, not from **things**, and their existence. Now the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the same thing as an absolute necessity of things. The absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing, or of the predicate in the judgment. The above proposition did not say that three angles were absolutely necessary, but that under the condition of the existence of a triangle, three angles are given in it by necessity. Nevertheless, this pure logical necessity has exerted so powerful an illusion, that, after having formed of a thing a concept **a priori** so constituted that it seemed to include existence in its sphere, people thought they could conclude with certainty that, because existence necessarily belongs to the object of that concept, provided always that I accept the thing as given (existing), its existence also must necessarily be accepted (according to the rule of identity), and that the Being therefore must
itself be absolutely necessary, because its existence is implied in a concept, which is accepted voluntarily only, and always under the condition that I accept the object of it as given.

If in an identical judgment I reject the predicate and retain the subject, there arises a contradiction, and hence, I say, that the former belongs to the latter necessarily. But if I reject the subject as well as the predicate, there is no contradiction, because there is nothing left that can be contradicted. To accept a triangle and yet to reject its three angles is contradictory, but there is no contradiction at all in admitting the non-existence of the triangle and of its three angles. The same applies to the concept of an absolutely necessary Being. Remove its existence, and you remove the thing itself, with all its predicates, so that a contradiction becomes impossible. There is nothing external to which the contradiction could apply, because the thing is not meant to be externally necessary; nor is there anything internal that could be contradicted, for in removing the thing out of existence, you have removed at the same time all its internal qualities. If you say, God is almighty, that is a necessary judgment, because almightiness cannot be removed, if you accept a deity, that is, an infinite Being, with the concept of which that other concept is identical. But if you say, God is not, then neither his almightiness, nor any other of his predicates is given; they are all, together with the subject, removed out of existence, and therefore there is not the slightest contradiction in that sentence.

We have seen therefore that, if I remove the predicate of a judgment together with its subject, there can never be an internal contradiction, whatever the predicate may be. The only way of evading this conclusion would be to say that there are subjects which cannot be removed out of existence, but must always remain. But this would be the same as to say that there exist absolutely necessary subjects, an assumption the correctness of which I have called in question, and the possibility of which you had undertaken to prove. For I cannot form to myself the smallest concept of a thing which, if it had been removed together with all its predicates, should leave behind a contradiction; and except contradiction, I have no other test of impossibility by pure concepts a priori. Against all these general arguments (which no one can object to) you challenge me with a case, which you represent as a proof by a fact, namely, that there is one, and this one concept only, in which the non-existence or the removal of its object would be self-contradictory, namely, the concept of the most real Being (ens realissimum). You say that it possesses all reality, and you are no doubt justified in accepting such a Being as possible. This for the present I may admit, though the absence of self-contradictoriness in a concept is far from proving the possibility of its object. Now reality comprehends existence, and therefore existence is contained in the concept of a thing possible. If that thing is removed, the internal possibility of the thing would be removed, and this is self-contradictory.

I answer: — Even in introducing into the concept of a thing, which you wish to think in its possibility only, the concept of its existence, under whatever disguise it may be, you have been guilty of a contradiction. If you were allowed to do this, you would apparently have carried your point; but in reality you have achieved nothing, but have only committed a tautology. I simply ask you, whether the proposition, that this or that thing exists, is an analytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, then by its existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing; but in that case, either the thought within you would be the thing itself, or you have presupposed existence, as belonging to possibility, and have according to your own showing deduced existence from internal possibility, which is nothing but a miserable tautology. The mere word reality, which in the concept of a thing sounds different from existence in the concept of the predicate, can make no difference. For if you call all accepting or positing (without determining what it is) reality, you have placed a thing, with all its predicates, within the concept of the subject, and accepted it as real, and you do nothing but repeat it in the predicate. If, on the contrary, you admit, as
every sensible man must do, that every proposition involving existence is synthetical, how
can you say that the predicate of existence does not admit of removal without contradiction, a
distinguishing property which is peculiar to analytical propositions only, the very character of
which depends on it?

