We come now to the examination of such virtues and vices as are entirely natural, and have no dependance on the artifice and contrivance of men. The examination of these will conclude this system of morals.

The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are removed, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition. The most immediate effects of pleasure and pain are the propense and averse motions of the mind; which are diversified into volition, into desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, according as the pleasure or pain changes its situation, and becomes probable or improbable, certain or uncertain, or is considered as out of our power for the present moment. But when along with this, the objects, that cause pleasure or pain, acquire a relation to ourselves or others; they still continue to excite desire and aversion, grief and joy: But cause, at the same time, the indirect passions of pride or humility, love or hatred, which in this case have a double relation of impressions and ideas to the pain or pleasure.

We have already observed, that moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious. Now since every quality in ourselves or others, which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love; as every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It follows, that these two particulars are to be considered as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge of the one by the other; and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility.

If any action be either virtuous or vicious, it is only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never considered in morality.

This reflection is self-evident, and deserves to be attended to, as being of the utmost importance in the present subject. We are never to consider any single action in our enquiries concerning the origin of morals; but only the quality or character from which the action proceeded. These alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person. Actions are, indeed, better indications of a character than words, or even wishes and sentiments; but it is only so far as they are such indications, that they are attended with love or hatred, praise or blame.

To discover the true origin of morals, and of that love or hatred, which arises from mental qualities, we must take the matter pretty deep, and compare some principles, which have been already examined and explained.

We may begin with considering a-new the nature and force of sympathy. The minds of all
men are similar in their feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, in some degree, susceptible. As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature. When I see the effects of passion in the voice and gesture of any person, my mind immediately passes from these effects to their causes, and forms such a lively idea of the passion, as is presently converted into the passion itself. In like manner, when I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion. Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, it is certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs of anxiety and concern in the patient and assistants, would have a great effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of pity and terror. No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From these we infer the passion: And consequently these give rise to our sympathy.

Our sense of beauty depends very much on this principle; and where any object has a tendency to produce pleasure in its possessor, it is always regarded as beautiful; as every object, that has a tendency to produce pain, is disagreeable and deformed. Thus the conveniency of a house, the fertility of a field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the principal beauty of these several objects. Here the object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only by its tendency to produce a certain effect. That effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy. To this principle, therefore, is owing the beauty, which we find in every thing that is useful. How considerable a part this is of beauty can easily appear upon reflection. Wherever an object has a tendency to produce pleasure in the possessor, or in other words, is the proper cause of pleasure, it is sure to please the spectator, by a delicate sympathy with the possessor. Most of the works of art are esteemed beautiful, in proportion to their fitness for the use of man, and even many of the productions of nature derive their beauty from that source. Handsome and beautiful, on most occasions, is nor an absolute but a relative quality, and pleases us by nothing but its tendency to produce an end that is agreeable.….  

The same principle produces, in many instances, our sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty. No virtue is more esteemed than justice, and no vice more detested than injustice; nor are there any qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as amiable or odious. Now justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has that tendency to the good of mankind; and, indeed, is nothing but an artificial invention to that purpose. The same may be said of allegiance, of the laws of nations, of modesty, and of good-manners. All these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society. And since there is a very strong sentiment of morals, which in all nations, and all ages, has attended them, we must allow, that the reflecting on the tendency of characters and mental qualities, is sufficient to give us the sentiments of approbation and blame. Now as the means to an end can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good of society, where our own interest is not concerned, or that of our friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues. Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature, that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and that it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues. From thence we may presume, that it also gives rise to many of the other virtues; and that qualities acquire our approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind. This presumption must become a certainty, when we find that most of those qualities, which we naturally approve of, have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society: While the qualities, which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency, and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable. For having found, that such tendencies
have force enough to produce the strongest sentiment of morals, we can never reasonably, in
these cases, look for any other cause of approbation or blame; it being an inviolable maxim in
philosophy, that where any particular cause is sufficient for an effect, we ought to rest satisfied
with it, and ought not to multiply causes without necessity. We have happily attained experiments
in the artificial virtues, where the tendency of qualities to the good of society, is the sole cause
of our approbation, without any suspicion of the concurrence of another principle. From thence
we learn the force of that principle. And where that principle may take place, and the quality
approved of is really beneficial to society, a true philosopher will never require any other principle
to account for the strongest approbation and esteem.

That many of the natural virtues have this tendency to the good of society, no one can doubt
of. Meekness, beneficence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity bear the greatest
figure among the moral qualities, and are commonly denominated the social virtues, to mark their
tendency to the good of society. This goes so far, that some philosophers have represented all
moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education, when skilful politicians endeavoured to
restrain the turbulent passions of men, and make them operate to the public good, by the notions
of honour and shame. This system, however, is nor consistent with experience. For, first, there are
other virtues and vices beside those which have this tendency to the public advantage and loss.
Secondly, had not men a natural sentiment of approbation and blame, it coued never be excited by
politicians; nor would the words laudable and praise-worthy, blameable and odious be any more
intelligible, than if they were a language perfectly known to us, as we have already observed. But
though this system be erroneous, it may teach us, that moral distinctions arise, in a great measure,
from the tendency of qualities and characters to the interests of society, and that it is our concern
for that interest, which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive
concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently it is that principle, which takes us so
far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as
if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss.

The only difference betwixt the natural virtues and justice lies in this, that the good, which
results from the former, arises from every single act, and is the object of some natural passion:
Whereas a single act of justice, considered in itself, may often be contrary to the public good;
and it is only the concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, which is
advantageous. When I relieve persons in distress, my natural humanity is my motive; and so far
as my succour extends, so far have I promoted the happiness of my fellow-creatures. But if we
examine all the questions, that come before any tribunal of justice, we shall find, that, considering
each case apart, it would as often be an instance of humanity to decide contrary to the laws of
justice as conformable them. Judges take from a poor man to give to a rich; they bestow on the
dissolute the labour of the industrious; and put into the hands of the vicious the means of harming
both themselves and others. The whole scheme, however, of law and justice is advantageous to
the society; and it was with a view to this advantage, that men, by their voluntary conventions,
established it. After it is once established by these conventions, it is naturally attended with a
strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests
of society. We need no other explication of that esteem, which attends such of the natural virtues,
as have a tendency to the public good.

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