The Dilemma of Determinism
William James

A common opinion prevails that the juice has ages ago been pressed out of the free-will controversy, and that no new champion can do more than warm up stale arguments which everyone has heard. This is a radical mistake. I know of no subject less worn out, or in which inventive genius has a better chance of breaking open new ground—not, perhaps, of forcing a conclusion or of coercing assent, but of deepening our sense of what the issue between the two parties really is, of what the ideas of fate and of free will imply. At our very side almost, in the past few years, we have seen falling in rapid succession from the press works that present the alternative in entirely novel lights. Not to speak of the English disciples of Hegel, such as Green and Bradley; not to speak of Hinton and Hodgson, nor of Hazard here—we see in the writings of Renouvier, Fouillée, and Delbœuf how completely changed and refreshed is the form of all the old disputes. I cannot pretend to vie in originality with any of the masters I have named, and my ambition limits itself to just one little point. If I can make two of the necessarily implied corollaries of determinism clearer to you than they have been made before, I shall have made it possible for you to decide for or against that doctrine with a better understanding of what you are about. And if you prefer not to decide at all, but to remain doubters, you will at least see more plainly what the subject of your hesitation is. I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove to you that the freedom of the will is true. The most I hope is to induce some of you to follow my own example in assuming it true, and acting as if it were true. If it be true, it seems to me that this is involved in the strict logic of the case. Its truth ought not to be forced willy-nilly down our indifferent throats. It ought to be freely espoused by men who can equally well turn their backs upon it. In other words, our first act of freedom, if we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free. This should exclude, it seems to me, from the freewill side of the question all hope of a coercive demonstrations,—a demonstration which I, for one, am perfectly contented to go without.

With thus much understood at the outset, we can advance. But not without one more point understood as well. The arguments I am about to urge all proceed on two suppositions: first, when we make theories about the world and discuss them with one another, we do so in order to attain a conception of things which shall give us subjective satisfaction; and, second, if there be two conceptions, and the one seems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other, we are entitled to suppose that the more rational one is the truer of the two. I hope that you are all willing to make these suppositions with me; for I am afraid that if there be any of you here who are not, they will find little edification in the rest of what I have to say. I cannot stop to argue the point; but I myself believe that all the magnificent achievements of mathematical and physical science—our doctrines of evolution, of uniformity of law, and the rest—proceed from our indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational shape in our minds than the shape into which it is thrown there by the crude order of our experience. The world has shown itself, to a great extent, plastic to this demand of ours for rationality. How much farther it will show itself plastic no one can say. Our only means of finding out is to try; and I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions
of moral as of mechanical or of logical rationality. If a certain formula for expressing the
nature of the world violates my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard,
or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for
example; the one demand being, so far as I can see, quite as subjective and emotional as the
other is. The principle of causality, for example—what is it but a postulate, an empty name
covering simply a demand that the sequence of events shall some day manifest a deeper
kind of belonging of one thing with another than the mere arbitrary juxtaposition which
now phenomenally appears? It is as much an altar to an unknown god as the one that Saint
Paul found at Athens. All our scientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods.
Uniformity is as much so as is free will. If this be admitted, we can debate on even terms.
But if anyone pretends that while freedom and variety are, in the first instance, subjective
demands, necessity and uniformity are something altogether different, I do not see how we
can debate at all.

To begin, then, I must suppose you acquainted with all the usual arguments on the
subject. I cannot stop to take up the old proofs from causation, from statistics, from the
certainty with which we can foretell one another’s conduct, from the fixity of character,
and all the rest. But there are two words which usually encumber these classical arguments,
and which we must immediately dispose of if we are to make any progress. One is the
eulogistic word freedom, and the other is the opprobrious word chance. The word “chance”
I wish to keep, but I wish to get rid of the word “freedom.” Its eulogistic associations
have so far overshadowed all the rest of its meaning that both parties claim the sole right
to use it, and determinists today insist that they alone are freedom’s champions. Old-
fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not shrink from
such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we
have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and
even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity
understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom. Even a writer as
little used to making capital out of soft words as Mr. Hodgson hesitates not to call himself
a “free-will determinist.”

