



Why Happiness is Not Pleasure

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The ancient Greeks believed that every human being seeks happiness (*eudaimonia*).¹ If Pharrell Williams' popular song is any indication, 21st century Westerners agree. Indeed, if someone asked you if you wanted to be happy, it would be extremely strange to answer "No" rather than "Yes." However, many 21st century Westerners also assume that what happiness is, is relative to each individual.² Happiness for you is whatever you think it is; as a line in the "Happy" song puts it, "Clap along if you know what happiness is to you." We might think that there is no point to debating what genuine happiness is because, unlike the less-enlightened peoples of previous eras, we realize that happiness is whatever we want it to be for ourselves, and no view of happiness can be wrong.

It may come as a surprise that some of the ancient Greeks thought so as well. The sophist Protagoras (c. 490-420 B.C.) contended, "Of all things the measure is Man, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not."³ Plato interpreted him to mean that truth is relative to each individual (*Theaetetus* 152 a-c). Just as when the same wind is blowing, one of us may feel it is cold and another may feel that it isn't cold (*Theaetetus* 152 b); one person may believe that happiness is one thing and another person believe that happiness is something else. Of course, there are numerous views about what happiness is. Since, according to Protagoras, each one of us is the measure of what is true and false, for us, each one of us is correct in whatever we believe happiness is.

Nevertheless, most ancient Greek schools of philosophy thought otherwise. Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics and Epicureans insisted that there are right and wrong answers to the question 'What is happiness?' and they argued with each other over what the right answer is. They were well aware that the variety of views about what happiness is tempts us to accept Protagoras' relativism. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) Aristotle observed, "Now fine and just actions... admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by convention and not by nature" (*EN* 1094 b 15-16).⁴ Yet he, like his Platonist, Stoic, and Epicurean opponents, insisted that what true happiness is, is not merely a matter of convention, relative to each individual.

In what follows, I will borrow heavily from Aristotle to clarify some preliminary points about happiness. Next, I will consider the reasons Epicurus and John Stuart Mill gave for thinking that happiness is pleasure. Finally, I will set out and defend various arguments which insist that happiness is not pleasure. If these arguments are successful—and I think that they are—they will also show that Protagoras is wrong. True happiness is not whatever one thinks it to be.

I

My first, preliminary point is to observe that humans act for the sake of goals that we want.⁵

Aristotle began his *Nicomachean Ethics* with the same observation, “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good (*EN* 1094 a 1). You are reading this article in order to determine if I present good arguments against hedonism. You will eat later today in order to “keep soul and body together” (as one of my philosophy professors used to say). Perhaps tomorrow you will go to work in order to earn a living. In these and countless other examples, we act for the sake of goals, or ends, that we want.

Aristotle noticed a distinction between the goals that we pursue. Some of these goals are products of the activities (e.g., making dinner, finishing a term paper, etc.). In these cases the products are usually more important than the activities that produce them. Accordingly, the activities are instrumentally valuable (*EN* 1094 a 3-6). But other goals are internal to the activities themselves (e.g., going for a stroll, pursuing a hobby, etc.). These activities thereby have a value that is internal to the activities themselves. Furthermore, some activities might initially be done for the sake of some external goal, and then later are done for the sake of some good internal to the activities themselves. For example, an athlete initially plays the sport in order to win; victory is an external goal. But later the athlete discovers a value in playing that sport excellently. This internal value is, to an extent, different from the external goal; an athlete can play the sport excellently and still lose or, alternatively, win the contest by cheating.⁶ Of course, the best situation is where there is a fit between the external goal and the internal goal, such as when an athlete wins the contest by playing the sport excellently.

Aristotle further noticed that we prioritize the various goals that we seek. In his example, the bridle-maker produces an object that is used by the equestrian, who in turn has a skill that is utilized by the military commander (*EN* 1094 a 10-15). Similarly, a student wants to pass a philosophy course in order to satisfy the humanities requirement. The student wants to satisfy that requirement in order to graduate, and wants to graduate with a degree in a specific area of study in order to pursue a career in that field. However, the prioritization of various goals has a limit. There does seem to be an ultimate goal that we seek. Humans seek to live well and do well. To live well and do well is to be happy. “Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy” (*EN* 1095 a 16-19). Happiness, thus understood, is the *ultimate* end. It is desired for its own sake and not primarily for the sake of anything else.

