We may open our introduction to logic by examining something of the characteristic property of logic in its genus which is philosophy. Boethius says that not any knowledge whatever is philosophy, but only that which consists in the greatest things; for we do not call all wise men philosophers, but only those whose intelligence penetrates subtle matters. Moreover, Boethius distinguishes three species of philosophy, speculative, which is concerned with speculation on the nature of things, moral, for the consideration of the honorableness of life, rational, for compounding the relation of arguments, which the Greeks call logic. However, some writers separated logic from philosophy and did not call it according to Boethius, a part of philosophy but an instrument, because obviously the other parts work in logic in a manner, when they use its arguments to prove their own questions. As, if a question should arise in natural or moral speculation, arguments are derived from logic. Boethius himself holds, against them, that there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being both an instrument and a part of a single thing, as the hand is both a part and an instrument of the human body. Logic moreover seems itself often its own instrument when it demonstrates a question pertaining to itself by its own arguments, as for example: man is the species of animal. It is none the less logic, however, because it is the instrument of logic. So too it is none the less philosophy because it is the instrument of philosophy. Moreover, Boethius distinguishes it from the other two species of philosophy by its proper end, which consists in compounding arguments. For although the physicist compounds arguments, it is not physics but only logic which instructs him in that.

He noted too in regard to logic that it was composed of and reduced to certain rules of argumentation for this reason, namely, lest it lead inconstant minds into error by false inferences, since it seems to construct by its reasons what is not found in the nature of things, and since it seems often to infer things contrary in their conditions, in the following manner: Socrates is body, but body is white, therefore Socrates is white. On the other hand: Socrates is body, but body is black, therefore Socrates is black.

Moreover in writing logic the following order is extremely necessary that since arguments are constructed from propositions, and propositions from words, he who will write logic perfectly, must first write of simple words, then of propositions, and finally devote the end of logic to argumentations, just as our prince Aristotle did, who wrote the Categories on the science of words, the On Interpretation on the science of propositions, the Topics and the Analytics on the science of argumentations.

Porphyry himself moreover as the very statement of the title shows, prepares this introduction for the Categories of Aristotle, but later he himself shows that it is necessary to the whole art. The intention of it, the matter, the manner of treatment, the utility or the part of dialectic to which the present science is to be subordinated, will now be distinguished briefly and precisely.

The intention is particularly to instruct the reader in the Categories of Aristotle, that he may be able to understand more easily the things that are there treated. This makes necessary the treatment of the five subjects which are its materials, namely genus, species, difference, property, and accident. He judged the knowledge of these to be particularly useful to the Categories because the investigation is concerning them in almost the whole course of the Categories. That which we spoke of as five, however, can be referred to the words, genus, species and the others.
and also in a certain sense to the things signified by them. For he appropriately makes clear the significance of these five words which Aristotle uses, lest one be ignorant, when one has come to the Categories, of what is to be understood by these words; and he is able, moreover, to treat of all the things signified by these words, as if of five things, since, although they are infinite taken singly, inasmuch as genera are infinite and likewise species and the others, nevertheless as has been said, all are considered as five, because all are treated according to five characteristics, all genera according to what constitutes genera, and the others in the same way, for in this same way the eight parts of speech are considered according to their eight characteristics, although taken singly they are infinite.

The manner of treatment here is the following: having first distinguished the natures of each singly in separate treatments of them, he proceeds then for further knowledge of them to their common properties and characteristics.

Its utility, as Boethius himself teaches, is principally as it is directed to the Categories. But it is spread in four directions which we shall disclose more carefully later when he himself takes it up.

If the parts of logic have first been distinguished carefully, it is seen at once what is the part through which the science of the present work leads to logic. On the authority of Cicero and Boethius there are two parts of which logic is composed, namely, the science of discovering arguments and of judging them, that is, of confirming and proving the arguments discovered. For two things are necessary to one who argues, first to find the arguments by which to argue, then if any should criticize the arguments as defective or as insufficiently firm to be able to confirm them. Wherefore Cicero says that discovery is by nature prior. The present science, however, is concerned with both parts of logic, but most of all with discovery. And it is a part of the science of discovering. For how can an argument be deduced from genus or species or the others, if the things which are here treated are not known? Wherefore Aristotle himself introduces the definition of the predicables into the Topics, when he treats of their places, as Cicero likewise does in his Topics. But since an argument is confirmed from the same considerations from which it is discovered this science is not unrelated to judgment. For, as an argument is derived from the nature of genus and species, so, once derived, it is confirmed from the nature of genus and species. For considering the nature of species in man, so far as it is related to animal, I find at once from the nature of the species the argument for proving animal. But if anyone should criticize the argument, I show that it is suitable immediately by indicating the nature of the species and the genus in both, so that from the same conditions of the terms the argument may be found and when it has been found it may be confirmed.

There are some nevertheless who separate this science [i.e. the Isagoge] and the science of the categories and of the divisions and of definitions and even of propositions completely from discovery and judgment, nor do they count it in any sense among the parts of logic, although, for all that, they think such subjects are necessary to the whole of logic. But authority as well as reason seems contrary to them. For Boethius On the Topics of Cicero asserts a double division of dialectic, both parts of which so include each other reciprocally that they each comprise the whole of dialectic. The first part is through the science of discovery and judgment; the second through the science of division, definition and collection. He reduces each of these to the other so that in the science of discovery (which is one of the two divisions of the above classification) he includes also the science of division or definition, for the reason that arguments are deduced from divisions as well as from definitions. Wherefore the science of genus and of species or of the others may also be adapted for a similar reason to discovery. Boethius himself says that the treatise on the Categories comes first among the books of Aristotle for those beginning logic. From this it is apparent that the Categories, in which the reader has his introduction to logic, are not to be separated from logic, particularly since the distinction of the categories supplies the greatest strength to the argumentation, since the nature, to which each thing pertains or does not pertain, can be established by it. The peculiar study of propositions [i.e. the On Interpretation] likewise is not unrelated to that of arguments, since it proves now this, now that, as contrary or contradictory or opposed in any other manner whatever. Therefore, since all treatises of logic
converge to the end of logic, that is to argumentation^ we separate the knowledge of none of them from logic. Having examined these things let us begin the literal commentary.

Since it is necessary, He places first an introduction concerning the subject matter of which he will write, in which he indicates the subject matter itself and gives assurance of the utility of the book and promises that he will write in an introductory manner concerning that which philosophers have judged rightly of these things. There are however three accustomed meanings of the word necessary? Since it is sometimes used to mean inevitable as, it is necessary that substance is not quality, sometimes to mean useful, as, to go to the forum, sometimes to mean determined, as, that man will die some time. The first two meanings of necessary obviously are of such sort that they seem to contend with each other with respect to which of them can be taken more properly here. For it is both the highest necessity to know these things first that one may proceed to others, since without the former the latter cannot be known, and it is an obvious utility. If however any one should consider seriously the context, he will decide that useful is meant more properly than inevitable. For since Porphyry supplies the thing for which he says it is necessary, as if intending some sort of relation to something else, he suggests the meaning of utility. For useful, has reference to something else; inevitable is so called because of itself. Construe it thus: it is necessary, that is, useful, to know what genus is, etc., that is, what the characteristics of each are. This is shown in their definitions which are assigned not according to their substance but according to their accidental properties, since the name of genus and the name of the others do not designate substance but accident. Wherefore we interpret that what according to property rather than substance. As well for that, etc. He brings forward four points in which he shows a fourfold utility, as we noted above, namely, categories, definitions, divisions, demonstrations, that is, arguments, which demonstrate the question proposed. Which, that is, the knowledge of categories, is in Aristotle, that is, is contained in his treatise. For a book is sometimes designated by the name of its author, as for example Lucian. And for the imposition of definitions, that is, for imposing and compounding definitions. And in general. Likewise these five predicables are useful for those things which are in division and demonstration, that is, in argumentation. And since it is necessary, that is, it is useful to so many things to know these things, I shall try to approach what has been said by the ancients, making a rendering for you, that is, a treatise, concerning the contemplation of such things, that is, concerning the consideration of these five predicables, I say a compact rendering, that is, moderately short. This he explains immediately, saying: briefly and as in an introductory manner. For too much brevity may introduce too great obscurity, according to that saying of Horace: I labor to be brief I become obscure. Therefore lest the reader be distrustful because of brevity or lest he be confused because of prolixity, he promises to write in an introductory manner. But, how this work may be of use as well to the categories as to the other three subjects, Boethius himself states carefully enough, but still let us touch on it briefly.