Now, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely
smothered. Freedom in all these senses presents simply no problem at all. No matter what
the soft determinist means by it,—whether he means the acting without external constraint;
whether he means the acting rightly, or whether he means the acquiescing in the law of the
whole,—who cannot answer him that sometimes we are free and sometimes we are not?
But there is a problem, an issue of fact and not of words, an issue of the most momentous
importance, which is often decided without discussion in one sentence,—nay, in one
clause of a sentence,—by those very writers who spin out whole chapters in their efforts to
show what “true” freedom is; and that is the question of determinism, about which we are
to talk tonight.

Fortunately, no ambiguities hang about this word or about its opposite, indeterminism.
Both designate an outward way in which things may happen, and their cold and mathematical
sound has no sentimental associations that can bribe our partiality either way in advance.
Now, evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is, as
I intimated a while back, strictly impossible to find. Let us look at the difference between
them and see for ourselves. What does determinism profess?

It professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and
decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in
its womb; the part we call the present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future
complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible. The whole is in each and every
part, and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be
no equivocation or shadow of turning.

With earth’s first clay they did the last man knead,
And there of the last harvest sowed the seed.
And the first morning of creation wrote
What the last dawn of reckoning shall read.

Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what the others shall be. It admits that possibilities may be in excess of actualities, and that things not yet revealed to our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be really possible; and the one becomes impossible only at the very moment when the other excludes it by becoming real itself. Indeterminism thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact. It says there is a certain ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things. To that view, actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of which they are chosen; and, somewhere, indeterminism says, such possibilities exist, and form a part of truth.

Determinism, on the contrary, says they exist nowhere, and that necessity on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get realized are, for determinism, pure illusions: they never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, it says, about this universe of ours, all that was or is or shall be actual in it having been from eternity virtually there. The cloud of alternatives our minds escort this mass of actuality with is a cloud of sheer deceptions, to which “impossibilities” is the only name that rightfully belongs.

The issue, it will be seen, is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over or wipe out. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying with one side makes the other false.

The question relates solely to the existence of possibilities, in the strict sense of the term, as things that may, but need not, be. Both sides admit that a volition, for instance, has occurred. The indeterminists say another volition might have occurred in its place: the determinists swear that nothing could possibly have occurred in its place. Now, can science be called in to tell us which of these two point-blank contradicters of each other is right? Science professes to draw no conclusions but such as are based on matters of fact, things that have actually happened; but how can any amount of assurance that something actually happened give us the least grain of information as to whether another thing might or might not have happened in its place? Only facts can be proved by other facts. With things that are possibilities and not facts, facts have no concern. If we have no other evidence than the evidence of existing facts, the possibility-question must remain a mystery never to be cleared up.

And the truth is that facts practically have hardly anything to do with making us either determinists or indeterminists. Sure enough, we make a flourish of quoting facts this way or that; and if we are determinists, we talk about the infallibility with which we can predict one another’s conduct; while if we are indeterminists, we lay great stress on the fact that it is just because we cannot foretell one another’s conduct, either in war or statecraft or in any of the great and small intrigues and businesses of men, that life is so intensely anxious and hazardous a game. But who does not see the wretched insufficiency of this so-called objective testimony on both sides? What fills up the gaps in our minds is something not objective, not external. What divides us into possibility men and anti-possibility men is different faiths or postulates,—postulates of rationality. To this man the world seems more
rational with possibilities in it,—to that man more rational with possibilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us monists or pluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always some sentiment like this.