Since we wish to be happy, it makes sense for us to ask ourselves “what will bring me true happiness?” Aristotle remarked, “Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right?” (*EN* 1094 a 22-24). Elsewhere, in his *Eudemian Ethics* (*EE*) he advised:

Everybody able to live according to his own purposive choice should set before him some object for noble living to aim at—either honor or else glory or wealth or culture—on which he will keep his eyes fixed in all his conduct (since clearly it is a mark of much folly not to have one’s life regulated with regard to some End), it is therefore most necessary first to decide within oneself, neither hastily nor carelessly, in which of the things that belong to us the good life consists, and what are the indispensable conditions for men’s possessing it (*EE* 1214 b 6-14).⁷

Aristotle has a point. It does seem to be a mark of folly to fail to consider what true happiness is. How can you achieve a goal that you want—living well and doing well—if you never explicitly consider what that goal is? As Socrates famously put it, “The unexamined life is not worth living” (*Apology* 38 a). On the other hand, Aristotle’s claim that one should have his eyes fixed on this end in all of his conduct is surely an exaggeration. It hardly seems possible—let alone psychologically healthy—to focus on a single goal in every action that one performs. But I don’t think Aristotle expected us to take his exaggeration literally.⁸ Instead, his point is that, given our desire for happiness, we should carefully reflect on what true happiness is and then organize our lives in such a way that best enables us to achieve it.

As we begin such reflection, we should acknowledge that many people change their minds about what happiness is. Aristotle remarks, “The many think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honor; they differ, however, from one another -- and often even the same man identifies it with different things, with health when he is ill, with wealth when he is poor” (*EN* 1095 a 22-25). Why do people change their minds about what they think will make themselves happy? In some cases this is due to changing circumstances in their lives. But in other cases it seems to be due to the realization that their earlier views about happiness were incorrect. Consider the regrets of recovering alcoholics who realized that the pleasures of drinking were ruining their lives⁹ or the stories of lottery winners who wind up divorced and bankrupt.¹⁰ Such cases strongly suggest that, *pace* Protagoras, some people have false beliefs about what will truly make them happy, with devastating results.

But if some beliefs about happiness are false, how are we supposed to determine what answer, if any, is correct? Aristotle observed that we must begin from where we are at, that is, from what is best known to us (*EN* 1095 b 3). We begin with our own beliefs about what happiness is, what is good, what is worthwhile, etc. In the process of our inquiry, we may discover that some of those beliefs are false, or at least incomplete. We might also discover that some of those beliefs survive scrutiny. It would be surprising if all of our beliefs emerged from inquiry unscathed, but it would be even more surprising if none of them did. Aristotle summarized his approach in these words:

And about all these matters the endeavor must be made to seek to convince by means of rational arguments, using observed facts as evidences and examples. For the best thing would be if all mankind were seen to be in agreement with the views that will be stated, but failing that, at any rate that all should agree in some way. And this they will do if led to change their ground, for everyone has something relative to contribute to the truth, and we must start from this to give a sort of proof about our views; for from statements that are true but not clearly expressed, as we advance, clearness will also be attained, if at every stage we adopt more perspicacious positions in exchange for the customary confused statements (*EE* 1216 b 26-34).

Furthermore, we cannot expect more precision from ethics than the subject matter allows. Ethics is not like mathematics or the natural sciences. It deals with the unavoidable messiness and contingencies of human life. Consequently, Aristotle insisted that we should be content with premises and conclusions that are true for the most part. He thought an outline of what happiness is, is the best we can get (*EN* 1094 b 11-28).

Finally, we should consider the possibility that not everyone profits from an investigation into happiness and other topics in ethics (*EN* 1095 a 2 ff.). Some people are too immature

or lack much self-control (*EN* 1095 a 1-10). Other people are too wicked to either profit from or contribute to an inquiry in ethics. There is a need for being brought up in good habits. Aristotle remarked:

Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the subjects of political science [and ethics] must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points (*EN* 1095 b 5-8; cf. 1179 b 1-19).

Since not everyone has the right sort of maturity or character to discuss ethics, we should not expect everyone to agree with the conclusions of our arguments.