And first let us show how each of the treatments of these five predicables is proper to the categories. Knowledge of genus pertains to the categories because Aristotle there sets forth the ten supreme genera of all things, in which categories he comprehends the infinite meanings of the names of all things: but how they are the genera of other things can not be known, unless it is preceded by a knowledge of genera. The knowledge of species likewise is not unrelated to the categories; with-out that knowledge there can be no knowledge of genus; for since they are relative to each other they draw their essence and knowledge from each other. Wherefore it is necessary to define one by the other, as Porphyry himself states. 8 Difference, too, which when joined to the genus completes the species, is necessary to distinguishing species as well as to distinguishing genus: in stating the division of the genus, the difference shows the signification of that which the species contains. Many things, moreover, are brought forth by Aristotle in the Categories where these three, genus, species, difference, are taken up; if they were not first known those further conclusions could not be understood. One of these is the rule: Things of diverse genera the knowledge of property too is of help because Aristotle himself speaks of the properties of the categories, as when he says that the property of substance is that since it is one and the same in number, etc. Therefore, lest the nature of property be ignored at that later
point, it must be demonstrated now. Still this must be noted, that Porphyry treats only of the properties of the most special species, whereas Aristotle investigates the properties of genera; but nevertheless the nature of those properties [of genera] is made clear through the similarity of these [of the most special species], for the properties of genera are described in the same way as the properties of species, namely, that the property belongs only to that one species, to every individual of that species, and at all times. Who will doubt the extent to which the knowledge of accident is valuable to the categories, when he finds in nine of the categories only accidents? Besides Aristotle frequently arid earnestly seeks out the properties of those things which are in the subject, that is, of accidents, to which especially pertains the treatment of accident. The knowledge of accident is also profitable to the distinguishing of difference or property, because difference and property will not be known perfectly if the distinction of accident is not had.

Now, however, let us show how the same five predicables are valuable for definitions. Definition, of course, is either substantial or it is description. Substantial, on the one hand, which is only of species, uses genus and differences, and therefore the treatment of genus as well as of difference or species is valuable to it. But description is frequently derived from accidents. Wherefore knowledge of accident is particularly valuable to it. Knowledge of property moreover is generally present in all definitions which have a likeness to property in this respect, that they too are converted with that which is defined.

The five predicables also are so necessary to divisions that without a knowledge of them division is made by chance rather than by reason. This assertion must be tested in connection with the several divisions. There are three kinds of essential division, namely, division of genus, of whole, and of word; again, three kinds of accidental division, namely, when the accident is divided into subjects, or the subjects into accidents, or the accident into accidents. The division of genus is sometimes made into species, and sometimes into differences asserted for species. Wherefore genus as well as species and difference is needed for that division; and the same three contribute to the distinction of the division of whole and of word, which might be confused with the divisions of genus, if the nature of the genus were not first known, as e.g. that the entire genus is predicated univocally of each species, whereas the whole is not predicated singly of the parts composing it, and the word which has multiplex applications is not adapted to its divisions univocally. The predicables are therefore also extremely useful for the division of equivocal words for the following reason, that they were useful for definitions, for from definitions it is known what is equivocal or what is not. For the accidental division likewise, the knowledge of accident, by which such division is constituted, is necessary, and the other predicables too are valuable for making the distinction of that division, otherwise we should divide genus into species or difference, as we divide accident into subjects.

The knowledge of the five predicables, as we have stated above, is obviously valuable too for discovering argumentations or for confirming them once they have been discovered. For we find arguments and we confirm them, when they have been found, according to the nature of genus and of species or the others. Boethius moreover in this place calls them the five seats of syllogisms, 10 against which statement it might be said that we do not accept places [tapoi] in the perfect combination of syllogisms. But certainly that special word is used loosely instead of the genus, that is, speaking of syllogism instead of argumentation, otherwise Boethius would lessen the utility if he directed this knowledge only to syllogisms and not generally to all argumentations, which are similarly called demonstrations by Porphyry. Moreover, in a certain sense it is possible to assign places in the perfect combination of syllogisms, not that they belong to syllogisms per se, but because they too can be adduced as evidence of syllogisms in that they afford confirmation of enthymemes which are deduced from syllogisms. Now, however, that these things have been stated concerning utility, let us return to the literal interpretation.

From the more lofty questions. He states further how lie will preserve the introductory manner, namely, by abstaining from difficult questions and from questions involved in obscurity and by treating in an ordinary way the more simple ones. Nor is it without meaning that he says in an ordinary way: for a thing may be easy in itself and still not be treated lucidly.

At present concerning general” He states definitely what those more lofty questions are,
not resolve them. And the cause is stated for both actions, namely, that he should pass over inquiring into them and nevertheless should make mention of them. For he does not treat of them for this reason, because the uncultivated reader is not able to inquire into them or perceive them. But on the other hand he mentions them lest he make the reader negligent. For if he had ignored them entirely, the reader, thinking there was absolutely nothing more to be inquired concerning them would disdain altogether the inquiry into them. There are then three questions, as Boethius says, 13 secret and very useful and tried by not a few philosophers, but solved by few. The first is as follows, namely, whether genera and species subsist or are placed in the naked understandings alone, etc., as if he were to say: whether they have true being or whether they consist in opinion alone. The second is; if they are conceded to be truly, whether they are corporeal essences or incorporeal, and the third is whether they are separated from sensibles or are placed in them. For the species of incorporeal beings are two, 14 in that some incorporeal beings, such as God and the soul, can subsist in their incorporeality apart from sensibles, and others are in nowise able to be beyond the sensible objects in which they are, as line cannot be found except in a body. These questions, however, he passes over in this fashion, saying: At present I shall refuse to say concerning genera and species this, whether they subsist, etc., or whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, or whether, when they are said to be incorporeal, they should be separated from sensibles, etc., and in accord with them. This last can be taken in different ways. For it can be taken this way, as if to say: I will refuse to make the three assertions stated above concerning them and certain other statements in accord with these, that is, these three questions. In the same way, other questions which are difficult can be brought up concerning them, such as, the question of the common cause of the imposition of universal nouns, namely, what is that cause in virtue of which different things agree, or again the question of the understanding of universal nouns, in which no particular thing seems to be conceived, nor does the universal word seem to deal with any such particular thing, and many other difficult questions. We are able so to expound the words, and in accord with them that we may add a fourth question, namely, whether genera and species, so long as they are genera and species, must have something subject to them by nomination, or whether, if the things named were destroyed, the universal could still consist of the meaning only of the conception, as this noun rose when there is not a single rose to which it is common. But we shall investigate these questions more carefully later.