The stronghold of the determinist sentiment is the antipathy to the idea of chance. As soon as we begin to talk indeterminism to our friends, we find a number of them shaking their heads. This notion of alternative possibilities, they say, this admission that any one of several things may come to pass, is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance; and chance is something the notion of which no sane mind can for an instant tolerate in the world. What is it, they ask, but barefaced crazy unreason, the negation of intelligibility and law? And if the slightest particle of it exists anywhere, what is to prevent the whole fabric from falling together, the stars from going out, and chaos from recommencing her topsy-turvy reign?

Remarks of this sort about chance will put an end to discussion as quickly as anything one can find. I have already told you that “chance” was a word I wished to keep and use. Let us then examine exactly what it means, and see whether it ought to be such a terrible bugbear to us. I fancy that squeezing the thistle boldly will rob it of its sting.

The sting of the word “chance” seems to lie in the assumption that it means something positive, and that if anything happens by chance, it must needs be something of an intrinsically irrational and preposterous sort. Now, chance means nothing of the kind. It is a purely negative and relative term, giving us no information about that of which it is predicated, except that it happens to be disconnected with something else-not controlled, secured, or necessitated by other things in advance of its own actual presence. As this point is the most subtle one of the whole lecture, and at the same time the point on which all the rest hinges, I beg you to pay particular attention to it. What I say is that it tells us nothing about what a thing may be in itself to call it “chance.” It may be a bad thing, it may be a good thing. It may be lucidity, transparency, fitness incarnate, matching the whole system of other things, when it has once befallen, in an unimaginably perfect way. All you mean by calling it “chance” is that this is not guaranteed, that it may also fall out otherwise. For the system of other things has no positive hold on the chance-thing. Its origin is in a certain fashion negative: it escapes, and says, Hands off! coming, when it comes, as a free gift, or not at all.

This negativeness, however, and this opacity of the chance-thing when thus considered ab extra, or from the point of view of previous things or distant things, do not preclude its having any amount of positiveness and luminosity from within, and at its own place and moment. All that its chance-character asserts about it is that there is something in it really of its own, something that is not the unconditional property of the whole. If the whole wants this property, the whole must wait till it can get it, if it be a matter of chance. That the universe may actually be a sort of joint-stock society of this sort, in which the sharers have both limited liabilities and limited powers, is of course a simple and conceivable notion.

Nevertheless, many persons talk as if the minutest dose of disconnectedness of one part with another, the smallest modicum of independence, the faintest tremor of ambiguity about the future, for example, would ruin everything, and turn this goodly universe into a sort of insane sand-heap or nulliverse, no universe at all. Since future human volitions are as a matter of fact the only ambiguous things we are tempted to believe in, let us stop for a moment to make ourselves sure whether their independent and accidental character need be fraught with such direful consequences to the universe as these.

What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance as far as the present moment is concerned? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street are called; but that only one, and that one either one, shall be chosen. Now, I ask you seriously to suppose that this ambiguity of my choice
is real; and then to make the impossible hypothesis that the choice is made twice over, and each time falls on a different street. In other words, imagine that I first walk through Divinity Avenue, and then imagine that the powers governing the universe annihilate ten minutes of time with all that it contained, and set me back at the door of this hall just as I was before the choice was made. Imagine then that, everything else being the same, I now make a different choice and traverse Oxford Street. You, as passive spectators, look on and see the two alternative universes,—one of them with me walking through Divinity Avenue in it, the other with the same me walking through Oxford Street. Now, if you are determinists you believe one of these universes to have been from eternity impossible: you believe it to have been impossible because of the intrinsic irrationality or accidentality somewhere involved in it. But looking outwardly at these universes, can you say which is the impossible and accidental one, and which the rational and necessary one? I doubt if the most ironclad determinist among you could have the slightest glimmer of light on this point. In other words, either universe after the fact and once there would, to our means of observation and understanding, appear just as rational as the other. There would be absolutely no criterion by which we might judge one necessary and the other matter of chance. Suppose now we relieve the gods of their hypothetical task and assume my choice, once made, to be made forever. I go through Divinity Avenue for good and all. If, as good determinists, you now begin to affirm, what all good determinists punctually do affirm, that in the nature of things I couldn’t have gone through Oxford Street,—had I done so it would have been chance, irrationality, insanity, a horrid gap in nature,—I simply call your attention to this, that your affirmation is what the Germans call a Machtspruch, a mere conception fulminated as a dogma and based on no insight into details. Before my choice, either street seemed as natural to you as to me. Had I happened to take Oxford Street, Divinity Avenue would have figured in your philosophy as the gap in nature; and you would have so proclaimed it with the best deterministic conscience in the world.