II

With these preliminary points in mind, let us examine the popular view that happiness is pleasure. Many notable philosophers, from Democritus (c. 460-370 B.C.) and Epicurus (341-270 B.C.) to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), have defended this thesis.¹¹ Epicurus insisted:

He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a happy life...Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing (*Letter to Menoeceus* [LM]).¹²

Approximately two millennia later, Mill echoed this claim:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure... [P]leasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things... are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain (*Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, p. 7).¹³

For whatever reason, Mill did not defend his claims about happiness and pleasure. Perhaps he, like Epicurus, took them to be self-evident. According to Cicero, Epicurus thought that there is no need to argue that pleasure is pursued and pain is avoided. These things are perceived, “as we perceive that fire is hot, snow is white, and honey is sweet. None of these things requires confirmation by sophisticated argumentation; it is enough just to have them pointed out” (*On Goals*, I, 30). When pressed to give an argument, Epicureans defended their view by appealing to the “babe-in-the-cradle.” Epicureans claimed that newborn animals all feel an impulse to seek pleasure and an impulse to avoid pain. Moreover, these

are the only impulses that they feel right from birth. Any other human impulses may possibly be due to arbitrary or perverted ways of thinking and feeling. Hence, these initial, congenital impulses that are simply and directly for pleasure and the absence of pain are necessarily trustworthy, as guides to the truth about what should be pursued and avoided (*On Goals*, I, 30).

However, not every philosopher agreed that happiness is pleasure and that nature proves this to be so. Aristotle spoke for a number of philosophers when he charged that the view that happiness is pleasure is too bestial (*EN* 1095 b 20), since even brute animals can pursue pleasure and avoid pain. John Stuart Mill described this as the “swine objection”:

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened (*Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, p. 7).

Moreover, the Stoics rejected the Epicurean interpretation of the babe-in-the-cradle. According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics denied that the animal’s first impulse is pleasure. Rather, they “say that an animal’s first impulse is to preserve itself, because nature made it congenial to itself from the beginning...” (7.85).¹⁴

In response to the “swine objection,” Epicurus insisted that he was not advocating a bestial life. He wrote:

When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or willful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual lust, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life (*LM*).

He argued that not every pleasure is to be chosen because some short-term pleasures produce long-term suffering, just as some short-term pains produce long-term pleasures.

And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but will often pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And often we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is should be chosen, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned (*LM*).

Epicurus also distinguished between three types of desires. Some desires, such as the desires for fame and immortality, are groundless.¹⁵ Other desires are natural. One type of natural desire is necessary, and “of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live” (*LM*), such as the desire for food. The other type of natural desire is not necessary, such as the desire for

pizza. It is natural to desire delicious pizza, but billions of people manage to live without it. Epicurus implied that the wise person is content with satisfying the natural and necessary desires:

He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquility of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled (*LM*).

Mill's response was slightly different. He answered the "swine objection" by distinguishing between the quantity and quality of pleasures. Even if the pleasures of sensuality are quantitatively more intense, they fall short of the pleasures of intellect and imagination in quality. Mill wrote:

But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.... It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone (*Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, p. 8).

When pressed to determine which of two pleasures have a higher quality, Mill appealed to the experience of competent judges.

If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account (*Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, pp. 8-9).

Finally, since many of their critics insist that genuine happiness requires the moral virtues, such as justice and courage, both Epicurus and Mill acknowledged that there is a role for moral virtue in their account of happiness—they make life more pleasant. Epicurus wrote:

It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life (*Principal Doctrines*, V).

Mill didn't agree with Epicurus that the moral virtues always make an individual's life more

pleasant; sometimes virtue requires that one must sacrifice one's own happiness for the sake of others. But Mill added that when moral virtues, self-sacrifice and noble character deserve admiration, it is only because they promote the greatest happiness for the greatest number (*Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, pp. 15-16).

III

Nevertheless, there are a number of problems with Epicurus' and Mill's responses. First of all, it seems to concede that happiness is not pleasure *per se*. For if the desires for some pleasures are groundless, and if some pleasures bring about greater pains in the long run, and if some pleasures are of inferior quality, then happiness doesn't include *them*. Plato raised a similar objection in his *Republic*. His Socrates argued that pleasure cannot be the unqualified good because there are some bad pleasures (505c). It is safe to say that Epicurus and Mill would agree with the rest of us that, for example, the pleasures some people get from sexually abusing children are base and vile. Therefore, even on their own view, happiness isn't every kind of pleasure. It is, at most, a subset of pleasures.