Now, however, let us follow the introduction literallry. Note that when Prophry says: at present, that is, in the present treatise, he intimates in a way that the reader may expect these questions to be solved elsewhere. Most exalted business. He states the reason for which he abstains here from these questions, namely, because to treat them is very exalted with respect to the reader who may not be able to attain to them in order to determine this business now. And requiring greater diligence of inquiry, for although the author is able to solve it, the reader is not able to inquire into it. Greater diligence of inquiry, I say, than yours. This, however. Having stated these things concerning which he is silent, he states those which he does treat of, namely, that which the ancients, not in age but in comprehension, concluded probably, that is, with verisimilitude, that is in which all have agreed and there was no dissension, concerning these things, to wit, genus and species and of the other three things mentioned. For in resolving the aforesaid questions some are of one opinion and others of another. Wherefore Boethius 16 records that Aristotle held that genera and species subsist only in sensibles but are understood outside them, whereas Plato held not only that they were understood without sensibles but that they actually were separate. And of these the ancients, I say, and most of all the peripatetics, that is, part of these ancients; he calls dialecticians or a kind of argumentators the peripatetics. Note likewise that the functions which are proper to introductions can be distinguished in this introduction. For Boethius says on the Topics of Cicero: Every introduction which is intended to compose the reader, as is said in the Rhetoric, seises on benevolence or prepares attention or produces docility. For it is proper that any one of the three or several at the same time be present in every introduction; but two are to be noted in this introduction, docility when
he sets forth the material, which is those five predicables, and attention when he commends
the treatise for a fourfold utility in that which the ancients advanced as the doctrine of these,
or when he promises the style of an introduction. But benevolence is not necessary here where
there is no knowledge hateful to one who seeks the treatment of it by Porphyry.

Let us return now, as we promised, to the above stated questions, and inquire carefully into
them, and solve them. And since it is known that genera and species are universals and in them
Porphyry touches on the nature of all universals generally, let us inquire here into the common
nature of universals by studying these two [genus and species], and let us inquire also whether
they apply only to words or to things as well.

In the On Interpretation Aristotle defines the universal as that which is formed naturally apt
to be predicated of many; Porphyry moreover defines the particular, that is, the individual as
that which is predicated of only one. Authority seems to ascribe the universal as much to things
as to words; Aristotle himself ascribes it to things since he asserted immediately before the
definition of universal: However, since of things some are universals, and others are singulars,
I call that universal which is formed to be predicated of many, and that singular which is not,
etc. Likewise Porphyry himself, when he said species are made of genus and difference, located
them in the nature of things. From which it is manifest that things themselves are contained in
the universal noun.

Nouns too are called universals. Wherefore Aristotle says: Genus determines quality with
respect to substance; for it signifies how each thing is. And Boethius in the book on Divisions
says: It is, however, extremely useful to know this, that the genus is in a certain man-
tier the single likeness of many species, and that likeness displays the substantial agreement of them
all. Yet to signify or to display pertains to words; but to be signified applies to things. And again
he says: The designation of a noun is predicated of many nouns, and is in a certain manner a
species containing under itself individuals. However, it is not properly called species since a
noun is not substantial but accidental, but it is decidedly a universal since the definition of the
universal applies to it. Hence it follows that words are universals whose function it is to be
predicates of propositions.

Since it would seem, then, that things as well as words are called universal, it must be
inquired how the universal definition can be applied to things. For it seems that nothing, nor
any collection of things, is predicated of many things taken one by one, which [predication] is
required as the characteristic of the universal. For although this people or this house or Socrates
may be predicated of all their parts at the same time, still no one says that they are universals,
since the predication of them does not apply to each of the several individuals or parts. And one
thing is predicated of many much less properly than a collection of things. Let us hear therefore
how either one thing or a collection of things is called universal, and let us state all the opinions
of all thinkers.

Certain philosophers, indeed, take the universal thing thus: in things different from each
other in form they set up a substance essentially the same; this is the material essence of the
individuals in which it is, and it is one in itself and diverse only through the forms of its inferiors.
If these forms should happen to be taken away, there would be absolutely no difference of
things, which are separated from each other only by a diversity
of forms, since the matter is in essence absolutely the same. For example, in individual men,
different in number, [i.e. in the different individuals of the species man] there is the same
substance of man, which here is made Plato through these accidents, there Socrates through
those. To these doctrines Porphyry seems to assent entirely when he says: By participation
in the species many men are one but in particulars the one and common is many. And again
he says: Individuals are defined as follows, that each one of them consists of properties the
collection of which is not in another. Similarly, too, they place in the several animals different
in species one and essentially the same substance of animal, which they make into diverse
species by taking on diverse differences, as if from this wax I should first make the statue of
a man, then the statue of a cow, by accommodating the diverse forms to the essence which
persists wholly the same. This however is of importance, that the same wax does not constitute
the statues at the same time, as is possible in the case of the universal, namely, that the universal is common, Boethius says, in such a way that the same universal is at the same time entirely in the different things of which it constitutes the substance materially; and although it is universal in itself, the same universal is individual through forms adventing, without which it subsists naturally in itself; and apart from them it in no sense exists actually; for it is universal in nature but individual in actuality, and it is understood incorporeal and not subject to sense in the simplicity of its universality, but the same universal subsists in actuality, corporeal and sensible through accidents: and according to the same authority, Boethius, individuals subsist and universals are understood. This is one of two opinions. Although authorities seem, to agree very much upon it, physics is in every manner opposed to it. For if what is the same essentially, although occupied by diverse forms, exists in individual things, it is necessary that one thing which is affected by certain forms be another thing which is occupied by other forms, so that the animal formed by rationality is the animal formed by irrationality, and so the rational animal is the irrational, and thus contraries would be placed in the same thing at the same time; but they are in no wise contrary when they come together in the same essence, just as whiteness and blackness would not be contrary if they occurred at the same time in this one thing, although the thing itself were white from one source and black from another, just as it is white from one source and hard from another, that is, from whiteness and from hardness. For things that are diverse by contrariness cannot be inherent at the same time in the same thing, like relatives and most others. Wherefore Aristotle in his chapter on Relativity [in the Categories] demonstrates that great and small, which he shows to be present at the same time in the same thing in diverse respects, cannot be contraries because they are present in the same thing at the same time.

But perhaps it will be said according to that opinion that rationality and irrationality are no less contrary because they are found thus in the same thing, namely, in the same genus or in the same species, unless, that is, they be joined in the same individual. That too is shown thus: rationality and irrationality are truly in the same individual because they are in Socrates. But since they are in Socrates at the same time, it is proved that they are in Socrates and in an ass at the same time. But Socrates and the ass are Socrates. And Socrates and the ass are indeed Socrates, because Socrates is Socrates and the ass, since obviously Socrates is Socrates and Socrates and the ass is the ass. That Socrates is the ass is shown as follows according to this opinion: whatsoever is in Socrates other than the forms of Socrates, is that which is in the ass other than the forms of the ass. But whatever is in the ass other than the forms of the ass, is the ass. Whatever is in Socrates other than the forms of Socrates, is the ass. But if this is so, since Socrates is himself that which is other than the forms of Socrates, then Socrates is himself the ass. The truth of what we assumed above, namely, that whatever is in the ass other than the forms of the ass is the ass, we may indicate as follows, for neither are the forms of the ass the ass, since then accidents would be substance, nor are the matter and the forms of the ass taken together the ass, since then it would be necessary to say that body and not body were body.

There are those who, seeking an escape from this position, criticize only the words of the proposition, the rational animal is the irrational animal, but not the opinion, saying that the animal is both, but that that is not shown properly by these words the rational animal is the irrational animal, because clearly although it is one and the same thing, it is called rational for one reason and irrational for another, that is, from opposite forms. But surely, then, there is no opposition in those forms which would adhere absolutely in these things at the same time, nor do critics criticize the following propositions, the rational animal is the mortal animal or the white animal, the walking animal; because the animal is not mortal in that it is rational, nor does it walk in that it is white, but these propositions they hold as entirely true because the same animal has both forms at the same time although under a different aspect. Otherwise they would say that no animal is man since nothing is man in that it is animal.