But what a hollow outcry, then, is this against a chance which, if it were presented to us, we could by no character whatever distinguish from a rational necessity! I have taken the most trivial of examples, but no possible example could lead to any different result. For what are the alternatives which, in point of fact, offer themselves to human volition? What are those futures that no seem matters of chance? Are they not one and all the Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street of our example? Are they not all of them kinds of things already here and based in the existing frame of nature? Is anyone ever tempted to produce an absolute accident, something utterly irrelevant to the rest of the world? Do not the motives that assail us, all the futures that offer themselves to our choice, spring equally from the soil of the past; and would not either one of them, whether realized through chance or necessity, the moment it was realized, seem to us to fit that past, and in the completest and most continuous manner to interdigitate with the phenomena already there?

The more one thinks of the matter, the more one wonders that so empty and gratuitous a hubbub as this outcry against chance should have found so great an echo in the hearts of men. It is a word which tells us absolutely nothing about what chances, or about the modus operandi of the chancing; and the use of it as a war cry shows only a temper of intellectual absolutism, a demand that the world shall be a solid block, subject to one control,—which temper, which demand, the world may not be found to gratify at all. In every outwardly verifiable and practical respect, a world in which the alternatives that now actually distract your choice were decided by pure chance would be by me absolutely undistinguished from the world in which I now live. I am, therefore, entirely willing to call it, so far as your choices go, a world of chance for me. To yourselves, it is true, those very acts of choice, which to me are so blind, opaque, and external, are the opposites of this, for you are within them and effect them. To you they appear as decisions; and decisions, for him who makes
them, are altogether peculiar psychic facts. Self-luminous and self-justifying at the living
moment at which they occur, they appeal to no outside moment to put its stamp upon them
or make them continuous with the rest of nature. Themselves it is rather who seem to make
nature continuous; and in their strange and intense function of granting consent to one
possibility and withholding it from another, to transform an equivocal and double future
into an unalterable and simple past.

But with the psychology of the matter we have no concern this evening. The quarrel which
determinism has with chance fortunately has nothing to do with this or that psychological
detail. It is a quarrel altogether metaphysical. Determinism denies the ambiguity of future
volitions, because it affirms that nothing future can be ambiguous. But we have said enough
to meet the issue. Indeterminate future volitions do mean chance. Let us not fear to shout
it from the house-tops if need be; for we now know that the idea of chance is, at bottom,

exactly the same thing as the idea of gift,—the one simply being a disparaging, and the
other a eulogistic, name for anything on which we have no effective claim. And whether
the world be the better or the worse for having either chances or gifts in it will depend
altogether on what these uncertain and unclaimable things turn out to be.

And this at last brings us within sight of our subject. We have seen what determinism
means: we have seen that indeterminism is rightly described as meaning chance; and we
have seen that chance, the very name of which we are urged to shrink from as from a
metaphysical pestilence, means only the negative fact that no part of the world, however
big, can claim to control absolutely the destinies of the whole. But although, in discussing
the word “chance,” I may at moments have seemed to be arguing for its real existence, I
have not meant to do so yet. We have not yet ascertained whether this be a world of chance
or no; at most, we have agreed that it seems so. And I now repeat what I said at the outset,
that, from any strict theoretical point of view, the question is insoluble. To deepen our
theoretic sense of the difference between a world with chances in it and a deterministic
world is the most I can hope to do; and this I may now at last begin upon, after all our
tedious clearing of the way.