Furthermore, a consideration of the moral virtue of temperance (*sōphrosunē*) shows that happiness isn't even found in every kind of natural pleasure.¹⁶ The temperate person pursues and enjoys the pleasures that come from eating, drinking, and sexual activity in the right ways, at the right times, in the right amounts and with the right people (*EN* 1107 b 4-6; 1119 b 17-18). In addition, the temperate person isn't pained at the absence of these pleasant things (*EN* 1118 b 34). The self-indulgent person, on the other hand, habitually pursues these pleasures to excess (*EN* 1107 b 4-6; 1118 b 24-27). Moreover, the self-indulgent person might also delight in the wrong sorts of pleasures, i.e., the sorts of pleasures that are base and vile (*EN* 1118 b 26; 1173 b 20-24). Since the temperate person can abstain from natural pleasures with little or no pain or craving (*EN* 1119 a 14-16), and even Epicurus acknowledged that the pleasant life requires the virtues and is not found in self-indulgence, even Epicurus should grant that happiness is not found in every kind of natural pleasure. If a pleasure can be taken to excess, but happiness cannot be taken to excess, then happiness is not that pleasure.

The problems don't end there. If their critics are correct, Epicurus and Mill misunderstood the nature of pleasure. The Stoics contended that "pleasure is a byproduct which supervenes when nature itself, on its own, seeks out and acquires what is suitable to [the animal's] constitution."¹⁷ Their thinking seems to be that animals naturally seek their own preservation and obviously eating is necessary for survival. If eating was painful and hunger wasn't painful, animals would avoid eating and eventually starve. So the pleasure that animals get from eating is simply a by-product of their natures achieving what is suitable.

Aristotle's account of pleasure also challenged the view found in Epicurus and Mill. Aristotle argued that pleasure is an *energeia*, a term that may be translated as 'activity,' 'actualization,' or 'being-at-work'.¹⁸ Pleasure completes another activity "as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age" (*EN* 1174 b 32). It is not a movement (*kinēsis*), because a movement is complete only when the activity reaches its intended end. For example, building a house is complete only when the house is finished and ready for occupancy. Instead, pleasure is an activity that is complete at any and every time, just as the activity of seeing is complete whenever the animal is seeing something (*EN* 1174 a 13-b 14). Furthermore, pleasure completes its corresponding activity in the following way. When a power is in good condition and is active in relation to its object, then

the activity is pleasant. So, for example, when the power of sight is in good condition and a human is actively seeing something beautiful, then the activity is pleasant (*EN* 1174 b 15-1175 a 2). Similarly, when the power to eat is in good condition and the animal is actively eating something delicious, then the activity is pleasant. The activity and the pleasure are so bound together that they seem inseparable, “since without activity pleasure does not arise, and every activity is completed by the attendant pleasure” (*EN* 1175 a 20-22).

Nevertheless, the activity and its attendant pleasure can be separated. For example, the biological goal of eating is survival (cf. *De An.* 415 a 14-27) and the pleasure of eating is for the sake of the animal’s survival. More importantly, the goals—both external and internal—of virtuous activities can also be separated from their attendant pleasures. For instance, consider a generous action, such as volunteering one’s time and talents in building a house as part of a Habitat for Humanity project. The external goal of the activity is to build a home for people who are otherwise too poor to purchase it themselves. The internal goal of the activity, for a truly generous person, is to do something that is noble and fine (*EN* 1120 a 13-14), that is, to do what is generous simply for its own sake (*EN* 1105 a 33-34). The generous activities will be also pleasant to the generous person—a point I will return to shortly (cf. *EN* 1099 a 16-19). But that doesn’t mean that the primary reason why a generous person acts generously is because it is fun.

Since pleasures are bound up with the activities which they complete, they differ in kind (*EN* 1175 a 22-36). The pleasures of eating are different from the pleasures of viewing beautiful objects; the pleasures of playing a sport well are different from the pleasures of discussing philosophical topics. Consequently, Mill’s project of ranking pleasures according to their qualities and quantities is bound to fail. There is no way that competent judges can consistently rule on whether or not, for example, the pleasures of playing a musical instrument are of a higher quality than the pleasures of playing a sport. The pleasures are too different in kind for allegedly competent judges to compare on any kind of standardized scale because the activities which they complete are too different in kind to compare.

To summarize, I have argued that some pleasures are not worth pursuing because, as even Epicurus and Mill acknowledge, they are groundless, lead to worse pains, or are of inferior quality. Moreover, a plausible account of temperance indicates that the temperate person abstains from some natural pleasures. Furthermore, Epicurus and Mill misunderstand the nature and role of pleasure; pleasure completes its corresponding activity without necessarily being the goal of that activity. Therefore, Epicurus and Mill are wrong—happiness is not pleasure. Moreover, if they are wrong, then so too is Protagoras—what genuine happiness is, is not whatever a person believes it is.