Furthermore according to the position of the above stated doctrine there are only ten essences of all things, that is, the ten generalissima, because in each one of the categories only one essence is found, and that is diversified only through the forms of subordinated classes, as has
been said, and without them the essence would have no variety. Therefore, just as all substances are the same at bottom, so all qualities are the same, and quantities, etc. through the categories. Since, therefore, Socrates and Plato have in themselves things of each of the categories, and since these things are at bottom the same, all the forms of the one are forms of the other, which are not essentially different in them-selves, just as the substances in which they inhere are not different, so that, for example, the quality of the one is the quality of the other for both are quality. They are therefore no more different because of the nature of qualities than because of the nature of substance, because the Essence of their substance is one as is likewise that of qualities. For the same reason quantity, since it is the same, does not make a difference nor do the other categories. For which reason there can be no difference because of forms, which are not different from each other, exactly as substances are no different from each other.

Moreover, how should we explain the plurality of things under substance if the only diversity were of forms while the subject substance remained at bottom the same? For we do not call Socrates many in number because of the imposition of many forms.

That position cannot stand, moreover, by which it is held that individuals are made up by the accidents of themselves. For if individuals draw their being from accidents, obviously the accidents are prior naturally to the individuals, as differences are prior to the species they draw into being. For as man is made distinct by the formation of difference, so they speak of Socrates from the imposition of accidents. Whence Socrates cannot be without accidents, nor man without differences. Therefore, Socrates is not the basis of accidents as man is not the basis of differences. If, however, accidents are not in individual substances as in subjects, surely they are not in universals. For whatever things are in second substances as in subjects, he shows are likewise universally in first substances as in subjects. Whence, consequently, it is manifest that the opinion in which it is held that absolutely the same essence subsists at the same time in diverse things, lacks reason utterly.

Therefore others are of another opinion concerning universality, and approaching the truth more closely they say that individual things are not only different from each other in forms, but are discrete personally in their essences, nor is that which is in one in any way to be found in another whether it be matter or form; nor even when the forms have been removed can things subsist less discrete in their essences because their personal discreteness (according to which of course this is not that) is not determined by forms but is the diversity itself of essence, just as the forms themselves are diverse one from the other in themselves; otherwise the diversity of forms would proceed in infinitum, so that it would be necessary that still other forms be made the basis of the diversity of any forms Porphyry noted such a difference between the most comprehensive genus arid the ultimate species, saying: Further, species would never become the highest genus and genus would never become the ultimate species, as if he were to say: this is the difference between them, that the essence of the one is not the essence of the other. So too the distinc- tion of categories is not effected through some forms which make it, but through the diversification of their very essence. But since they hold all things are so diverse from each other that none of them participates with another in either the same matter essentially or the same form essentially, and yet, they cling to the universality of things, they reconcile these positions by saying that things which are discrete are one and the same not essentially but indifferently, as they say individual men, who are discrete in themselves, are the same in man, that is, they do not differ in the nature of humanity, and the same things which they call individual according to discreteness, they call universal according to indifference and the agreement of similitude.

But here too there is disagreement. For some hold that the universal thing is only in a collection of many. They in no manner call Socrates and Plato species in themselves, but they say that all men collected together are that species which is man, and all animals taken together that genus which is animal, and thus with the others. Boethius seems to agree with them in this. 18 Species must be considered to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of individuals, and genus from the likeness of species. For since he says
the collected likeness he indicates a collecting of many. Otherwise they would not have in the
universal thing a predication of many things or a content of many things, nor would universals
be fewer
than individuals.

There are others, moreover, who say that the species is not only men brought together, but
also the individuals in that they are men, and when they say that the thing which is Socrates is
predicated of many, it is to be taken figuratively as if they were to say: many are the same as
he, that is, agree with him, or else he agrees with many. According to the number of things they
posit as many species as there are individuals and as many genera, but according to the likeness
of natures they assign a smaller number of universals than individuals. Certainly all men are at
one time many in themselves by personal discreteness and one by the similitude of humanity;
and with respect to discreteness and with respect to likeness the same are judged to be different
from themselves, as Socrates, in that he is a man, is divided from himself in that he is Socrates.
Otherwise the same thing could not be its own genus or species unless it should have some
difference of its own from itself, since things that are relatives must at least in some one respect
be opposed one to the other.

Now, however, let us first invalidate the opinion which was set down above concerning
collection, and let us inquire how the whole collection of men together, which is called one
species, has to be predicated of many that it may be universal, although the whole collection
is not predicated of each. But if it be conceded that the whole is predicated of different things
by parts, in that, namely, its individual parts are accommodated to themselves, that has nothing
to do with the community of the universal, all of which, as Boethius says, must be in each
individual, and it is in this point that the universal is distinguished from the type of community
which is common by its parts, as for example a field of which the different parts belong to
different men. Further, Socrates would in the same way be predicated of many because of his
many different parts, so that he would himself be a universal. Even more, it would be proper that
any group of many men taken together be called universal and the definition of the universal
or even of the species would be adapted to them in the same way, so that the whole collection
of men would then include many species. In the same way we should call any collection of
bodies or spirits one universal substance with the result that, since the whole collection of
substances is one generalissimum, if any one substance be removed and the others remain, we
should have to maintain that there are many generalisima in substances. But perhaps it should
be said that no collection which is included in the generalissimum, is generalissimum. But I
still object that when one substance has been taken from substances, if the residual collection is
not the generalissimum and nevertheless remains universal substance, it is necessary that this
be a species of substance and have a coequal species under the same genus. But what can be
opposite to it, since either the species of substance is contained entirely in it, or else it shares
the same individuals with it, as rational animal, mortal animal? Even more. Every universal
is naturally prior to its own individuals. But a collection of any things is an integral whole to
the individuals of which it is composed and is naturally posterior to the things from which it is
composed. Further. Between the integer and the universal Boethius sets up this difference in
the on Divisions, that the part is not the same as the whole, but the species is always the same
as the genus. But how will the whole collection of men be able to be the multitude of animals?

It remains for us now to attack those who call single individuals, in that they agree with
others, universal, and who grant that the same individuals are predicated of many things, not as
they may be the many essentially, but because the many agree with them. But if it is the same
to be predicated of many as to agree with many, how do we say that an individual is predicated
of only one, since clearly there is nothing which agrees with only one thing? How too is a
difference made between universal and particular by being predicated of many, since in exactly
the same way in which man agrees with many, Socrates too agrees with many? Surely man, in
so far as he is man and Socrates in so far as he is man agree with others. But neither man, in so
far as he is Socrates nor Socrates in so far as he is Socrates agrees with others. Therefore, that
which man has, Socrates has and in the same way.
Further, since the thing is granted to be absolutely the same, namely, the man which is in Socrates and Socrates himself, there is no difference of the one from the other. For nothing is itself different from itself at the same time because it has whatsoever it has in itself and in absolutely the same manner. Whence Socrates, at once white and a grammarian, although he has different things in himself, is not nevertheless by that fact different from himself since he has the same two and in absolutely the same manner. Indeed he is not a grammarian in another manner from himself nor white in another manner, just as white is not other than himself nor grammarian other than himself. Moreover how can this, which they say, be understood, that Socrates agrees with Plato in man, since it is known that all men differ from each other as well in matter as in form? For if Socrates agrees with Plato in the thing which is man, but no other thing is man except Socrates himself or another, it is necessary that he agree with Plato either in himself or in another. But in himself he is rather different from him; with respect to another it is concluded likewise that he is not another. There are, however, those who take agree in man negatively, as if it were said: Socrates does not differ from Plato in man. But this likewise can be said, that he does not differ from him in stone, since neither of them is stone. And so no greater agreement between them is noted in man than in stone, unless perchance some proposition precede it, as if it were stated thus: They are man because they do not differ in man. But this cannot stand either, since it is utterly false that they do not differ in man. For if Socrates does not differ from Plato in the thing which is man, he does not differ from him in himself. For if he differs in himself from Plato, but he is himself the thing which is man, certainly he differs from him also in the thing which is man.

