The Subject Matter of Metaphysics

Aristotle

1. There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be something to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes.

2. There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but all that ‘is’ is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to ‘be’ by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing. As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being.-But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.

Now for each one class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, investigates all articulate sounds. Hence to investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science.

If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that-in fact this would even strengthen our case); for ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’, and the doubling of the words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly ‘one existent man’ adds nothing to ‘existent man’, and that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing
apart from being; and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, 
and similarly is from its very nature something that is:-all this being so, there must be exactly 
as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the essence of these is the work of a 
science which is generically one-I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same and the similar 
and the other concepts of this sort; and nearly all contraries may be referred to this origin; let us 
take them as having been investigated in the ‘Selection of Contraries’.

And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there 
must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this. For being falls 
immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera. 
For the philosopher is like the mathematician, as that word is used; for mathematics also has 
parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within the sphere of 
mathematics.

Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed 
to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in 
both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is 
a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not 
present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what 
is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in 
(privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted):-
in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the 
dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either from these or from 
plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above named. And contrariety 
is one of these concepts; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of 
otherness. Therefore, since there are many senses in which a thing is said to be one, these 
terms also will have many senses, but yet it belongs to one science to know them all; for a term 
belongs to different sciences not if it has different senses, but if it has not one meaning and its 
definitions cannot be referred to one central meaning. And since all things are referred to that 
which is primary, as for instance all things which are called one are referred to the primary one, 
we must say that this holds good also of the same and the other and of contraries in general; so 
that after distinguishing the various senses of each, we must then explain by reference to what 
is primary in the case of each of the predicates in question, saying how they are related to it; for 
some will be called what they are called because they possess it, others because they produce 
it, and others in other such ways.

It is evident, then, that it belongs to one science to be able to give an account of these 
concepts as well as of substance (this was one of the questions in our book of problems), 
and that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to investigate all things. For if it is 
not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates 
seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what contrariety is, or 
how many meanings it has? And similarly with all other such questions. Since, then, these are 
estential modifications of unity qua unity and of being qua being, not qua numbers or lines or 
fire, it is clear that it belongs to this science to investigate both the essence of these concepts 
and their properties. And those who study these properties err not by leaving the sphere of 
philosophy, but by forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these 
other things. For number qua number has peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness, 
commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in 
themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly the solid and the motionless and that 
which is in motion and the weightless and that which has weight have other peculiar properties. 
So too there are certain properties peculiar to being as such, and it is about these that the 
philosopher has to investigate the truth.-An indication of this may be mentioned: dialecticians 
and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists 
only in semblance, and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common 
to all things; but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to
philosophy. For sophistic and dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy, but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not.

Again, in the list of contraries one of the two columns is privative, and all contraries are reducible to being and non-being, and to unity and plurality, as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality. And nearly all thinkers agree that being and substance are composed of contraries; at least all name contraries as their first principles—some name odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit and the unlimited, some love and strife. And all the others as well are evidently reducible to unity and plurality (this reduction we must take for granted), and the principles stated by other thinkers fall entirely under these as their genera. It is obvious then from these considerations too that it belongs to one science to examine being qua being. For all things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries. And these belong to one science, whether they have or have not one single meaning. Probably the truth is that they have not; yet even if ‘one’ has several meanings, the other meanings will be related to the primary meaning (and similarly in the case of the contraries), even if being or unity is not a universal and the same in every instance or is not separable from the particular instances (as in fact it probably is not; the unity is in some cases that of common reference, in some cases that of serial succession). And for this reason it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or unity or being or the same or the other, but only to presuppose these concepts and reason from this starting-point.—Obviously then it is the work of one science to examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the same science will examine not only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and the concepts ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’, ‘genus’ and ‘species’, ‘whole’ and ‘part’, and the others of this sort.

3. We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance. Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher; for these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of being qua being and each genus has being. But men use them just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to which their demonstrations refer extends. Therefore since these truths clearly hold good for all things qua being (for this is what is common to them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the inquiry into these as well. And for this reason no one who is conducting a special inquiry tries to say anything about their truth or falsity,—neither the geometry nor the mathematician. Some natural philosophers indeed have done so, and their procedure was intelligible enough; for they thought that they alone were inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one kind of thinker who is above even the natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of being), the discussion of these truths also will belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with primary substance. Physics also is a kind of Wisdom, but it is not the first kind.—And the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic; for they should know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it.

Evidently then it belongs to the philosopher, i.e. to him who is studying the nature of all substance, to inquire also into the principles of syllogism. But he who knows best about each genus must be able to state the most certain principles of his subject, so that he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher, and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. For a principle which every one must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed
to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; we must presuppose, to guard against dialectical objections, any further qualifications which might be added. This, then, is the most certain of all principles, since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and if it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject (the usual qualifications must be presupposed in this premiss too), and if an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms.


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