I wish first of all to show you just what the notion that this is a deterministic world
implies. The implications I call your attention to are all bound up with the fact that it is
a world in which we constantly have to make what I shall, with your permission, call
judgments of regret. Hardly an hour passes in which we do not wish that something might
be otherwise; and happy indeed are those of us whose hearts have never echoed the wish
of Omar Khayam—

That we might clasp, ere closed, the book of fate,
   And make the writer on a fairer leaf
Inscribe our names, or quite obliterate.

Ah! Love, could you and I with fate conspire
To mend this sorry scheme of things entire,
   Would we not shatter it to bits, and then
Remold it nearer to the heart’s desire?

Now, it is undeniable that most of these regrets are foolish, and quite on a par in point of
philosophic value with the criticisms on the universe of that friend of our infancy, the hero
of the fable “The Atheist and the Acorn,”—

Fool! had that bough a pumpkin bore,
Thy whimsies would have worked no more, etc.
Even from the point of view of our own ends, we should probably make a botch of remodeling the universe. How much more then from the point of view of ends we cannot see! Wise men therefore regret as little as they can. But still some regrets are pretty obstinate and hard to stifle,—regrets for acts of wanton cruelty or treachery, for example, whether performed by others or by ourselves. Hardly any one can remain entirely optimistic after reading the confession of the murderer at Brockton the other day: how, to get rid of the wife whose continued existence bored him, he inveigled her into a desert spot, shot her four times, and then, as she lay on the ground and said to him, “You didn’t do it on purpose, did you, dear?” replied, “No, I didn’t do it on purpose,” as he raised a rock and smashed her skull. Such an occurrence, with the mild sentence and self-satisfaction of the prisoner, is a field for a crop of regrets, which one need not take up in detail. We feel that, although a perfect mechanical fit to the rest of the universe, it is a bad moral fit, and that something else would really have been better in its place.

But for the deterministic philosophy the murder, the sentence, and the prisoner’s optimism were all necessary from eternity; and nothing else for a moment had a ghost of a chance of being put in their place. To admit such a chance, the determinists tell us, would be to make a suicide of reason; so we must steel our hearts against the thought. And here our plot thickens, for we see the first of those difficult implications of determinism and monism, which it is my purpose to make you feel. If this Brockton murder was called for by the rest of the universe, if it had to come at its preappointed hour, and if nothing else would have been consistent with the sense of the whole, what are we to think of the universe? Are we stubbornly to stick to our judgment of regret, and say, though it couldn’t be, yet it would have been a better universe with something different from this Brockton murder in it? That, of course, seems the natural and spontaneous thing for us to do; and yet it is nothing short of deliberately espousing a kind of pessimism. The judgment of regret calls the murder bad. Calling a thing bad means, if it means anything at all, that the thing ought not to be, that something else ought to be in its stead. Determinism, in denying that anything else can be in its stead, virtually defines the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible,—in other words, as an organism whose constitution is afflicted with an incurable taint, an irremediable flaw. The pessimism of a Schopenhauer says no more than this,—that the murder is a symptom; and that it is a vicious symptom because it belongs to a vicious whole, which can express its nature no otherwise than by bringing forth just such a symptom as that at this particular spot. Regret for the murder must transform itself, if we are determinists and wise, into a larger regret. It is absurd to regret the murder alone. Other things being what they are, it could not be different. What we should regret is that whole frame of things of which the murder is one member. I see no escape whatever from this pessimistic conclusion if, being determinists, our judgment of regret is to be allowed to stand at all.