Now, however, that reasons have been given why things cannot be called universals, taken either singly or collectively, because they are not predicated of many, it remains to ascribe universality of this sort to words alone. Just as, therefore, certain nouns are called appellative by grammarians and certain nouns proper, so certain simple words are called by dialecticians universals, certain words particulars, that is, individuals. A universal word, however, is one which is apt by its invention to be predicated singly of many, as this noun man which is conjoinable with the particular names of men according to the nature of the subject things on which it is imposed. A particular word is one which is predicable of only one, as Socrates when it is taken as the name of only one. For if you take it equivocally, you make it not a word, but many words in signification, because according to Priscian many nouns obviously may coincide in a single word. When, therefore the universal is described to be that which is predicated of many, the that which, which is used, indicates not only the simplicity of the word as regards discreteness of expression but also the unity of meaning as regards discreteness of equivocals.

Having shown, however, what is accomplished by the phrase that which above in the definition of the universal, we should consider carefully two more phrases which follow, namely, to be predicated and of many.

To be predicated is to be conjoinable to something truly by the declarative function of a substantive verb in the present [tense], as man can be joined truly to different things by a substantive verb. Verbs such as he runs and he walks likewise when predicated of many have the power of substantive verbs to join as a copula joins. Whence Aristotle says in the second section of the on Interpretation: These verbs in which ‘is’ does not occur, as to run or to walk do the same when so affirmed as if ‘is’ were added. And again he says: There is no difference in the expressions man walks and man is walking.

That he says, of many, however, brings together names according to the diversity of things named. Otherwise Socrates would be predicated of many when it is said: this man is Socrates, this animal is, this white, this musician. These names although they are different in the understanding nevertheless have precisely the same subject thing.

Note, moreover, that the conjoining involved in construction to which grammarians direct their attention is one thing, the conjoining of predication which dialecticians consider another: for as far as the power of construction is concerned, man and stone are properly conjoinable by is, and any nominative cases, as animal and man, in respect to making manifest a meaning.
but not in respect to showing the status of a thing. The conjoining involved in construction consequently is good whenever it reveals a perfect sentence, whether it be so or not. But the conjoining involved in predication, which we take up here, pertains to the nature of things and to demonstrating the truth of their status. If anyone should say man is a stone, he has not made a proper construction of man and stone in respect to the meaning he wished to demonstrate, but there has been no fault of grammar; and although so far as the meaning of the proposition is concerned, this stone is predicated of man, to whom clearly it is construed as predicated (as false categories too have their predicated term), still in the nature of things stone is not predicable of man. We merely note here the great force of this predication while defining the universal.

It seems, then, that the universal is never quite the appellative noun, nor the particular the proper noun, but they are related to each other as that which exceeds and that which is exceeded. For the appellative and proper contain not only the nominative cases but also the oblique cases, which do not have to be predicated, and therefore they are excluded in the definition of the universal by to be predicated; these oblique cases, moreover, because they are less necessary to the proposition (which alone, according to Aristotle, is the subject of the present speculation, that is, of dialectic consideration, and assuredly the proposition alone compounds argumentations), are not taken by Aristotle himself in any sense into the nouns, and he himself does not call them nouns but the cases of nouns. But just as it is not necessary that all appellative and proper nouns be called universals or particulars, so also conversely. For the universal includes not only nouns but also verbs and infinite nouns, to which, that is, to infinite nouns, the definition of the appellative which Priscian gives does not seem to apply.

However, now that a definition of universal and of particular has been assigned to words, let us inquire carefully into the property of universal words especially. Questions have been raised concerning these universals, for there are very grave doubts concerning their meaning, since they seem neither to have any subject thing nor to constitute a clear meaning of anything. Universal nouns seemed to be imposed on no things whatsoever, since obviously all things subsisted in themselves discretely and, as has been shown did not agree in anything, according to the agreement of which thing the universal nouns could be imposed. Consequently, since it is certain that universals are not imposed on things according to the difference of discreteness of things, for they would then be not common, but particular; and again since universals could not name things as they agree in something, for there is nothing in which they agree, universals seem to derive no meaning from things, particularly since they constitute no understanding of anything. Wherefore in the on Divisions Boethius says that the word man gives rise to doubt of its meaning because when it has been heard, the understanding of the person hearing is carried off by many changing things and is betrayed into errors. For unless someone define the word, saying: ‘all men walk’ or at least ‘certain men’ and should characterize this man if he happens to walk, the understanding of the person hearing does not agree in anything, according to the agreement of which thing the universal nouns could be imposed. Consequently, since it is certain that universals are not imposed on things according to the difference of discreteness of things, for they would then be not common, but particular; and again since universals could not name things as they agree in something, for there is nothing in which they agree, universals seem to derive no meaning from things, particularly since they constitute no understanding of anything.
nothing. But it seems that there cannot be a meaning which does not have a subject thing which it conceives. Whence Boethius says in the Commentary: Every idea is made either from the subject thing, as the thing is constituted or as it is not constituted. For an idea cannot be made from no subject. Wherefore universals seem wholly unrelated to signification.

But this is not so. For they signify in a manner different things by nomination, not however by forming a conception arising from different things but only pertaining to each of them. Just as this word man names individual things for a common reason, namely that they are men, because of which it is called universal, and also forms a certain conception which is common, not proper, that is, pertaining to the individuals of which it conceives the common likeness.

But now let us inquire carefully into these things which we have touched upon briefly, namely, what that common cause by which the universal word is imposed is 9 and what the conception of the understanding of the common likeness of things is, and whether the word is called common because of a common cause in which the things agree or because of a common conception or because of both at once.

And first we should consider the common cause, Individual men, discrete from each other in that they differ in respect to properties no less in essences than in forms (as we noted above when we were inquiring into the physics of a thing) are united nevertheless in that they are men. I do not say that they are united in man, since no thing is man except a discrete thing, but in being man. But to be man is not the same as man nor any thing, if we should consider it very carefully, as not to be m the subject is not anything, nor is it anything not to undergo contrariety or not to undergo more and less; in these nevertheless Aristotle says all substances agree. For since, as we have demonstrated above, there can be no agreement in fact, if that by which there is an agreement between any things, be taken in this way, that it is not anything, so Socrates and Plato are alike in being man as horse and ass are alike in not being man, in which way both horse and ass are called non-man. Consequently for different things to agree is for the individuals to be the same or not to be the same, as to be man or white or not to be man and not to be white. It seems, however, that we must avoid considering the agreement of things according to that which is not anything (as if we were to unite in nothing things which are) since we say, in fact, that this and that agree in the status of man, that is, in that they are men. But we understand nothing other than that they are men, and in this they do not differ in the least, in this, I say, that they are men, although we appeal to no essence. We call it the status itself of man to be man, which is not a thing and which we also called the common likeness of which he who imposed the word conceived.

Having shown the signification of universals, namely, relative to things by nomination, and having set forth the cause of their common imposition, let us now show what are the understandings of universals which they constitute.

And let us first distinguish generally the nature of all understandings.

Although, then, the senses as well as the understandings are of the soul, this is the difference between them, that the senses are exercised only through corporeal instruments and perceive only bodies or what are in bodies, as sight perceives the tower and its visible qualities. The understanding, however, as it does not need a corporeal instrument, so it is not necessary that it have a subject body to which it may be referred, but it is satisfied with the likeness of things which the mind constructs for itself, into which it directs the action of its intelligence. Wherefore if the tower should be destroyed and removed, the sense which acted on it perishes, but the understanding remains in the likeness of the thing preserved in the mind. However, just as the sense is not the thing perceived to which it is directed, so neither is the understanding
the form of the thing which it conceives, but the understanding is a certain action of the soul by which it is called intelligent or understanding, but the form to which it is directed is a certain imaginary and fictive tiling, which the mind constructs for itself when it wishes and as it wishes, like those imaginary cities which are seen in dreams, or that form of the projected building which the artist conceives as the figure and exemplar of the thing to be formed, which we can call neither substance nor accident.