I might have hoped to put an end to this subtle argumentation, without many words, and
simply by an accurate definition of the concept of existence, if I had not seen that the illusion,
in mistaking a logical predicate for a real one (that is the predicate which determines a thing),
resists all correction. Everything can become a logical predicate, even the subject itself may be
predicated of itself, because logic takes no account of any contents of concepts. Determination,
however, is a predicate, added to the concept of the subject, and enlarging it, and it must not
therefore be contained in it.

Being is evidently not a real predicate, or a concept of something that can be added to the
concept of a thing. It is merely the admission of a thing, and of certain determinations in it.
Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is almighty, contains
two concepts, each having its object, namely, God and almightiness. The small word is, is not
an additional predicate, but only serves to put the predicate in relation to the subject. If, then, I
take the subject (God) with all its predicates (including that of almightiness), and say, God is, or
there is a God, I do not put a new predicate to the concept of God, but I only put the subject by
itself, with all its predicates, in relation to my concept, as its object. Both must contain exactly
the same kind of thing, and nothing can have been added to the concept, which expresses
possibility only, by my thinking its object as simply given and saying, it is. And thus the real
does not contain more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more
than a hundred possible dollars. For as the latter signify the concept, the former the object and
its position by itself, it is clear that, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept
would not express the whole object, and would not therefore be its adequate concept. In my
financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their concept
only (that is their possibility), because in reality the object is not only contained analytically in
my concept, but is added to my concept (which is a determination of my state), synthetically;
but the conceived hundred dollars are not in the least increased through the existence which is
outside my concept.

By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing (even in completely
determining it), nothing is really added to it, if I add that the thing exists. Otherwise, it would
not be the same that exists, but something more than was contained in the concept, and I
could not say that the exact object of my concept existed. Nay, even if I were to think in a
thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality would not be supplied by my saying that
so defective a thing exists, but it would exist with the same defect with which I thought it; or
what exists would be different from what I thought. If, then, I try to conceive a being, as the
highest reality (without any defect), the question still remains, whether it exists or not. For
though in my concept there may be wanting nothing of the possible real content of a thing
in general, something is wanting in its relation to my whole state of thinking, namely, that
the knowledge of that object should be possible a posteriori also. And here we perceive the
cause of our difficulty. If we were concerned with an object of our senses, I could not mistake
the existence of a thing for the mere concept of it; for by the concept the object is thought as
only in harmony with the general conditions of a possible empirical knowledge, while by its
existence it is thought as contained in the whole content of experience. Through this connection
with the content of the whole experience, the concept of an object is not in the least increased;
our thought has only received through it one more possible perception. If, however, we are
thinking existence through the pure category alone, we need not wonder that we cannot find any
characteristic to distinguish it from mere possibility.

Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it, in order to attribute to it existence. With objects of the senses, this takes place through their connection with any one of my perceptions, according to empirical laws; with objects of pure thought, however, there is no means of knowing their existence, because it would have to be known entirely a priori, while our consciousness of every kind of existence, whether immediately by perception, or by conclusions which connect something with perception, belongs entirely to the unity of experience, and any existence outside that field, though it cannot be declared to be absolutely impossible, is a presupposition that cannot be justified by anything.

The concept of a Supreme Being is, in many respects, a very useful idea, but, being an idea only, it is quite incapable of increasing, by itself alone, our knowledge with regard to what exists. It cannot even do so much as to inform us any further as to its possibility. The analytical characteristic of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in mere positions (realities), cannot be denied to it; but the connection of all real properties in one and the same thing is a synthesis the possibility of which we cannot judge a priori because these realities are not given to us as such, and because, even if this were so, no judgment whatever takes place, it being necessary to look for the characteristic of the possibility of synthetical knowledge in experience only, to which the object of an idea can never belong. Thus we see that the celebrated Leibniz is far from having achieved what he thought he had, namely, to understand a priori the possibility of so sublime an ideal Being.

Time and labour therefore are lost on the famous ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a Supreme Being from mere concepts; and a man might as well imagine that he could become richer in knowledge by mere ideas, as a merchant in capital, if, in order to improve his position, he were to add a few noughts to his cash account.