The only deterministic escape from pessimism is everywhere to abandon the judgment of regret. That this can be done, history shows to be not impossible. The devil, *quoad existentiam*, may be good. That is, although he be a principle of evil, yet the universe, with such a principle in it, may practically be a better universe than it could have been without. On every hand, in a small way, we find that a certain amount of evil is a condition by which a higher form of good is brought. There is nothing to prevent anybody from generalizing this view, and trusting that if we could but see things in the largest of all ways, even such matters as this Brockton murder would appear to be paid for by the uses that follow in their train. An optimism quand même, a systematic and infatuated optimism like that ridiculed by Voltaire in his *Candide*, is one of the possible ideal ways in which a man may train himself to look on life. Bereft of dogmatic hardness and lit up with the expression of a tender and pathetic hope, such an optimism has been the grace of some of the most
religious characters that ever lived.

    Throb thine with Nature's throbbing breast,
    And all is clear from east to west.

    Even cruelty and treachery may be among the absolutely blessed fruits of time, and
to quarrel with any of their details may be blasphemy. The only real blasphemy, in short,
may be that pessimistic temper of the soul which lets it give way to such things as regrets,
remorse, and grief.

    Thus, our deterministic pessimism may become a deterministic optimism at the price of
extinguishing our judgments of regret.

    But does not this immediately bring us into a curious logical predicament? Our
determinism leads us to call our judgments of regret wrong, because they are pessimistic
in implying that what is impossible yet ought to be. But how then about the judgments of
regret themselves? If they are wrong, other judgments, judgments of approval presumably,
ought to be in their place. But as they are necessitated, nothing else can be in their place; and
the universe is just what it was before,--namely, a place in which what ought to be appears
impossible. We have got one foot out of the pessimistic bog, but the other one sinks all the
deeper. We have rescued our actions from the bonds of evil, but our judgments are now
held fast. When murders and treacheries cease to be sins, regrets are theoretic absurdities
and errors. The theoretic and the active life thus play a kind of see-saw with each other on
the ground of evil. The rise of either sends the other down. Murder and treachery cannot be
good without regret being bad: regret cannot be good without treachery and murder being
bad. Both, however, are supposed to have been foredoomed; so something must be fatally
unreasonable, absurd, and wrong in the world. It must be a place of which either sin or
error forms a necessary part. From this dilemma there seems at first sight no escape. Are
we then so soon to fall back into the pessimism from which we thought we had emerged?
And is there no possible way by which we may, with good intellectual consciences, call the
cruelties and treacheries, the reluctances and the regrets, all good together?

    Certainly there is such a way, and you are probably most of you ready to formulate
it yourselves. But, before doing so, remark how inevitably the question of determinism
and indeterminism slides us into the question of optimism and pessimism, or, as our
fathers called it, “the question of evil.” The theological form of all these disputes is the
simplest and the deepest, the form from which there is the least escape—not because, as
some have sarcastically said, remorse and regret are clung to us with a morbid fondness by
the theologians as spiritual luxuries, but because they are existing facts of the world, and
as such must be taken into account in the deterministic interpretation of all that is fated to
be. If they are fated to be error, does not the bat’s wing of irrationality still cast its shadow
over the world?...

    …[T]he only consistent way of representing a pluralism and a world whose parts may
affect one another through their conduct being either good or bad is the indeterministic
way. What interest, zest, or excitement can there be in achieving the right way, unless we
are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a natural way,—nay, more, a
menacing and an imminent way? And what sense can there be in condemning ourselves for
taking the wrong way, unless we need have done nothing of the sort, unless the right way
was open to us as well? I cannot understand the willingness to act, no matter how we feel,
without the belief that acts are really good and bad. I cannot understand the belief that an
act is bad, without regret at its happening. I cannot understand regret without the admission
of real, genuine possibilities in the world. Only then is it other than a mockery to feel, after
we have failed to do our best, that an irreparable opportunity is gone from the universe, the
loss of which it must forever after mourn.