Nevertheless, there are those who call that form the same as the understanding, as they call the building of the tower, which I conceive while the tower is not there and which I contemplate, lofty and square in the spacious plain, the same as the understanding of the tower. Aristotle seems to agree with them, when he calls, in the on Interpretation, those passions of the soul which they call the understandings, the likenesses of things.

We, on the other hand, call the image the likeness of the thing. But there is nothing to prevent the understanding also being called in a sense a likeness, because obviously it conceives that which is properly called the likeness of the thing. But we have said, and well, that it is different from the image. For I ask whether that squareness and the loftiness is the true form of the understanding which is formed to the likeness of the quantity and the composition of the tower. But surely true squareness and true loftiness are present only in bodies, and neither an understanding nor any true essence can be formed from a fictive quality. It remains, therefore, that just as the quality is fictive, a fictive substance is subject to it. Perhaps, moreover, the image in a mirror too, which seems to be the subject of sight, can be said truly to be nothing, since obviously the quality of a contrary color appears often in the white surface of the mirror.

The following question, however, can be raised, when the soul perceives and understands the same thing at the same time, as when it discerns a stone, whether then the understanding too deals with the image of the stone or whether the understanding and the sense at the same time have to do with the stone itself. But it seems more reasonable that the understanding has no need of the image when there is present to it the truth of the substance. If, moreover, any one should say where there is sense there is no understanding, we should not concede that. For it often happens that the mind perceives one thing and understands another, as is apparent to those who study well, who, while they look at the things present to the open eyes, nevertheless think of other things concerning which they write.

Now that the nature of understandings has been examined generally, let us distinguish between the understandings of universals and particulars. These are separated in that that which is of the universal noun, conceives a common and confused image of many things, whereas that which the particular word generates, holds to the proper and as it were the particular form of one thing, that is, restricts itself to only one person. Whence when I hear man a certain figure arises in my mind which is so related to individual men that it is common to all and proper to none. When, however, I hear Socrates a certain form arises in my mind, which the likeness of a certain person. Whence by this word Socrates, which generates in the mind the proper form of one person, a certain thing is specified and determined, but by man, the understanding of which rests in the common form of all men, that very community leads to confusion, lest we should not understand any one in particular. Wherefore man is rightly said to signify neither Socrates nor any other man, since none is specified by the meaning of the word, although nevertheless it names particulars. Socrates, on the other hand, must not only name a certain particular, but also determine the subject thing.

But the question is raised, then, since we said above that according to Boethius every idea has a subject thing, how this applies to the ideas of universals. But it must be noted surely that Boethius introduces this statement in the sophistical argument by which he shows that the idea of universals is vain. Whence there is nothing to prevent that the statement is not proved in truth; whence avoiding falsity he shows the reasons of other writers. We can, moreover, refer to, as the thing subject to the understanding, either the true substance of the thing, as when it is at one with the sense, or else the conceived form of anything whatsoever, that is, when the thing is absent, whether that form be common as we have said or proper; common, I say, with respect to the likeness of many which it retains although it is still considered in itself as one thing. For
thus, to show the nature of all lions, one picture can be made representing what is proper to no one of them, and on the other hand another can be made suitable to distinguish any one of them, which would bring out certain individual characteristics, as if it were painted limping or mutilated or wounded by the spear of Hercules. Just as, therefore, one figure of things is painted common another particular, so too, are they conceived one common, another proper.

However, with respect to that form to which the understanding is directed, it is a matter of doubt, not unintelligently, whether the word too signifies the form. This seems to be firmly established by authority as well as by reason. For Priscian in the first book of Constructions, after he had stated first the common imposition of universals on individuals, seemed to have a certain other meaning of universals, namely, a meaning of common form, saying: with respect to the general and special forms of things, those which are constituted in the divine mind intelligibly before they were produced in bodies, are suited to demonstrate the genera or species of the nature of things. For the question in this place is of God, as of an artist about to compose something, who preconceives in his mind the exemplary form of the thing to be composed; he works to the likeness of this form which is said to go into the body when the true thing is composed in its likeness. This common conception, however, is well ascribed to God, but not to man, because those general works or special states of nature are proper to God, not to the artist; as man, soul, or stone are proper to God, but house or sword to man. Whence the latter, house or sword, are not works of nature, as are the former, nor are words of them of substance, but of accident, and therefore they are neither genera nor are they species. Therefore, conceptions of this sort by abstraction are ascribed well to the divine mind but not to the human mind, because men who learn things only through the senses, scarcely ever or never ascend to simple understanding of this sort, and the exterior sensuality of accidents prevents them from conceiving the natures of things purely. God, however, to whom all things which he created are known through themselves and who knows them before they are, distinguishes the individual states among them, and sense is no impediment to him who alone has only true understanding. Whence it happens that men have, in those things which have not been touched by the sense, opinion rather than understanding as we learn from experience itself. For, when we have thought of some city which we have not seen we discover when we have come to it that we had thought it to be otherwise than it is.

So likewise I think we have opinion of the intrinsic forms which do not come to the senses, such as rationality and mortality, paternity, sitting. Any names of any existent things, on the other hand, generate, so far as is in them, understanding rather than opinion, because their inventor intended that they be imposed according to some natures or properties of things, although even he was not able to think out thoroughly the nature or the property of the thing. Priscian, however, calls these common conceptions general or special, because general or special nouns describe them in one way or another to us. He says that the universals themselves are as proper nouns to these conceptions, which, although they are of confused meaning with respect to the essences named, direct the mind of the auditor to that common conception immediately, just as proper nouns direct the attention to the one thing which they signify. Porphyry, too, when he says that some ideas are constituted from matter and form, and some to the likeness of matter and form, seems to have understood this conception, since he says to the likeness of matter and form, of which more will be said in its proper place. Boethius likewise, when he says that the collected from the likeness of many things is genus or species, seems to have understood the same common conception. Some insist that Plato was of this opinion too, namely that he called those common ideas which he places in nous, genera or species. In this perhaps Boethius records that he dissented from Aristotle when he says 23 that Plato wanted genera and species and the others not only to be understood universals, but also to be and to subsist without bodies, as if to say that he understood as universals those common conceptions which he set up separated from bodies in nous, not perhaps taking the universal as the common predication, as Aristotle does, but rather as the common likeness of many things. For that latter conception seems in no wise to be predicated of many as a noun is which is adapted singly to many.

That he says Plato thinks universals subsist without sensibles, can be resolved in another
manner so that there is no disagreement in the opinions of the philosophers. For what Aristotle says to the effect that universals always subsist in sensibles, he said only in regard to actuality, because obviously the nature which is animal which is designated by the universal name and which according to this is called universal by a certain transference, is never found in actuality except in a sensible thing, but Plato thinks that it so subsists in itself naturally that it would retain its being when not subjected to sense, and according to this the natural being is called by the universal name. That, consequently, which Aristotle denies with respect to actuality, Plato, the investigator of physics, assigns to natural aptitude, and thus there is no disagreement between them.

Moreover, now that authorities have been advanced who seem to build up by universal words common concepts which are to be called forms, reason too seems to assent. For what else is it to conceive forms by nouns than to signify by nouns? But certainly since we make forms diverse from understandings, there arises now besides thing and understanding a third thing which is the signification of nouns. Although authority does not hold this, it is nevertheless not contrary to reason.

Let us, then, set forth what we promised above to define, namely, whether the community of universal words is considered to be because of a common cause of imposition or because of a common conception or because of both. There is nothing to prevent that it be because of both, but the common cause which is taken in accordance with the nature of things seems to have greater force.

Likewise we must define that which we noted above, namely, that the conceptions of universals are formed by abstraction, and we must indicate how we may speak of them alone, naked and pure but not empty.