Finally, if Aristotle’s approach to ethical debates was—and is—correct (see *EE* 1216 b 26-34), then, despite its flaws, there is some truth to the view that happiness is pleasure and an Aristotelian should be able to explain why. If, as Aristotle argued, genuine happiness consists of noble activities done with excellence (i.e., virtuous activities), then given the close connection between activity and pleasure, virtuous people will find noble activities to be generally pleasant to do. Happiness might seem to be pleasure because noble activities are pleasant for virtuous people. Aristotle explained:

Their [virtuous persons’] life is also in itself pleasant. For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g. not only is a horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a spectacle to the lover of sights, but also in the same way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice and in general virtuous

acts to the lover of virtue... [T]he lovers of what is noble find pleasant the things that are by nature pleasant; and virtuous actions are such, so that these are pleasant for such men as well as in their own nature. Their life, therefore, has no further need of pleasure as a sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasure in itself. For, besides what we have said, the man who does not rejoice in noble actions is not even good; since no one would call a man just who did not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly in all other cases. If this is so, virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. But they are also good and noble, and have each of these attributes in the highest degree, since the good man judges well about these attributes; his judgment is such as we have described. Happiness then is the best, noblest, and most pleasant thing in the world (*EN* 1099 a 6-25).

Of course, we still need a defense of the view that genuine happiness consists of noble activities done from an excellent character. But that will have to wait for another time.

ENDNOTES

1. The Greek word ‘εὐδαιμονία’ is notoriously difficult to translate. In addition to ‘happiness,’ it can be translated as ‘prosperity,’ ‘good fortune,’ and even ‘opulence.’ (See Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., and Jones H.S. (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1843/1968).) It is derived from Greek words for ‘good’ (εὖ) and ‘divine being’ (δαίμων). This suggests that the happy person is fortunate and under the favor of a god.
2. For an extended critique of moral relativism, see Shane Drefcinski, “The Superficial Sophistication of Moral Relativism,” *Logos* 11, no. 3 (2008), 152-169.
3. The famous fragment comes from Protagoras’ “On Truth.”
4. All quotations from the *Nicomachean Ethics* are from the W.D. Ross, J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
5. The secondary literature on Aristotle’s ethics is legion. For a very recent defense of Aristotle’s commonsensical approach to ethics, see David Roochnik, *Retrieving Aristotle in an Age of Crisis*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 150-158.
6. Aristotle’s distinction is important for his own account of happiness—noble activities done with excellence (i.e., virtuous activities). For an extended treatment of the connection between internal and external goals, see Eugene Garver, “Aristotle’s Genealogy of Morals,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, (June 1984), 471-92.
7. All quotations from the *Eudemian Ethics* are from the translation posted at the *Perseus Digital Library* (<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/>).
8. For an extended treatment that shows Aristotle neither believes nor recommends that whatever anyone does he does in order to promote his own happiness, see Timothy Roche, “In Defense of an Alternative View of the Foundation of Aristotle’s Moral Theory,” *Phronesis* Vol. XXXVIII (1992), 46-83.
9. Mickey Mantle is a poignant example; see Rick Weinberg, “Mantle, Nearing Death, Laments a Wasted Life,” (<http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/espn25/story?page=moments/58>).
10. Joe Nocera, “The Bad Luck of Winning,” *New York Times*, December 1, 2012, A25, (http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/opinion/nocera-the-bad-luck-of-winning.html?_r=0).

11. Aristotle acknowledged the plausibility of the view that happiness is pleasure and even argued *against* that no pleasure is good; see *EN* 1152 b1-1154 b 34.
12. All quotations from the *Letter to Menoeceus* are from the Robert Drew Hicks translation, posted on the *Internet Classics Archive* (<http://classics.mit.edu/index.html>).
13. All references to *Utilitarianism* are from the Hackett edition, edited by George Sher (Indianapolis, 1979).
14. *Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings*, Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, translators, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), 136.
15. John Cooper suggests that the central basis for a desire being groundless is the absolute, irrational commitment to obtaining its object, with the consequence that it brings unnecessary pain when it is not satisfied; see his “Epicurus: Pleasure and Desire,” in *Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 502-506.
16. I acknowledge that a defender of Epicurus and Mill could object to my use of Aristotle’s account of temperance, since he is a critic of hedonism. However, despite their acknowledgment that virtue is important for happiness, neither Epicurus nor Mill gives an account of temperance. Hence, if Aristotle’s account of temperance is flawed, a contemporary defender of hedonism owes us a better account, consistent with Epicurus’ rejection of the pleasures of sensuality.
17. Diogenes Laertius 7.86, in Inwood and Gerson 1988, 136.
18. See Roochnik 2013, 102-106; 142.