If you insist that this is all superstition, that possibility is in the eye of science and reason impossibility, and that if I act badly "tis that the universe was foredoomed to suffer this defect, you fall right back into the dilemma, the labyrinth, of pessimism and subjectivism, from out of whose toils we have just found our way.

Now, we are of course free to fall back, if we please. For my own part, though, whatever difficulties may beset the philosophy of objective right and wrong, and the indeterminism it seems to imply, determinism, with its alternative of pessimism or romanticism, contains difficulties that are greater still. But you will remember that I expressly repudiated a while ago the pretension to offer any arguments which could be coercive in a so-called scientific fashion in this matter. And I consequently find myself, at the end of this long talk, obliged to state my conclusions in an altogether personal way. This personal method of appeal seems to be among the very conditions of the problem; and the most anyone can do is to confess as candidly as he can the grounds for the faith that is in him, and leave his example to work on others as it may.

Let me, then, without circumlocution say just this. The world is enigmatical enough in all conscience, whatever theory we may take up toward it. The indeterminism I defend, the free-will theory of popular sense based on the judgment of regret, represents that world as vulnerable, and liable to be injured by certain of its parts if they act wrong. And it represents their acting wrong as a matter of possibility or accident, neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly warded off. In all this, it is a theory devoid either of transparency or of stability. It gives us a pluralistic, restless universe, in which no single point of view can ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever unacceptable. A friend with such a mind once told me that the thought of my universe made him sick, like the sight of the horrible motion of a mass of maggots in their carrion bed.

But while I freely admit that the pluralism and the restlessness are repugnant and irrational in a certain way, I find that every alternative to them is irrational in a deeper way. The indeterminism with its maggots, if you please to speak so about it, offends only the native absolutism of my intellect,—an absolutism which, after all, perhaps, deserves to be snubbed and kept in check. But the determinism with its necessary carrion, to continue the figure of speech, and with no possible maggots to eat the latter up, violates my sense of moral reality through and through. When, for example, I imagine such carrion as the Brockton murder, I cannot conceive it as an act by which the universe, as a whole, logically and necessarily expresses its nature without shrinking from complicity with such a whole. And I deliberately refuse to keep on terms of loyalty with the universe by saying blankly that the murder, since it does flow from the nature of the whole, is not carrion. There are some instinctive reactions which I, for one, will not tamper with. The only remaining alternative, the attitude of gnostical romanticism, wrenches my personal instincts in quite as violent a way. It falsifies the simple objectivity of their deliverance. It makes the goose flesh the murder excites in me a sufficient reason for the perpetration of the crime. It transforms life from a tragic reality into an insincere melodramatic exhibition, as foul or as tawdry as anyone’s diseased curiosity pleases to carry it out. And with its consecration of the roman naturalists state of mind, and its enthronement of the baser crew of Parisian littérateurs among the eternally indispensable organs by which the infinite spirit of things attains to that subjective illumination which is the task of its life, it leaves me in presence of a sort of subjective carrion considerably more noisome than the objective carrion I called it in to take away.

No! better a thousand times, than such systematic corruption of our moral sanity, the plainest pessimism, so that it be straightforward; but better far than that the world of chance.
Make as great an uproar about chance as you please, I know that chance means pluralism and nothing more. If some of the members of the pluralism are bad, the philosophy of pluralism, whatever broad views it may deny me, permits me, at least, to turn to the other members with a clean breast of affection and an unsophisticated moral sense. And if I still wish to think of the world as a totality, it lets me feel that a world with a chance in it of being altogether good, even if the chance never come to pass, is better than a world with no such chance at all. That “chance” whose very notion I am exhorted and conjured to banish from my view of the future as the suicide of reason concerning it, that “chance” is—what? Just this,—the chance that in moral respects the future may be other and better than the past has been. This is the only chance we have any motive for supposing to exist. Shame, rather, on its repudiation and its denial! For its presence is the vital air which lets the world live, the salt which keeps it sweet….


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