And first concerning abstraction. In relation to abstraction it must be known that matter and form always subsist mixed together, but the reason of the mind has this power, that it may now consider matter by itself; it may now turn its attention to form alone; it may now conceive both intermingled. The two first processes, of course, are by abstraction; they abstract something from things conjoined that they may consider its very nature. But the third process is by conjunction. For example, the substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and invested in infinite forms; when I turn my attention to this in the material essence of the substance, after having circumscribed all forms, I have a concept by the process of abstraction. Again, when I consider only corporeity in it, which I join to substance, that concept likewise (although it is by conjunction with respect to the first, which considered only the nature of substance) is formed also by abstraction with respect to other forms than corporeity, none of which I consider, such as animation, sensuality, rationality, whiteness.

Conceptions of this sort through abstraction seemed perhaps false and vain for this reason, that they perceive the thing otherwise than it subsists. For since they are concerned with matter by itself or form separately, and since none the less neither of these subsists separately, they seem obviously to conceive the thing otherwise than it is, and therefore to be empty. But this is not so. For if one understands otherwise than the thing is constituted, in such manner that one considers it manifestly in such a nature and property as it does not have, certainly that understanding is empty. But that is not what is done in abstraction. For, when I consider this man only in the nature of substance or of body, and not also of animal or of man or of grammarian, obviously I understand nothing except what is in that nature, but I do not consider all that it has. And when I say that I consider only this one among the qualities the nature has, the only refers to the attention alone, not to the mode of subsisting, otherwise the understanding would be empty. For the thing does not have only it, but it is considered only as having it. And still in a certain sense it is said to be understood otherwise than it is, not in another state than it is, as has been said above, but otherwise, in that the mode of understanding is other than the mode of subsisting. For this thing is understood separately from the other, not separated from it, although it does not, notwithstanding, exist separately; and matter is perceived purely and form simply, although the one is not purely and the other is not simply, so that manifestly that purity or simplicity is reduced to the understanding and not to the subsistence of the thing, so
that they are of course modes of understanding and not of subsisting. The senses, moreover, often operate in different ways with composite things, so that if a statue is half of gold and half of silver, I can discern separately the gold and the silver which are joined together, that is, examining now the gold, now the silver by itself, looking separately upon things which are conjoined, but not looking upon them as separated, in that they are not separated. So too the understanding considers separately by abstraction, but does not consider as separated, otherwise it would be empty.

Nevertheless, perhaps such a conception too could be good which considers things which are conjoined, as in one manner separated and in another manner conjoined, and conversely. For the conjunction of things as well as the division can be taken in two ways. For we say that certain things are conjoined to each other by some likeness, as these two men in that they are men or grammarians, and that certain things are conjoined by a kind of apposition and aggregation, as form and matter or wine and water. The conception in question conceives things which are so joined to each other as divided in one manner, in another conjoined. Whence Boethius ascribes the following power to the mind, that it can by its reason both compound that which was disjoined and resolve that which is composite, departing nevertheless in neither from the nature of the thing, but only perceiving that which is in the nature of the thing. Otherwise it would not be reason, but opinion, that is, if the understanding should deviate from the state of the thing.

But the following question arises concerning the providence of the artist, whether it is empty when he holds in mind the form of a work still future, seeing that the thing is not yet constituted so. But if we grant that, we are forced to say that likewise the providence of God is empty, which he had before the creation of his work. But if one says this with respect to the effect, namely, that what he foresees would not eventuate actually as he foresees, then it is false that the providence was empty. If on the other hand one says that it was empty for this reason, that it did not yet agree with the future state of the thing, we are disinclined to the evil words but we do not object to the opinion. For it is true that the future state of the world was not yet materially, when he disposed it intelligibly as future still. Nevertheless, we are not accustomed to call empty the thought or the providence of anything except that which lacks effect, nor do we say that we think in vain except those thoughts which we will not accomplish actually. Consequently, modifying the words we should say that the providence is not empty which does not think in vain, but conceives things which are not yet materially as if they subsisted, which is natural to all providences. Obviously thought concerning future things is called providence; thought concerning past things memory; concerning present things understanding proper. If, however, any one says that he is deceived who thinks of providing for the future state as for the one now existing, he is rather himself deceived in thinking that such an one must be said to be deceived. For, to be sure, he who foresees for the future is not deceived, unless he should think it is already as he foresees. Nor, in fact, does the conception of a non-existent tiling lead to deception, but rather the faith added to it. For even though I think of a rational crow, if I do not believe it, I am not deceived. So too the provident person is not deceived, in that he does consider that that which he thinks as existing does not now exist thus, but as he thinks of it now he sets it as present in the future. Surely every conception of the mind is as of the present. So if I should consider Socrates in that he was a boy or in that he will be an old man, I join boyhood or old age to him, as it were in the present, because I consider him at present in a past or future property. Nevertheless, no one says that this memory is empty because what it conceives as present it considers in the past. But there will be a fuller investigation of this in relation to the on Interpretation.

In the case of God it is decided even more rationally that his substance, which alone is immutable and simple, is varied by no conceptions of things or any other forms. For although the custom of human speech presumes to speak of the creator as of creatures, since of course it calls him either provident or intelligent, still nothing in him should be understood or can be diverse from him, that is, neither his understanding nor any other form. And consequently any question
concerning the understanding with respect to God is superfluous. And to speak the truth more expressly, it is nothing other for him to foresee the future than for him, who is true reason in himself, not to be in darkness concerning the future.

Now, however, that many things have been shown concerning the nature of abstraction, let us return to the conception of universals which must always be formed by abstraction. For when I hear man or whiteness or white I do not recall from the meaning of the noun all the natures or properties which are in the subject things, but from man I have only the conception although confused, not discrete, of animal and rational mortal but not of the later accidents as well. For the conceptions of individuals, too, are formed by abstraction, when namely, it is said: this substance, this body, this animal, this man, this whiteness, this white. For by this man I consider only the nature of man but related to a certain subject, whereas by man I consider that same nature simply in itself not related to anyone. Wherefore the understanding of universal s is rightly spoken of as alone and naked and pure, that is, alone from the senses, because it does not perceive the thing as sensual, and naked in regard to the abstraction of all and of any forms, and pure with respect to discreteness because nothing whether it be matter or form, is designated in it; in this latter respect we called a conception of this sort confused above.

Consequently, having examined these things, let us proceed to the resolution of the questions concerning genera and species proposed by Porphyry, which we can do easily now that the nature of all universals has been shown.

The first question, then, was to this effect, whether genera and species subsist, that is, signify something truly existent, or are placed in the understanding alone etc., that is, are located in empty opinion without the thing, like the following words, chimera and goat-stag which do not give rise to a rational understanding.

To this it must be replied that in truth they signify by nomination things truly existent, to wit, the same things as singular nouns, and in no wise are they located in empty opinion; nevertheless, they consist in a certain sense in the understanding alone and naked and pure, as has been determined. There is nothing, however, to prevent one who states the question from taking some words in one way in inquiry and one who solves it from taking them in another way in solution, as if he who solves the question were to say: you ask whether they are placed in the understanding alone, etc. This you can take in the manner (which is the true one) which we discussed above. And the words can be taken in absolutely the same sense on both sides, by the resolver and by the inquirer, and then it is made a single question not by opposition of the prior members of two dialectical questions, to wit, these: whether they are or are not, and again whether they are placed in the sole and naked and pure understanding or not. The same can be said in the second question which is as follows: whether subsisting they are corporeal or incorporeal, that is, when they are conceded to signify subsistences whether they signify subsistences which are corporeal or subsistences which are incorporeal. Certainly everything that is, as Boethius says, is either corporeal, or incorporeal, that is, we take these words corporeal and incorporeal for substantial body and non-body, or for that which can be perceived by the corporeal sense, such as man, wood, whiteness, or that which cannot, such as soul, justice. Corporeal likewise can be taken for discrete, as if the following were inquired: since universals signify subsistences, whether they signify them discrete or not discrete. For he who investigates the truth of the thing well, considers not only what can be said truly, but everything that can be stated in opinion. Whence even though it be certain to some that nothing subsists except the discrete, nevertheless because there can be the opinion that there might be other subsistences, it is inquired not without reason concerning them too. And this last meaning of corporeal seems to fall in better with the question; namely, that the question be raised concerning discrete and non-discrete. But perhaps when Boethius says that everything that is either corporeal or incorporeal, the incorporeal seems superfluous since no existing thing is incorporeal, that is, non-discrete. Nor does that which comes to mind in relation to the order of the questions seem to afford any help, unless perhaps in this respect, that as corporeal and incorporeal divide subsistences in another sense, so too it seems they divide them in this sense, as if the inquirer were to say: I see that of existing things some are called corporeal and others incorporeal, which of these
shall we say are the things signified by universals? To which the reply is made: in a certain
sense corporeal things, that is, things discrete in their essence and incorporeal with respect to
the designation of the universal noun because obviously universals do not name discretely and
determinately, but confusedly, as we have set forth sufficiently above. Whence the universal
names themselves are called both corporeal with respect to the nature of things and incorporeal
with respect to the manner of signification, because although they name things which are
discrete, nevertheless they do not name them discretely and determinately.

The third question, of course, whether they are placed in sensibles, etc., follows from granting
that they are incorporeal, because obviously the incorporeal taken in a certain manner is divided
by being and by not being in the sensible, as we have also noted above. And universals are
said to subsist in sensibles that is to signify an intrinsic substance existing in a thing which is
sensible by its exterior forms, and although they signify this substance which subsists actually
in the sensible thing, yet they demonstrate the same substance naturally separated from the
sensible thing, as we determined above in relation to Plato. 30 Wherefore Boethius says that
genera and species are understood, but are not, outside sensible things, in that obviously the
things of genera and species are considered with respect to their nature rationally in themselves
beyond all sensuality, because they can truly subsist in themselves even when the exterior
forms by which they come to the senses have been removed. For we grant that all genera or
species are in sensual things. But because the understanding of them was said to be always
apart from sense, they seemed in no wise to be in sensible things. Wherefore it was inquired
rightly whether they could ever be in sensibles, and it is replied with respect to some of them
that they are, but in such fashion that, as has been said, they continue to be naturally beyond
sensuality.

We can however take corporeal and incorporeal in the second question as sensible and
insensible, in order that the order of questions may be more appropriate; and since the
understanding of universals was said to be only from sense, as has been said, it was asked
properly, whether universals were sensible or insensible; and since it is answered that some
of them are sensible with respect to the nature of things, and that the same are insensible with
respect to the mode of signifying, because obviously they do not designate the sensible things
which they name in the same manner as they are perceived, that is as discrete, and sense does
not discover them by demonstration of them, it remained a question whether universals named
sensible things only or whether they also signified something else; to which it is replied that
they signify both sensible things and at the same time that common conception which Priscian
ascribes particularly to the divine mind.

And in accord with them. With respect to that which we understand here as the fourth
question, as we noted above the following is the solution, that we in no wise hold that universal
nouns are, when, their things having been destroyed, they are not predicable of many things
inasmuch as they are not common to any things, as for example the name of the rose when there
are no

longer roses, but it would still, nevertheless, be significative by the understanding, although it
would lack nomination; otherwise there would not be the proposition: there is no rose.

Questions, moreover, were raised properly concerning universal words, but none concerning
singular words, because there was no such doubt concerning the meaning of singular words.
For their mode of signifying accorded well with the status of things. As things are discrete in
themselves, so they are signified by words discretely, and the understanding of them refers to
a definite thing, which reference universals do not have. Besides although universals did not
signify things as discrete, they did not seem on the other hand to signify things as agreeing,
since, as we have also shown above there is nothing in which they agree. Consequently, since
there was so much doubt concerning universals, Porphyry chose to treat of universals alone,
excluding singulars from his intention as clear enough in themselves, although for all that, he
sometimes treats of them in passing because of other things.

It must be noted, however, that although the definition of the universal or of the genus or
the species includes only words, nevertheless these nouns are often transferred to their things,
as when it is said that species is made up of genus and difference, that is, the thing of the species from the thing of the genus. For when the nature of words is examined with respect to signification, it is question sometimes of words and sometimes of things, and frequently the names of the latter and the former are transferred reciprocally. For this reason most of all, the ambiguous treatment of logic as well as grammar leads many, who do not distinguish clearly the property of the imposition of nouns or the abuse of transference, into error by the transference of nouns.

Boethius, moreover, makes this confusion by transferences in the Commentaries most of all and particularly in connection with the inquiry into these questions, so that it may even seem right to pass by the inquiry into what it is that he calls genera and species. Let us run over his questions briefly and let us apply ourselves, as is necessary, to the aforesaid opinion. In the investigation of the questions here that he may resolve the problem better, he first throws it into confusion by some sophistical questions and reasons, that he may teach us later to free ourselves from them. And he sets forth such difficulty that all concern with and investigation of genera and species must be put off, 33 as if to say, that clearly the words genera and species cannot be said to be that which they seem, either with respect to the signification of things or with respect to the understanding. He shows this with respect to the signification of things in that no universal thing, whether single or multiplex, is ever found, that is, no thing predicable of many, as he himself shows carefully and as we have proved above. Moreover, he first establishes that there is no one universal thing and therefore no genus nor species, saying: every thing that is one is one in number that is, discrete in its own essence; but genera and species which must be common to many things cannot be one in number and therefore cannot be one. But since someone may say against this assumption that genera and species are one in number in the sense of one that is common,, he offers such an one the following refutation,, saying: 30 each thing one in number in the sense that it is common either is common through its parts or whole through the succession of times or whole in the same time,, but in such wise that it does not constitute the substances of those things to which it is common. He removes at once all such modes of community from genus as well as from species, saying that they on the other hand are common in such a way that they are in the same time whole in each and constitute the substance of each of their particulars. For universal names are not participated in by the different things which they name, by parts, but they are the names, whole and entire, of singulars at the same time. They can likewise be said to constitute the substances of the things to which they are common either in that they signify by transference things which constitute other things, as for example animal names something in horse or in man which is the matter of them or even of men subordinated to it, or else in that they are said to make up the substance, because they come in a certain manner into the knowledge of the things because of which they are said to be substantial to them, seeing that man denotes all that which is animal and rational and mortal.

Moreover, after Boethius shows with respect to a simple thing that it is not universal, he proves the same with respect to a multiple thing showing that clearly the species or genus is not a multitude of discrete things, and he destroys the opinion by which someone may say that all substances collected together are the genus substance and all men the species which is man, as if the following were stated: If we assert that each genus is a multitude of things agreeing substantially, still every such multitude will have naturally another above it, and that again will have another and so ad infinitum, which is inconsistent. Consequently, it has been shown that universal names do not seem to be universal with respect to the signification of things, whether of a simple or of a multiple thing, since obviously they signify no universal thing, that is, no thing predicatable of many.

Therefore he argued also that they should not be said to be universals with respect to the signification of understanding, because he shows sophistically that it is a vain understanding, because clearly since it is by abstraction, it is constituted otherwise than the thing subsists. He resolves sufficiently and we have resolved carefully above the knot of this sophism. He did not think the other part of the argumentation, by which he shows that nothing is universal, needed limitation, since it was not sophistical. For he takes a thing as thing, not as word, because
clearly the common word, since it is in itself as it were a single thing in essence, is common by 
nomination in the appellation of many; according to this appellation clearly and not according 
to its essence it is predicable of many. Nevertheless, the multitude of things themselves is the 
cause of the universality of the noun, because as we have stated above only that which contains 
many is universal; yet the universality which the thing confers upon the word, the thing does not 
have in itself inasmuch as the word does not have meaning because of the thing and inasmuch 
as a noun is called appellative with respect to the multitude of things, even though we do not 
say that things signify or that they are appellative.